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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis uses a detailed study of industrial economic controls to examine the 
broader relationship between popular politics and economic policy in Britain 
between 1945 and 1955. Combining the personal insights of administrators with a 
high level intellectual history, it begins by analysing the relationship between 
controls and attempts to manage the economy during and after the Second World 
War. After tracing these developments in administration and usage, it will 
demonstrate that the ambiguous nature of individual controls allowed for the system 
as a whole to be used as a symbolic device within an intensely political debate. 
Indeed, far from raising entirely technical questions, it will show that controls were 
able to reduce complex economics into a simple form and provide a tangible link 
between everyday economics and potent philosophical critiques. They were, in this 
sense, able to symbolise both administrative inefficiencies and a rhetorical ‘choice 
between two ways of life’. Nevertheless, acknowledging the inherent artificiality of a 
debate that had imbued individual controls with an undue sense of significance, it 
will be argued that this discussion testified to certain shared ‘high level’ assumptions 
and did little to clarify confusions within the system. Thus, although the debates 
could be politically advantageous in the short term, it will be shown that they made 
little difference to the actual mechanisms of control and served to entrench barriers 
between the public and policy formers to which all were ostensibly dedicated to 
overcome. 
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Introduction 
Understanding Economic Controls 
 
The number of materials which sooner or later came under some form of 
government control during the Second World War ran into the many 
hundreds, and no single volume, or indeed series of volumes, could fully set out 
the history of these controls. 
 
Joel Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (London, 1953), p. xiii. 
 
 
There [exists] a terrifying mass of original documents, and there are thousands 
of people who actually took part in the performance, each with his own ideas 
of how, when and why things happened … How much easier it will be for 
some future historian to rewrite it all when the events can be viewed in 
dispassionate perspective, when mice have eaten some of the files, and when 
none of those who were alive at the time are there to point out the distant 
connection between what was written on the official files and what actually 
happened.  
 
Ely Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, 116:4 (1953), 466-7 (p. 466).  
 
 
This thesis owes its existence to ambiguity. Although it is explicitly focused on the 
political economy of those controls enforced by the state in the decade after 1945, it 
will become apparent that this is a subject mired in misunderstanding and one that is 
not easy to categorise. The history of such controls, it will be argued, is one of 
uncertainty. This conclusion was perhaps inevitable. After all, the thesis is ostensibly 
an attempt to produce for the post-war period what Joel Hurstfield declared was 
impossible for that preceding it. His contention that the system’s complexity 
rendered a full history of controls impossible is given more weight by the fact that he 
had been commissioned by the government to do just that.
1
 His was not the only 
warning. John Jewkes, who had helped to create many of the restrictions and later 
became one of their most vocal critics, was equally adamant that ‘no pen could fully 
describe and no mind could wholly grasp the vast mesh of controls’ enforced in the 
years after the Second World War.
2
 Charged with doing so in 1947, David Butt, a 
Whitehall economist who had briefly worked with Jewkes in wartime, similarly 
                                                 
1
 Joel Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (London, 1953), p. xiii.  
2
 John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (London, 1948), p. 217. 
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conceded that his task was impossible given that ‘any precise account could fill a 
volume’.3 Three and a half years later, when he tried to do so again, he conceded that 
he had been doomed to failure because there was simply ‘no obvious definition of 
the term “control”’.4 It was for this reason that Ely Devons, who had gained an 
intricate knowledge of the system as Jewkes’ wartime protégé, maintained that no 
attempt to replicate it would be able to capture its inherent intangibility.
5
 This study 
does not intend to disprove such claims. Instead, as the work of a future historian in 
the dispassionate mould envisaged by Devons, it will offer a more reflective view 
that seeks to examine the implications of this complexity for post-war planning and 
draw out what he referred to as ‘the distant connection between what was written on 
the official files and what actually happened’.6 The reason for doing so requires some 
explanation. 
 
* 
 
Given that the term ‘controls’ has been the source of such confusion, it is first 
necessary to set out the parameters of this study by defining how it has employed the 
word. At a basic level, a control can be understood as an administrative instrument 
that allows a degree of regulation over economic activity that would be impossible 
without its existence. Most of the measures considered within this thesis owed their 
being to the Second World War. Some were conceived as a means to focus 
production upon those industries which were most vital for the war effort. Others 
were used to ensure that materials were distributed carefully so as to manage 
shortages and counter the threat of inflation. The scale of the apparatus was 
impressive. Indeed, by 1945, thousands of bespoke schemes were being enforced by 
687 separate Defence Regulations. Yet, as will be seen, the actual development of 
such measures had been relatively unplanned and almost all were designed piecemeal 
to meet immediate crises. Very rarely were they understood to be anything more than 
                                                 
3
 Kew, The National Archives (TNA), T 230/319, Butt, ‘Controls’, 22 May 1947, p. 1. 
4
 TNA, T 230/340, Butt, ‘Controls in the United Kingdom’, 17 Jan 1951, p. 1. 
5
 Ely Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 116:4 (1953), 
466-7 (p. 466);‘Economic Planning in War and Peace’, The Manchester School of Economic and 
Social Studies (The Manchester School), 16:1 (1948), 1-28 (p. 1) and Planning in Practice: Essays in 
Aircraft Planning in Wartime (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 1-15. 
6
 Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, p. 466. 
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temporary expedients and very often their administration was far from rational. 
Many wartime controls would, however, be maintained well after 1945 to 
complement indirect fiscal and monetary measures. Still used to direct resources in 
accordance with certain defined priorities, they also became linked with broader 
attempts to plan economic development.
7
 The most visible controls were 
undoubtedly those covering consumer goods and these restrictions remain ubiquitous 
within studies of the period as a result.
8
 The history of such controls is important, 
especially from a social perspective. Nonetheless, consumer coupons formed only 
the tip of an iceberg. They were, in essence, the very last stage in an administrative 
process that was otherwise hidden from view. Moreover, as measures deliberately 
designed to ration goods that had already been produced, they played very little part 
in the actual planning of production, or decisions surrounding the definition of 
priorities. For this reason, the research underpinning this thesis has consciously 
focused upon the study of industrial controls. 
 
This decision comes with its own qualifications. Most obviously, the nature of any 
market-based economic system – even one which includes a degree of state 
intervention – renders an entirely binary distinction between consumer and industrial 
controls unworkable as each implicitly impacts upon the other. Moreover, even if the 
former are artificially excluded, one can still include a range of instruments under the 
somewhat obtuse title of the latter. During the period in question, there were, for 
instance, restrictions covering imports and currency exchange, environmental 
planning controls covering the distribution of industry, statutory instruments setting 
maximum and minimum prices for certain raw and semi-finished materials, an export 
licensing system which aimed to promote production in particular sectors, direct 
allocation schemes covering fuel and basic raw materials, a quota-based permit 
system that limited the production of most manufactured goods, so-called ‘ring-
                                                 
7
 G.D.N. Worswick, ‘Direct Controls’, in The British Economy 1945-1950, eds G.D.N. Worswick and 
P. Ady (Oxford, 1952), pp. 278-312 (p. 278). 
8
 Paul Addison, No Turning Back: The Peaceful Revolutions of Post-War Britain (Oxford, 2010), pp. 
20-23; Susan Cooper, ‘Snoek Piquante’, in Age of Austerity, eds M. Sissons and P. French (London, 
1963), pp. 33-54; Geoffrey Fry, The Politics of Decline (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 99-113; Peter 
Hennessy, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London, 2007), pp. 8-10; David Kynaston, 
Austerity Britain, 1945-1951 (London, 2007), ch. 4; K.O. Morgan, Britain since 1945: The People’s 
Peace (Oxford, 2001), pp. 76-93 and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowksa, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, 
Controls and Consumption, 1939-55 (Oxford, 2000), chs 2 and 4. 
4 
 
 
fence’ restrictions prohibiting some employees from leaving the workforce, a 
licensing system covering capital investment, not to mention short-lived controls 
over building materials and machine tools.
9
 This study remains focused upon the 
most direct of these measures and will primarily consider those relating to the 
licensing and allocation of materials. Nevertheless, befitting the focus on uncertainty, 
it will be stressed that such distinctions were only rarely drawn in practice and shown 
that the word ‘Control’ with a capital ‘C’ was also used to refer directly to those 
organisations responsible for administering individual regulations.
10
 As Butt noted in 
January 1951, the situation was muddled further by the fact that a myriad of more 
established processes – not least taxation and monetary policy – could also 
legitimately ‘be called controls over the freedom of the economy’.11 With this 
semantic confusion most pronounced within political debates over the system, the 
thesis has (whilst avoiding budgetary and monetary means) adopted a broad 
definition of a control as a physical measure applied directly to a particular sector, or 
an individual firm, for a particular purpose by either the state or an autonomous 
organisation acting on its behalf. 
 
The reason for choosing to focus on such controls can be traced back to their very 
intangibility. From a purely economic perspective, developments with the apparatus 
and the difficulties inherent within its administration have been well charted within a 
vast secondary literature focused on Britain’s economic policy during the 1940s and 
1950s. Tied into a history of economic planning, it has been well established, not 
least by Christopher Dow and Alec Cairncross, two more former economic advisors, 
that there was a broad move towards a less ‘hands-on’ approach during this period.12 
Over the past two decades this interest has continued with Stephen Brooke, Martin 
Chick, Scott Kelly, Neil Rollings, Keir Thorpe, Jim Tomlinson and Richard Toye 
amongst those contributing to a debate that has become inextricably wound up in 
                                                 
9
 Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945-51 (London, 1985), p. 334 and 
Worswick, ‘Direct Controls’, p. 280. 
10
 See below, p. 59. 
11
 TNA, T 230/340, Butt, ‘Controls in the United Kingdom’, p. 1. 
12
 Cairncross, Years of Recovery, p. 343 and J.C.R. Dow, The Management of the British Economy 
1945-60 (Cambridge, 1964), p. 168. 
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wider discussions regarding consensus and modernisation.
13
 Politically, too, controls 
have been heavily referenced in broader histories as examples of an austere 
economic reality that stood at odds with popular expectations of peace.
14
 Yet, for all 
of this notable interest, their longer term administration and development has been 
surprisingly under researched and few distinctions have been drawn between 
strategic controls related to economic development and those applied to meet specific 
market conditions. Their political significance remains similarly unclear, with 
competing narratives of controls as either the necessary precursors to economic 
rationalisation, electoral liabilities, evidence of an excessive and almost authoritarian 
interference, or the insignificant remnants of a system to which all were committed 
to reform. Moreover, not only have recent studies questioned the veracity of the link 
between control and planning, but a consumer-orientated view of their politics can 
only ever go some way towards explaining the apparent significance of a system 
that’s eventual reform was, as The Economist wryly noted, ‘felt with most relief by 
the businessman’.15 Following Devons’ logic, these failings might reasonably be 
explained by the fact that each of those involved in the development of the system 
had their ‘own ideas of how, when and why things happened’.16 As a result, they 
provide a clear opportunity for deeper interrogation. 
 
                                                 
13
 Alan Booth, ‘The “Keynesian Revolution” in Economic Policy-Making’, Economic History Review, 
36 (1983), 103-123; Stephen Brooke, ‘Problems of “Socialist Planning”: Evan Durbin and the Labour 
Government of 1945’, The Historical Journal, 34:3 (1991), 687-702; Martin Chick, Industrial Policy 
in Britain, 1945-1951: Economic Planning, Nationalisation and the Labour Governments 
(Cambridge, 1998), ch. 3; Scott Kelly, The Myth of Mr Butskell: The Politics of British Economic 
Policy, 1950-55 (Aldershot, 2002), ch. 5; Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Vol. 1 
Britain in Search of Balance (Basingstoke, 1986), p. 117; Neil Rollings, ‘Poor Mr Butskell: A Short 
Life Wrecked by Schizophrenia?’, Twentieth Century British History, 5:2 (1994), 183-205; Keir M. 
Thorpe, ‘“Statistical Floodlighting”? The Unpublished Economic Surveys 1946-7’, Contemporary 
British History, 11:4 (1997), 86-111; Jim Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: 
The Attlee Years, 1945-51 (Cambridge, 2002), chs 4 and 6; Richard Toye, The Labour Party and the 
Planned Economy, 1931-51 (Woodbridge, 2003), ch. 9 and Ina Zweinger-Bargielowska, ‘Consensus 
and Consumption: rationing, Austerity and Controls after the War’, in The Myth of Consensus: a New 
View on British History, 1945-1964, eds H. Jones and M. Kandiah (Basingstoke, 1996), 79-96. 
14
 Addison, No Turning Back, pp. 12-20; Fry, The Politics of Decline, pp. 112-3; Hennessy, Having It 
So Good, p. 10; Morgan, The People’s Peace, p. 68; Martin Pugh, State and Society: a Social and 
Political History of Britain, 1870-1992 (London, 1999), p. 272 and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 
Austerity in Britain, chs 2 and 5. 
15
 The Economist, 13 Nov 1948. 
16
 Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, p. 466. 
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There were a variety of ways that this opportunity could have been approached. 
However, after beginning with a fairly narrow study of institutional development, it 
soon became clear that this research should not be distilled into an issue of 
administration, economic policy, ideology, or political manoeuvre. Thus, although 
this thesis will draw upon existing scholarship, it does not intend to follow such work 
into a cyclical debate about the extent to which developments were representative of 
a loosely-defined consensus, or indicative of any rigid ideological retreat. It does not 
even directly address the impact of industrial controls on everyday life. Not only 
have such issues been dealt with in detail elsewhere, but the parameters within which 
they occur can be brought into question for constructing an almost ahistorical version 
of events.
17
 Most importantly, in maintaining a focus upon the broader meaning 
attributed to controls, much of this scholarship has simply overlooked the controls 
themselves and ignored a reality that was, in the words of Rollings, ‘more complex 
and ambiguous than that often presented’.18 By using its subject matter as a point of 
focus through which to examine a broader relationship between economic policy and 
popular politics, this thesis aims to examine how this reality interacted with an 
illusion that had continued to shape our understanding of controls. Indeed, despite 
numerous practical uncertainties, it will be shown that these regulations were able to 
become rhetorical symbols that reduced complex economics into a simple form and 
translated mundane grumbles into potent philosophical critiques. This process, like 
the system itself, was complex and interactive with abstract debates played out 
within the same sphere as practical investigations and against an unforgiving 
economic landscape that raised its own political questions; its history is all the more 
intriguing as a consequence. As a result, though deliberately concerned with a 
specific issue, the thesis has adopted a broad definition of ‘political economy’ and 
views it as representing the complex interactions between that which is economic 
                                                 
17
 Martin Francis, ‘Economics and Ethics: The Nature of Labour’s Socialism, 1945-51’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 61 (1995), 220-4; Henry Irving, ‘A Retreat from Socialism? Labour and the 
Bonfire of Controls’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Leeds, 2009), ch. 1; Ben Jackson, 
‘Revisionism Reconsidered: “Property-Owning Democracy” and Egalitarian Strategy in Post-War 
Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 16:4 (2005), 416-440 (p. 417) and Neil Rollings, ‘“The 
Reichstag Method of Governing”? The Attlee Government and Permanent Economic Controls’, in 
Labour Governments and Private Industry: Experience of 1945-51, eds N. Rollings, H. Mercer and J. 
Tomlinson (Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 15-37. 
18
 Neil Rollings, ‘Butskellism, the Postwar Consensus and the Managed Economy’, in The Myth of 
Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64, eds H. Jones and M. Kandiah (Basingstoke, 
1996), pp. 97-119 (p. 112). 
7 
 
 
and that which is political. Before setting out how this will be achieved in practice, it 
is worth dwelling briefly on the analytical framework that has shaped this approach. 
 
* 
 
With its focus on the construction of issues, perception, rhetoric and complexity, this 
thesis obviously draws upon a growing body of so-called ‘New Political History’ that 
has sought to advance traditional scholarship by examining the interaction between 
politics and other spheres.
19
 Nonetheless, it has consciously sought to combine this 
with what might be deigned a ‘high political’ approach. At first glance this might 
seem to be at odds with an awareness of a broader meaning of politics. Not only is 
such an approach now fairly unfashionable, but any attempt to reconstruct high level 
debates, let alone successfully reconcile them with popular politics, is acknowledged 
to be fraught with practical difficulties.
20
 Even so, it has become increasingly 
recognised that the two approaches need not be mutually exclusive and that an 
understanding of each can allow for a more nuanced historical analysis.
21
 Such a 
perspective is employed here for two main reasons. Firstly, having heeded Devons’ 
warning about the disconnection between real and remembered practice, a critical 
examination of the interaction between different actors is used to provide an 
important insight into the administration of individual controls. As will be seen, this 
has shown that decisions taken within the system could have far more impact than 
                                                 
19
 Through a measured adoption of cultural historical methods, this ‘New Political History’ has tended 
to focus on the importance of identity and rhetoric in understanding the interaction between the 
political and public spheres. For a fuller definition, see: Dror Wahrman, ‘The New Political History: 
A Review Essay’, Social History, 21:3 (1996), 343-354; Steven Fielding, ‘Looking for the New 
Political History’, Journal of Contemporary History, 42:3 (2007), 515-524 and Jon Lawrence, 
Electing our Masters: The Hustings and British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford, 2009), p. 8. 
20
 Laura Beers, ‘Whose Opinion?: Changing Attitudes Towards Opinion Polling in British Politics, 
1937-1964’, Twentieth Century British History, 17:2 (2006), 177-205; David M. Craig, ‘“High 
Politics” and the “New Political History”’, The Historical Journal, 53:2 (2010), 453-475 (pp. 462-3); 
Robert Crowcroft, ‘Maurice Cowling and the Writing of British History’, Contemporary British 
History, 22:2 (2008), 279-86; W.J.M. Mackenzie, Explorations in Government: Collected Papers, 
1951-1968 (London, 1975), pp. 17-30; Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of 
Scepticism (London, 1996), p. xviii and Philip Williamson, ‘Maurice Cowling and Modern British 
Political History’, Philosophy, Politics and Religion in British Democracy, eds R. Crowcroft, S.J.D. 
Green and R.C. Whiting (London, 2010), pp. 108-152  (p. 113). 
21
 Craig, ‘“High” and “New Political History”’, pp. 456-7; Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: 
Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, 1998), p. 63; Susan 
Pederson, ‘What is Political History Now?’, in What is History Now?, ed. D. Cannadine (Basingstoke, 
2004), p. 42 and Williamson, ‘Maurice Cowling and Modern British Political History’, p. 108. 
8 
 
 
those taken from above. Secondly, it allows for more attention to be paid to the 
academic discussion which helped to inform the intellectual climate. This is 
undoubtedly to have focused upon a relatively small number of policy formers. But, 
given that many of those who would provide intellectual critiques of the controls 
system had also been involved in its formation, it allows both a conceptual and a 
practical understanding of the issues at stake. As was stressed by the Conservative 
MP Richard Law, about whom more will be written later, any other focus would 
ignore the fact that the term control often referred to the decisions taken by ‘a 
youngish university lecturer … with no particular qualification for the task’.22 
Furthermore, having explicitly acknowledged that such individuals formed just one 
small part of an interrelated – and often unpredictable – political and economic 
landscape, the most obvious contradictions have hopefully been avoided. 
 
Quite fittingly, the decision to adopt this approach can be traced back to an almost 
accidental reading of Devons’ Planning in Practice. Devons, later the Robert Ottley 
Professor in Applied Economics at the Victoria University of Manchester, was a man 
for whom Law’s comments were particularly apt. Recruited to the wartime Central 
Economic Intelligence Service (CEIS) by Jewkes as a twenty six year old junior 
statistician, he had, after just four hectic years, worked his way to become the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP)’s Director of Statistics and Planning. His 
later career, cut short by an untimely death aged just fifty four, was less distinguished 
when viewed against conventional academic standards. Afflicted by doubt in his own 
ability and direction, some of his ideas were deliberately confrontational. Criticising 
Hurstfield’s text, for example, he questioned the ability to ever understand a system 
built upon individual relationships, noting that ‘All of the paraphernalia of planning 
[were] there … but they flit across the page like phantoms’.23 Nevertheless, drawing 
upon his experience and a playful scepticism that emulated F.M. Cornford’s cult 
Microcosmographia Acaemica, he sought to analyse the idiosyncrasies of 
administration as sites of political interaction and manoeuvre.
24
 Amongst the most 
                                                 
22
 Richard Law, Return from Utopia (London, 1950), p. 185. 
23
 Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, pp. 466-7. Hurstfield conceded that a more fruitful 
approach – one that could be adopted by a future generation of historians – would have been to offer a 
detailed case study of an individual control, see: Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials, p. xiii. 
24
 Ely Devons, ‘Managing an Organisation’, in Papers on Planning and Economic Management, ed A. 
Cairncross (Manchester, 1970), pp. 116-120 (p. 117). Despite setting out to ‘omit any consideration of 
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fruitful topics were those, like controls, that were relatively obscure and allowed for 
an analysis of the process of entanglement between ideas and their application.
25
 This 
approach, the product of much cross-disciplinary collaboration and debate within 
faculty seminars, was never encapsulated within a single text. But, through his 
influence on more distinguished colleagues including Bill Mackenzie, Max 
Gluckman and Arthur Lewis, the ideas underpinning it helped to shape the study of 
politics, sociology and economics in Britain.
26
 In the words of Cairncross, a friend 
and former MAP colleague, ‘To those who did not know him personally he was not a 
particularly significant figure … [but he possessed] a rare integrity which gave him 
the aura of a prophet’.27 Most importantly, it will be shown that the disparate papers 
remaining from their time together provide a fascinating insight into the questions 
that underpin this research and offer a potential bridge between its high and popular 
interests. 
 
* 
 
Given that this thesis accepts the complexity and ambiguity of its subject matter, an 
awareness of its evidence base and structure is also crucial. Regarding the former, 
care has been taken to marry an analysis of key policy developments with detailed 
research into the policy making and presentational processes underpinning their 
being. Specific attention has been paid to the Conservative Party Research 
Department, its Labour counterpart and the intricate web of governmental 
committees charged with making sense of the system. This has, where possible, been 
complemented by evidence from the controls themselves. Such archival sources have 
been entwined with a wide-ranging survey of contemporaneous academic accounts 
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so as to allow for the analysis of the relationship between controls and planning as it 
would have been understood at the time.
28
 The dense official histories of the Second 
World War produced under direction of Michael Postan and Keith Hancock in the 
decade or so after 1945, of which Hurstfield’s Control of Raw Materials formed a 
part, and numerous shorter papers included within learned journals and edited 
collections have provided a particularly intriguing insight into the system as it was 
perceived by those working within it. Whilst this has been of use to the 
administrative element of this research, the preconceptions held by politicians and 
early social scientists have made the analysis of public opinion rather more difficult. 
Instead of claiming to have found an answer to this problem, the sources employed 
here – a loose mixture of quantitative polls, qualitative surveys, newspaper cuttings, 
anecdotal observations and records from discussion groups – deliberately emulate 
those that were used by contemporary actors. Although this means that any 
conclusions are necessarily tentative, it has allowed for an analysis of the interaction 
between their preconceptions and the actions taken thereon. The public relations 
aspect of this work has, lastly, been evidenced through the analysis of key policy 
statements, political publications, electoral ephemera and a range of more unusual 
sources including documentary film, posters and even physical exhibitions. 
 
Regarding the structure, the following chapters are broadly thematic and – like the 
sources – reflect the different areas of research. To aid the reader, they have been 
grouped into two related parts. The first might be characterised as being broadly 
economic and will – as Hurstfield attempted – offer an overview of developments 
within the apparatus. Though it begins with a political overview, Chapter One 
attempts to establish a better understanding of controls’ perceived significance by 
setting out the nature of their relationship with economic planning. After conducting 
something of a historiographical overview, it will do so from a primarily contextual 
perspective and seeks to determine contemporary understandings through a survey of 
interwar economic debates. Following this, Chapter Two will broadly trace the 
system’s evolution between its wartime inception and 1947; Chapter Three will 
continue this story up until the point at which most controls had been removed in 
1955. Both will combine the personal insights of administrators with a high level 
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intellectual history, changes in political thought and a survey of practical policy 
developments to determine the framework within which subsequent debates 
occurred. The second section is more overtly political and will show how controls 
were able to become sites of a broader debate. Chapter Four seeks to explain how 
these often intangible and hidden regulations became symbolic points of rhetorical 
differentiation by examining the links drawn between controls and fundamental 
questions regarding the role of the state. Analysing the translation of this debate to a 
wider audience, Chapter Five will then detail how such a narrow economic issue was 
able to practically fulfil such a role before determining the impact of continued 
uncertainty and the high political implications that this held. Having dissected each 
strand of research, the conclusion will combine the findings to offer its own 
understanding of the complex political economy of state controls during the 
transition from war to peace. 
 
Chronologically, then, the study has avoided enforcing overly political boundaries 
and will instead span a ‘long’ transitional period covering the decade after 1945. The 
legacy of total war, this period was dominated by attempts to overcome a financial 
crisis, recurrent problems with the nation’s balance of payments and on-going 
shortages of material.
29
 However, although nominally demarcated by the end of 
fighting in Europe in May 1945 and the evocations of affluence that followed the 
Conservative Party’s second post-war election victory in 1955, it would be a mistake 
to view these dates as immovable boundaries. This point is best illustrated by simply 
taking into consideration changes within the system of industrial controls. On the one 
hand, the apparatus was inaugurated in August 1939 and drew upon a conceptual 
framework that was rooted in earlier developments. Moreover, when the term is 
taken literally, the transition from war to peace began well before Victory in Europe 
(VE) Day, with detailed thoughts regarding the continued usage of such measures 
beginning in 1942. On the other hand, the remnants of the wartime system – the 
Defence Regulations that underpinned each restriction – were only annulled in 1958 
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(though many of the specific controls had all but lapsed before this date). This is not 
to argue that there were no differences within the period. But, even when accepting 
the malleability of its boundaries, it is to stress a degree of continuity and to accept 
that any attempt at periodisation is somewhat arbitrary; the views of military, social, 
economic or political historians with a different point of focus would no doubt differ 
considerably. The obvious benefit of analysing a long transition is that it allows a 
comparative examination of the situation under both Labour and Conservative 
administrations. In doing so, it is hoped that this study can advance a historiography 
that has tended to view the 1951 General Election as a rigid point of change and has 
arguably distorted a political and economic reality that was less stable and less 
predetermined than is often presumed: a reality that was contested and within which 
the Conservatives were far from confident.
30
 
 
Whilst rejecting 1951 as an artificial division, the decision to use 1947 as the point of 
demarcation between Chapters Two and Three remains significant – not least 
because the year is often invoked as being both politically and economically 
decisive. Punctuated by severe snowfall, flooding and drought, a serious fuel 
shortage, a run on the pound, a dollar shortage and on-going struggles to attain 
national solvency, it was a year of unprecedented crisis that painfully highlighted the 
fragility of Britain’s economic transition to peace and destroyed any hopes that this 
would be a short process.
31
 Thus, despite disagreeing about their inevitability, both 
Cairncross and Dow suggested that the crises of 1947 represented the distinct end of 
a phase and forced a ‘reorientation of policy’ towards raising production at all 
costs.
32
 Presented as the point at which any long term attempt to plan the economy 
was abandoned, this shift was later seized upon as evidence of a burgeoning 
consensus and the date is now often invoked as the point at which controls began to 
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be removed in earnest.
33
 This thesis takes a slightly different approach. Drawing 
upon the more recent work of Chick, Rollings, Thorpe, Tomlinson and Toye, it will 
show that the events of 1947 sparked much theoretical deliberation, led to a thorough 
review of policy towards controls and were followed by a notable rationalisation of 
their administration.
34
 Politically, it will also be demonstrated that an academic re-
reading of the 1945 General Election, coupled with a pragmatic desire to translate 
economic arguments into popular appeals, led both Labour and the Conservatives to 
actively experiment in the field of public relations after this point, with both drawing 
heavily upon their stance towards controls. The history of 1947 was, therefore, far 
from representative of any simple point of retreat. Nonetheless, it will also be shown 
that the intermingling of political and economic ends, combined with the 
intensification of everyday hardships and a failure to address underlying confusions 
within the system, ensured that it was not a great move forward either. It was simply 
part of a story defined by uncertainty. 
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Chapter One 
Planning and Economic Controls 
 
The State must have a comprehensive economic policy … [It] must possess 
and act upon a moving blueprint of the community’s productive organisation. 
Where it does not operate it or control it, it must at least understand it and 
the factors and tendencies that work it. By this means it can use its own power 
to regulate where it does not own or operate. 
 
Herbert Morrison, ‘The State and Industry’, in Can Planning be Democratic? 
(London, 1944), pp. 1-23 (pp. 21-2). 
 
 
Economic planning is a much used and abused notion. The term is employed in 
different senses by different people; and the people who use it in any of these 
senses are frequently unclear as to its economic purpose and significance. 
 
Maurice Dobb, ‘Economic Planning and Planned Economies’, in Economics: Man 
and his Material Resources, ed. W.A. Lewis (London, 1949), pp. 247-276 (p. 247). 
 
 
This chapter will begin with a very political issue. On 23 July 1949, almost exactly 
four years after the results of the 1945 General Election had become known and 
Britain’s first majority Labour Government took office, the Conservative Party 
launched a campaign for re-election with the publication of a detailed 68 page policy 
statement entitled The Right Road for Britain. The publication, which was 
accompanied by an abridged version, went on to sell over two million copies during 
the first three months of its release and formed the basis of the Conservatives’ 
manifesto. Capturing the public mood, it described the party’s main purpose as being 
to ‘free the productive energies of the nation from the trammels of overbearing state 
control’.1 That October, addressing an estimated 10 000 delegates seated in a packed 
Earl’s Court Empress Hall, Winston Churchill presented the statement to the 
Conservative Party’s Annual Conference. Echoing its prose, he used the occasion to 
accuse Labour of having insulted ‘the rights and liberties of Englishmen’ during their 
period in office.
2
 As will be explored further in Chapter Four, this contention became 
a defining point of Churchill’s approach during a lengthy election campaign. 
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Speaking in front of a newsreel camera during a Pathé election address in early 1950, 
for instance, he again drew attention to the dangers of ‘regimentation’ when 
‘everything is controlled by an all-powerful state’.3 The current administration, he 
argued during a radio address delivered on 21 January, had ‘glor[ied] in controls for 
controls sake’. In stark contrast, he promised that a successful Conservative 
government would strive to liberate the nation from this ‘definite evil’ by ‘setting the 
people free’.4 
 
Churchill’s party would emerge from that election disappointed. As the final results 
were returned during the morning of the 24 February, it became clear that the 
Conservatives had failed to make a decisive breakthrough. Labour’s majority had 
been dramatically cut from 147 to 5, but Clement Attlee remained in Downing Street 
for a second term. On 25 October 1951, however, Britain went to the polls once 
again and, although the contest was somewhat overshadowed by events overseas, 
many of the earlier arguments continued to resonate. The Conservatives’ new policy 
statement, Britain Strong and Free, repeated the accusation that Labour had imposed 
‘control for controls sake’ and claimed that this had ‘hobbled’ the nation’s ‘spirit of 
endeavour’.5 Echoing claims made in The Right Road, this latest electoral contest 
was portrayed by Churchill as a potential ‘turning point’ for a country now facing a 
path that was ‘fatal to individual freedom’. His self-produced manifesto, which he 
hoped would complement the party’s official effort, continued by calling for an 
immediate reduction of ‘multiplying orders and rules’.6 Throughout his party’s 
campaigning, the broad call to ‘set the people free’ integrated concepts of liberty 
with everyday fears: queues, shortages, continued rationing, housing problems, the 
rising cost of living and the failure to tackle the balance of payments deficit were all 
blamed upon inefficient ‘socialist’ and ‘overbearing’ controls.7 Nonetheless, it is also 
clear that most of these controls – that long list of material allocation schemes, 
production licences and export permits set out in the Introduction – had very little 
direct impact on everyday life. As will be seen in Chapters Four and Five, this point 
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was well-recognised within the Conservative Party itself.
8
 Their apparent 
significance could, therefore, be considered something of a paradox. 
 
Thus, before turning to consider the evolution of government policy towards 
industrial controls during the long transition period, it is first necessary to understand 
why these instruments were so significant. This is all the more pressing given that 
Labour and the Conservatives were ostensibly committed to markedly similar 
objectives. Not only did both agree on the need to raise production and exports but, 
as will be seen, a process of decontrol had begun under Labour well before 1949. 
Moreover, the party had long declared – as Attlee stressed during a two day debate 
on the economic situation in February 1946 – that it was not in favour of ‘controls 
for their own sake’.9 Similarly, and despite the virulent rhetoric of opposition, the 
Conservatives Party’s 1950 manifesto had combined its call for liberty with the 
measured assertion that controls would not be removed over essential goods and 
services until they were ‘within the reach of every family and each individual’.10 Six 
years earlier, both parties had subscribed to the oft-referred 1944 White Paper on 
Employment Policy which committed them to some level of economic management 
and the retention of certain controls – encompassing a range of measures from 
consumer rationing to industrial licences – whilst ‘abnormal conditions’ remained.11 
The apparent disparity between the rhetorical illusion and economic reality of the 
debates surrounding controls underpins this thesis and provided the primary impetus 
for its research. The practical economic and administrative development of the 
controls system will, as noted in the Introduction, be explored in Chapters Two and 
Three whilst the more political aspects will be examined in the second part of the 
thesis. This chapter offers an initial link between each strand by examining the 
relationship between industrial controls and concepts of economic planning. Indeed, 
although maintaining a focus on the controls themselves, it will be shown that their 
development can only be fully understood in terms of this interrelationship. It begins 
with an introduction to the system itself. 
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-I- 
 
Those controls upon which this thesis is based were legally enforced by a wide-
ranging Emergency Powers (Defence) Act that came into force on Thursday 24 
August 1939, eight days before the German invasion of Poland. The Act enabled the 
formation of any subsequent Defence Regulation that was deemed: 
 
necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the 
realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any 
war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community.
12
 
 
Drawing upon experience gained during the latter stages of the First World War, it 
was confidently expected that any such conflict would necessitate a tight focus on 
real resources like manpower, fuel and munitions. So, although lacking specificity, 
enabling legislation for the creation of a ‘comprehensive and stringent’ programme 
of industrial controls was amongst the first measures pursued that September. 
Legally defined, and commonly referred to, as Defence Regulation 55 (DR55), this 
measure allowed the regulation and prohibition of industrial practices so as to focus 
production upon ‘essential work’.13 Its powers could be placed into two broad 
categories. The first – defined as being ‘negative’ – included those controls that 
restricted the effects of the price mechanism. The second – labelled as being 
‘positive’ – were those measures that introduced new incentives.14 By the summer of 
1940, following an intensification of the war effort which pulled almost 300 000 
people into the civil service, the scale of this framework was such that the 
government had effectively become the primary producer, wholesaler, distributor and 
consumer of all raw materials.
15
 Crucially, this Act would provide the cornerstone 
for controls policy until 1958 and provides the legislative basis upon which this 
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thesis rests. Yet, of the many thousands of individual regulations that it legally 
enforced, the majority were temporary, many merely codified pre-war practice, a 
large number were overlapping, some were quite obviously unimportant in the longer 
term, and others were – even by the war’s end – obsolete.16 As such, the paradox of 
their wider significance remains unanswered. 
 
Given that the economic importance of the various measures enacted by DR55 can 
be related specifically to their context, then their wider consequence should perhaps 
be understood in similar terms. It is, though, worth returning briefly to the 
Emergency Powers Act and, more specifically, DR55 first. Both, which regulated for 
the ‘control ... of any property or undertaking’ and defined the use of such in the 
general terms of ‘maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community’, were conspicuously sweeping in scope and imprecise in detail. 
Following a revision of the Emergency Powers Act in 1940, a change which enabled 
conscription of the ‘whole resources of the community’, The Times noted that the 
government had effectively taken ‘complete powers to order the life of the nation’.17 
For Keith Hancock, the Australian historian who edited the series of post-war official 
histories that included Joel Hurstfield’s volume, this seemed an obvious case of the 
government asking for ‘too much power rather than discover[ing] later that it 
possessed too little’.18 Writing in an introductory volume on The British War 
Economy under the direction of the influential economic historian Michael Postan, he 
and his co-author Margaret Gowing, argued that this all-purpose approach was 
motivated by a desire to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past; yet the decision can 
also be seen to have had a more important – if unforeseen – consequence on the 
future. For, as David Butt later realised, in legally enforcing such a diffuse and 
inherently subjective definition, the very term ‘controls’ was itself rendered open to 
interpretation.
19
 Its opacity ensured that, alongside the many irrelevant, obsolete and 
transitory restrictions that emerged after 1939, it was also possible to include powers 
relating to investment, the location of industry or external trade under its heading. 
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Moreover, these – to use a similarly loose contemporary definition, ‘basic’ – controls 
were seen by many to be integral to the future of the British economy. 
 
In the run up to their General Election victory in 1945, the Labour Party had 
confidently asserted its vision for this future. Echoing Herbert Morrison who had 
earlier called for ‘a comprehensive economic policy’, the party’s forward-facing 
manifesto declared that it intended to keep a ‘constructive hand on our whole 
productive machinery’ allowing a Labour government to ‘plan from the ground 
up’.20 This, explained a more technically detailed pamphlet entitled The Case for 
Nationalisation and Control, would allow a Labour government to co-ordinate 
economic development and mitigate against uncertainty. Most importantly, it would 
do so through the guidance of industry – avoiding the need for total state 
ownership.
21
 As will be shown later in this chapter, their bold aim built upon earlier 
foundations. It had, though, only been formally adopted three years earlier when the 
party’s Annual Conference of 1942 accepted a resolution that pledged ‘that there 
must be no return after the war to an unplanned competitive society’.22 The ‘Planned 
Economic Democracy’ envisaged would, it was hoped, not only banish the ills of the 
interwar period but would provide the rational economic foundations for Britain to 
be remade as a ‘Socialist Commonwealth’. Basic controls, it was claimed, would 
enable the interests of ‘the community’ to be placed above those of ‘profiteers’ and 
allow for the ‘full and free development of every individual’ therein.23 For Stephen 
Brooke and Richard Toye, who have each provided rigorous histories of the party 
and its relationship with planning in the period during and after the Second World 
War, this was the culmination of a process that had begun in 1931 and would ensure 
that the party was defined by this faith by the war’s end.24 
 
Although Brooke’s wartime study ends in 1945, and Toye’s with the election of 
1951, it will be shown in Chapter Three that a faith in a form of planning remained a 
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central component within Labour’s thinking throughout the long transition. This 
drew upon the strong contextual argument for some level of intervention during a 
period of continued shortages and dislocation that cut across traditional political 
boundaries. The need to ‘plan’ the transition was, in fact, like the Emergency Powers 
Act, accepted across the political spectrum and had been formally written into the 
Employment Policy White Paper. Indeed, even when looking to the longer term, both 
Labour and the Conservatives had envisaged that a degree of continued state 
intervention would be needed to ensure economic stability and avoid the wasteful 
fluctuations of an entirely unregulated market.
25
 Beyond this, and reflecting on the 
eventual evolution of the peacetime economy, a number of commentators have since 
argued that a policy of more deliberate planning could have better managed growth 
and avoided the so-called ‘stop-go’ development that is ubiquitous within declinist 
accounts of the 1950s.
26
 Importantly, the malleability of the concept meant that a call 
for greater intervention could be applied to a variety of different ends. So, between 
the late 1930s and the late 1950s, it was variously argued that planning could banish 
unemployment, raise production, avoid inflation, promote stable development, 
modernise industry, ensure greater efficiency, rectify deficits in the nation’s balance 
of payments, allow greater fairness, encourage popular participation in economic 
decisions – and safeguard fundamental freedoms. For the young Labour economist 
Evan Durbin, it was quite simply the ‘intellectual religion’ of his day.27 
 
Planning may have been an economic policy that held a great deal of political 
potential but it was also, as might already have been inferred from the brief glimpse 
at the Conservatives’ campaigning in the 1950 and 1951 General Elections, a 
contested one. Despite seeming to offer a less direct alternative to nationalisation, for 
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some, at least, the idea of any degree of enforced planning simply reeked of 
totalitarianism. Thus, it was, according to the influential Conservative Party policy 
maker ‘Rab’ Butler, quite simply a ‘Reichstag method of government’.28 
Nonetheless, whilst adherents and detractors sought to position themselves 
accordingly, both groups saw that planning would rest on some form of control. 
Their conception of what form this would take was, during the immediate transition 
period, grounded in the practical experience gained after 1939. In the words of the 
independent-minded Labour MP Sir Stafford Cripps, the Emergency Powers Act 
offered a ‘proven system’ around which debates could be hung.29 Thus, although it 
will be shown in Chapter Two that they did not represent an entirely suitable model, 
those controls legislated for by DR55 were presented as concrete examples of 
planning in action: examples of either a notable success or of an infringement of 
liberty that was unthinkable in times of peace. For Alec Cairncross, who was broadly 
sympathetic to a degree of intervention but would later criticise Labour for failing to 
move its vision beyond the retention of the wartime system, the two loosely-defined 
issues were presented as being essentially synonymous.
30
 This linkage imbued 
economic controls – again loosely-defined – with an undue sense of ideological 
significance. It also ensured that they would remain important markers within mid-
twentieth century political discourse. This process will be explored further in Chapter 
Four, but any such analysis must first be founded upon an economic understanding 
of planning itself. 
 
-II- 
 
In its simplest form, economic planning can be regarded as a three stage process. The 
first stage includes a survey of all available resources. The second requires the 
determination of an objective or set of priorities. The third, which was usually 
referred to as programming or secondary planning during the 1940s, regards the 
deliberate implementation of a policy or set of policies to achieve this aim.
31
 Leaving 
a fuller definition of programming to one side, it is generally accepted that planning 
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as a broadly-defined whole relates to a future period, that it requires some form of 
action (it is, as opposed to simply forecasting or ‘management’, a deliberate attempt 
to attain a specified aim) and coherence (reliant upon decisions but implying that 
these are somehow integrated).
32
 Put simply, it may be regarded as an attempt to 
achieve certain economic ends through the conscious co-ordination of means.
33
 But 
beyond this broad definition of ends and means, the concept is subject to numerous 
variables regarding its scope, intensity and flexibility.
34
 It can be either ‘top-down’, 
‘bottom-up’ or ‘two-way’; focused on either micro or macroeconomics; might or 
might not include direct intervention; and could have either a quantitative or 
qualitative objective.
35
 The last point is particularly problematic. Indeed, although 
later studies would often emphasise the importance of economic growth – which 
Cairncross and Dow believed was the main difference between ‘planning’ and 
‘management’ which merely implied stability – earlier invocations tended to 
emphasise economic stability and broader social benefits.
36
 Moreover, its inherent 
duality ensures that economic planning is not simply an economic process. The 
principle might be regarded as ‘neutral’ but both the definition of objectives and the 
choice of techniques used require political choices that, in turn, complicate the 
relationship between each stage.
37
 
 
Planning’s heterogeneity can be seen as the predominant theme within an economic 
literature that has employed the term to refer variously to a broad spectrum of 
economic instruments, institutions, procedures and ideals. The lack of clarity even 
led the authors of a 1968 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) study into 
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Economic Planning and Policies to declare – despite their institutional identity, not 
to mention the title of their book – that they would simply avoid using the word 
wherever possible.
38
 A decade before the PEP report, and in a sentence that was later 
echoed by it, Ely Devons noted that the term ‘has … acquired so many different 
possible meanings that it tends more to confuse than to clarify’; almost two decades 
later, the French economist Jacques Leruez, himself influenced by Devons’ work, 
concluded that his study was also hindered by the continued inability of policy 
makers to define what planning actually meant or how it might be realised.
39
 A 
similar tone can be detected in an earlier effort by the Treasury to put the actions of 
the 1945 Labour government into their historical context. Their secret study into 
‘Long Term Economic Planning’, begun in 1962 as part of the Historical Memoranda 
series, noted that planning ‘could be considered to cover the whole range of 
economic policy’ and that it was not easy to separate it from any other form of 
‘government action’.40 The only area upon which most commentators agreed was 
that planning implied making deliberate – or positive – choices. Yet, somewhat 
ironically, given that they were often conflated or viewed as synonymous, this leaves 
the relationship between planning and controls, or even the proper definition of the 
latter, unclear.
41
 
  
Those economists writing in the late 1960s and 70s were clear that an 
‘administrative’, ‘total’ or ‘command’ model of planning would rely on certain direct 
instruments. In this sense, planning was taken to mean that goods and services would 
be directed from the centre via ‘vertical’ controls over individual industries. Tending 
towards the allocation of raw materials, these would cover each development within 
the supply chain and direct materials from their input to their eventual end use.
42
 
However, although it is maintained that the relationship between the control of 
materials and end products was never fully resolved, British wartime planning had 
tended towards negative ‘horizontal’ controls. Administered by decentralised agents 
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and cutting across different industrial sectors, these covered particular stages within 
the supply chain by restricting the flow of materials through systems of licensing and 
compulsory purchase.
43
 More differences emerge when one considers these 
mechanisms in more detail. Indeed, although the majority of such restrictions should 
be regarded as negative controls, the theorists maintained that planning as a 
purposive method had to include a degree of positive inducement.
44
 This was not 
seen to preclude the use of physical controls as a method of compulsion, but it 
continues to confound our understanding of what constitutes a control. To complicate 
matters further, many writers also maintained that direct controls could also be used 
in unplanned ‘economic management’ whilst maintaining that an ‘indicative’ version 
of planning could be attained without any physical controls at all. Indeed, it was 
widely held that most Western European attempts to plan economic developments 
had focused merely upon the manipulation of the macroeconomic environment and 
the sharing of information: actions which were more usually described in managerial 
terms.
45
 
 
For an earlier generation of economists writing in the 1940s and 1950s, many of 
whom had witnessed wartime and post-war planning at first hand, the situation was 
arguably even more complex. The rhetorical link between planning and controls later 
identified by the likes of Cairncross was again well versed. Writing in his Penguin 
Special on post-war economic policy, for example, Andrew Schonfield noted that 
controls were ‘the very stuff of economic planning’.46 According to Sir Oliver 
Franks, reflecting on his own experience as a temporary administrator in the wartime 
Ministry of Supply during a series of lectures organised by the University of London, 
controls were needed throughout the planning process to ensure that statistics were 
collected, that objectives were defined and that such aims were enforced.
47
 They 
were, according to a lengthy reference paper produced by the Treasury’s Information 
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Division in March 1951, designed to ‘influence economic activities … [by] matching 
claims and resources in accordance with certain overall objectives of policy’.48 But, 
as recognised by the Marxist Cambridge Economist Maurice Dobb, who had spent 
the Second World War authoring a series of books on life in the USSR, this role 
could ‘vary considerably both in breadth and depth’.49 Others were still less forgiving 
and the exact relationship was increasingly questioned as Britain moved into the 
1950s. Edwin Plowden, for instance, a former industrialist who held the auspicious 
title of Chief Planning Officer between 1947 and 1953, was adamant that both 
concepts had lost most of their economic meaning and maintained that planning 
could probably be applied to include ‘most, if not all, of the [economic systems] 
operating in most Western countries today’.50 This scepticism was matched by an 
increasing acceptance that the task of economic control was far from simple. Thus, if 
a control-based vision of planning had been an ‘intellectual religion’ in 1945, it had 
according to Leruez, later struggled ‘against [a] rise of fresh orthodoxies and 
declining members of the faithful’.51 
 
Having witnessed the realities of wartime planning at the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production (MAP), Ely Devons was – to continue with the religious metaphor – 
another notable heretic. Questioning the assumed synonymy between planning and 
controls, his characteristically playful writing invoked a disparity between economic 
theory and administrative reality. This, like Franks, clearly drew upon practical 
experience. But, unlike his former colleague, it also included a much more abstract 
understanding of the system. Planning was, for Devons, not a pure science but a 
question of political choice that rested upon a series of myths.
52
 It was, he argued, 
akin to ‘magic in a primitive society’ in that it was used to ‘dress up uncertainties’ 
and justify human decisions about which there was no rational basis for action.
53
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Within this colourful framework, the system of controls was presented as having 
become an emotive myth that endorsed a view that government intervention could 
ensure economic rationality.
54
 In a significant, if underdeveloped, aside, Jim 
Tomlinson has claimed that such views were ‘exceptional’ during this period for 
being focused upon failings rather than possibilities.
55
 However, although few were 
able to encapsulate an argument so vividly, Devons was not the only economist to 
express such cynicism. Some interventions, like those made by John Jewkes and the 
former member of the Prime Minister’s Statistical Service (PMSS) Roy Harrod, were 
obviously polemical. Nonetheless, as was argued by ‘Ronnie’ Tress, another of 
Devons’ former colleagues and a co-contributor to the Manchester School of 
Economic and Social Studies, even this provided evidence that planning had been 
oversimplified and its relationship with controls undeveloped.
56
 Thomas Wilson, 
another young statistician and former colleague, agreed and decried the fact that most 
economists had simply failed to inform what had soon become a highly political 
debate.
57
 Indeed, although used by Tomlinson as an example of a more optimistic 
thought, it should not be forgotten that even Durbin’s religious assertion had drawn 
upon the blurred boundaries that existed between its economic and political 
components.
58
 
 
* 
 
Given the loose multiplicity of meaning, the potential for politicisation and the 
contentions outlined at the outset of this chapter, it should come as no surprise that 
economic planning has been the subject of some notable historical attention. Though 
some of this work has remained fairly economic in its analysis, a number of 
historians have – like Toye and Tomlinson – also examined the political dimension 
and a distinctive planning literature now sits alongside numerous broader studies of 
Labour and Conservative policies during this period. Despite some obvious 
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differences in emphasis, much of this established historical writing describes the 
same general drift away from the ideological commitments outlined by the incoming 
Labour Government in Let Us Face the Future towards a more pragmatic approach: 
a move that is seen to have become more pronounced from the late 1940s as controls 
were relaxed and to have been fulfilled once the Conservatives’ came to office in 
1951 with their pledge to restore ‘freedom’. Importantly, this is not simply seen to be 
a rhetorical shift. Instead, the removal of wartime controls has often been portrayed 
as symbolising either the gradual abandonment of planning or being indicative of a 
failure to ever start planning in practice.
59
 In this sense, Brooke argued in 1991 that 
the concept was ‘a notable, if unlikely, casualty’ of the transition period.60 His phrase 
continues to resonate within more recent studies. Nonetheless, the reasons for, and 
the implications of, planning’s apparently ill-fated struggle are more contentious and 
the subject has become entwined in a number of well-established historiographical 
debates. Before examining the relationship between this study and such discussions, 
it is worth briefly setting out some of the arguments that have been used. 
 
From a predominantly political perspective, it has been contended that planning’s 
failure was one of engagement. Both Kenneth Morgan and William Crofts have, for 
example, claimed that the government failed to properly articulate their vision in a 
manner that would gain public support.
61
 Such issues have also been explored by 
Brooke and Daniel Ritschel, who both suggest that a failure to engage properly with 
either trade unions or business interests was particularly damaging giving that it led 
to a number of debilitating compromises.
62
 Many of these points have been expanded 
by Tomlinson within an overarching thesis that maintains that progress was inhibited 
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by an unenviable assortment of political considerations.
63
 From a more economic 
perspective, the transitional context has also been invoked as a further hindrance to 
reform. A series of crises involving the nation’s balance of payments is, for instance, 
seen to have forced a short term focus at the expense of longer term development. 
Although the severity of the root cause remains contested, this contextual point is, as 
might be expected, generally accepted.
64
 More controversially, other historians have 
suggested that, without a clear blueprint for implementation, these issues merely 
exacerbated what was already an ‘intellectual failure’. Taking a fairly broad view, 
Alan Booth has claimed that there had been little real thought on the mechanics of 
planning before 1945 whilst Michael Cunningham has contended that such issues 
would haunt Labour’s time in office.65 From a slightly more technical perspective, 
the relationship between a planned economy and private industry – which can be 
extended to include questions surrounding the methods and aims of control – have 
been seen as particularly troublesome.
66
 On a more human level, Morrison, who as 
Lord President would be nominally responsible for overseeing planning policy and 
developments within the system of controls, has been the subject of equally stringent 
criticism for his apparent lack of understanding.
67
 Crucially, similar arguments 
regarding a lack of clarity have been applied elsewhere to explain the difficulties 
encountered by the Conservatives during their own haphazard attempts at economic 
management during the 1950s.
68
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Ambiguity, as noted from the outset, will be particularly important within this study 
and the theme can certainly be applied to a range of more practical failings. For R.S. 
Barker, who produced one of the first archival analyses of Labour’s attempt at 
planning, the lack of a deeper understanding left even the most enthusiastic planners 
reliant upon a sceptical civil service that was unable to make the imaginative leap 
necessary to overcome its inherent prejudices and ‘semi-detached’ approach to co-
ordination.
69
 Martin Chick, building upon this focus on departmental responsibilities 
in his detailed account of post war industrial policy, has shown that an inability to 
fully integrate planning with existing responsibilities was indicative of a much 
broader struggle to reconcile ‘market and state administrative mechanisms’.70 Peter 
Hennessy, in his broad history of the civil service, presents this problem as primarily 
one of recruitment. He contends that, whereas an influx of young and professionally 
trained economists during the Second World War had made the civil service more 
receptive to new ideas, their absence after 1945 ensured that it soon reverted to a 
more orthodox approach that was less likely to favour intervention and less able to 
plan with any success.
71
 Taking a slightly different perspective, Toye has suggested 
that – although a number of professionals were retained – the lack of intellectual 
leadership from Ministers who thought that they were planning when they were not 
led such efforts to become subsumed by squabbles amongst those that remained: a 
contention that is also central to an earlier PhD thesis on the failure of planning’s 
implementation written by Keir Thorpe.
72
 The apparent lack of direction has also 
been explored by Brooke, who suggests that it removed any impetus for meaningful 
reform and forced the incoming government to fall back upon the system of wartime 
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controls that was already in place.
73
 Of course, these individual factors would not 
have sat in isolation and some extend far beyond the remit of this study. For this 
reason, and following a framework set out by Thorpe in a measured article that was 
based upon his earlier research but drew its inspiration and methodology from a 1952 
review of government policy written by Devons, it is useful to refer to each within 
two broader categories: those of context and those of clarity.
74
 
 
As may be inferred from Thorpe’s use of Devons’ work, both contentions can again 
be traced back to the work of those mid-century economists who increasingly 
questioned their ability to plan and a concomitant scholarship which sought to 
chronicle the concept’s decline. Like Brooke, a 1952 PEP survey into the 
relationship between government and industry concluded that there had been ‘a 
loosening in the general concept of planning’ whilst Austin Robinson agreed that not 
enough had been done to find an alternative to the direct controls that were 
removed.
75
 Perhaps more critically, both points were central to Arnold Rogow’s 
belief that the ‘retreat from planning’ was evidence that Labour had failed to meet its 
stated goals.
76
 Rogow’s study, which had been conducted with much help from the 
young history graduate and Labour Party researcher Peter Shore, was indicative of a 
more overtly political interest in this story. In fact, fostered by the Labour Party’s 
electoral defeat in 1951, and centred on what Rogow saw as a the state’s reliance 
upon private industry, it was later used by the Conservative Party’s Research 
Department (CPRD) as a guide to Labour’s thinking.77 The subject was also of 
notable interest to many who had been implicated in the earlier failure. It was, for 
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Richard Crossman, one of the clearest ‘lessons of 1945’.78 Although Crossman was 
never a ‘key or systematic figure’, he had become an increasingly influential 
commentator from Labour’s backbenches and would return to the issue on a number 
of occasions. Indeed, as an active member of the party’s Keep Left group, he had 
earlier warned against an ‘epidemic of decontrol’ and would claim, pre-empting 
much later scholarship, that planning had failed due to Labour’s ‘intellectual 
exhaustion’ and its inability to challenge an ‘old Establishment’.79 
 
Interventions from the likes of Rogow and Crossman have helped to draw planning 
into a network of conflicting arguments surrounding the notion of a post-war 
consensus – a concept that has defined the parameters of so much discussion during 
the last thirty to forty years.
80
 Although an altogether less emotive issue than 
nationalisation, this has, in turn, linked the fate of planning into similarly 
introspective debates surrounding the Labour Party’s ‘revisionism’ and the extent to 
which a relaxation of controls should be seen as a ‘retreat’ for an administration that 
had previously declared its intention to recreate Britain as a ‘Socialist 
Commonwealth’.81 The loudest criticism has, unsurprisingly, tended to come from 
those who shared their exasperation. Ralph Miliband, for example, who had 
personally contributed to internal Labour Party debates as a conference delegate in 
the 1950s, drew upon Rogow and Crossman to argue that the issue was an example 
of intellectual paralysis in his impassioned critique of Parliamentary Socialism.
82
 
Nevertheless, with later commentators tending to agree, the issue is still widely held 
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to be ideologically significant.
83
 Indeed, it should be remembered that from a less 
critical perspective the removal of direct controls was famously seen by Alan Booth 
to have represented nothing short of a ‘Keynesian revolution’.84 As noted in the 
Introduction, these debates will form the background to Chapters Two and Three but 
it is not my intention to dwell upon them. Instead, emulating Neil Rollings’ attempt 
to decipher a reality that was ‘more complex and ambiguous than that often 
presented’, it will draw heavily upon a range of contemporary writings so as to adopt 
a relative approach that seeks to analyse the relationship between controls and 
planning as it would have been understood at the time.
85
 
 
Given the additional ambiguities outlined during this chapter, it is worth pausing 
briefly to consider this approach in a little more detail. Indeed, although seeking to 
build upon existing historiographical foundations, the focus upon contemporary 
understanding stands in stark contrast to much of the existing literature. Toye’s 
study, for example, whilst emphasising the importance of planning’s politics, 
deliberately rejects – as PEP did before him – a ‘vague’ contemporary understanding 
and instead adapts a model developed by John Bennett.
86
 This study makes no such 
attempt at redefinition. Instead, it accepts that planning was a fluid concept and 
embraces the importance of its political and economic context. Whilst the reliance on 
‘muddle’ might be regarded as potentially problematic, it is crucial that such a view 
is taken; given that planning need not rely on physical controls or that later 
definitions often emphasised specific context-bound objectives, to apply an external 
definition risks anachronism. That many of the more detailed economic studies of 
planning – including Bennett’s – are based upon an understanding of planning as it 
was conceived in later years of the former USSR, makes this all the more 
important.
87
 Indeed, it is possible to argue that much of the ingrained 
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historiographical debate that surrounds the notion of ‘retreat’ can be explained by a 
continued invocation of a rigid view of planning via physical controls that did not 
fully reflect differences in contemporary understanding. This is not to claim that a 
relative approach – or, indeed, any historical approach – can ever fully recreate 
Rollings’ complex reality. But it will provide a more realistic framework within 
which the Labour and Conservative policies towards controls can be further 
analysed. Thus, before moving to consider the actual development of the controls 
apparatus within Chapters Two and Three, it is necessary to better establish the 
intellectual context within which such developments occurred. 
 
-III- 
 
Although much planning literature dates from the 1960s and 70s, the idea had been a 
subject of considerable academic debate since the late 1920s. Some of this – like the 
work of the Socialist League, the New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB) and XYZ 
Club – was broadly party-political. But, despite the later links with Labour, much of 
it cut across established party lines.
88
 Invocations of planning were, in fact, linked to 
a much wider loss of faith in unregulated market forces during a period of economic 
gloom. Whereas cautious orthodox solutions appeared to have been rendered 
obsolete, planning appeared to offer an active solution to avoid further wasted 
capacity.
89
 As has been traced by Toye, the concept of a planned economy was the 
product of both earlier theoretical debates – in particular a 1908 mathematical essay 
by the Italian economist Enrico Barone, later translated as ‘The Ministry of 
Production in the Collectivist State’ – and the practical experience gained during the 
First World War.
90
 Nonetheless, although one can find scattered references to 
‘planning’ or ‘intervention’ beforehand, the term was only popularised a year after 
Barone’s death when Oswald Mosley published his Revolution by Reason in 1925. 
Inspired by proposals that had earlier been put forward by the Independent Labour 
Party, Mosley’s calls for a ‘policy of action’ ostensibly represented a radical call for 
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change. But, despite later developments, the extent of his radicalism should not be 
overstated. Indeed, as shown by Ritschel in his detailed study of interwar planning 
debates, a highly-practical bias ensured that even Mosley’s posturing was not 
dissimilar from other early invocations that called for greater intervention as a means 
of defending the market system against a ‘socialism’ that was still primarily defined 
in terms of public ownership.
91
 If planning was an intellectual religion, it was one 
housed in a broad church. 
 
As if to emphasise the concept’s cross-party appeal, a degree of planning would, in 
fact, also be promoted by a small group of Conservatives informally known as the 
YMCA. Drawing inspiration from the writings of Noel Skelton and David Steel 
Maitland, the group – which included Robert Boothby and the aristocratic Oliver 
Stanley – stressed that planning should be regarded as a reformist measure that 
would foster greater co-operation between the state and private industry.
92
 Utilising 
their connections with Harold Macmillan, at this point an ambitious MP representing 
the marginal seat of Stockton, the YMCA were able to cause a minor stir when their 
ideas were published in a deliberately provocative volume titled Industry and the 
State.
93
 Some of their ideas even found their way into the Liberal Party’s ‘Yellow 
Book’ on Britain’s Industrial Future which similarly emphasised the importance of 
industrial relations within a framework of national development.
94
 Mosley, too, 
attempted to woo the group and brought them into contact with the young 
industrialist Oliver Lyttelton and the pioneering aviator John Moore-Brazabon.
95
 
Although his advances were politely rebuffed, they again owed something to the 
increasingly unstable economic situation; as Macmillan noted, the suggestions 
included within their manifesto had been ‘forced upon us’ by necessity.96 
Unsurprisingly, then, the trend gathered pace as the economic situation worsened. In 
                                                 
91
 Daniel Ritschel, The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 
1930s (Oxford, 1997), pp. 64-9. 
92
 Robert Boothby et al, Industry and the State: A Conservative View (London, 1927), pp. 165-6. See 
also: E.H.H. Green, ‘The Conservative Party and Keynes’, in The Strange Survival of Liberal 
England, ed. E.H.H. Green and D.M. Tanner (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 186-211 (p. 191). 
93
 Simon Ball, The Guardsmen: Harold Macmillan, Three Friends, and the World they Built (London, 
2005), pp. 107-10. 
94
 Liberal Industrial Inquiry, Britain’s Industrial Future (London, 1928), pp. 205-225. 
95
 Ball, The Guardsmen, p. 119. 
96
 Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion’, p. 287. 
35 
 
 
1929, for instance, the Fabian academic G.D.H. Cole uncompromisingly called for 
the ‘conscious development’ of Britain’s ‘economic resources’ to meet the 
challenges being faced.
97
 Two years later, this was matched by a call for planning as 
a means of foresight from the Cambridge statistician Colin Clark and – somewhat 
improbably – the publication of a hugely influential National Plan for Britain by the 
ornithologist Max Nicholson in a special edition of the high-brow Weekend Review.
98
 
Drawing upon the ideas set out by Boothby, Macmillan, Stanley and the Liberal’s 
‘Yellow Book’, this countered Mosley’s ‘inacceptable’ statism and promoted a 
holistic vision for national regeneration that would provide an intellectual framework 
for those who later designed the wartime system.
99
 
 
Throughout these early accounts, planning was portrayed as representing a rational – 
even scientific – approach to economic management. Instead of an outright rejection 
of the market mechanism, it reflected a belief that intervention could help transform 
the current system to ensure that it worked more efficiently. This point was central to 
the maintenance of planning’s early intellectual momentum. It also fed into the 
founding of two explicitly ‘capitalist’ planning groups: PEP and the Next Five Years 
(NFY). The former was, in the words of Matthew Hilton, a classic ‘public sphere’ 
organisation that sought to provide a forum for discussion and help to link society 
with the state.
100
 Taking inspiration from Nicholson’s Weekend Review essay and 
bringing together a range of industrial, economic and political interests, both bodies 
stressed the importance of expertise and demanded co-ordinated political action to 
face the growing economic malaise.
101
 Yet, touted as a radical alternative to stagnant 
thinking, planning also augmented much political debate. Alongside Mosley’s 
famous ‘manifesto’, which Nicholson had set out to directly challenge, the Labour 
Party had also invoked the concept in 1931 with the slogan ‘we must plan or perish’ 
and would focus much of its post-election rebuilding around the issue.
102
 Following 
the logic of the examples considered earlier in this chapter, this duality ensured that 
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planning remained malleable. Understanding of exactly what the concept would 
entail was, thus, no clearer at this early stage than that which was presented within 
the work of those later historians and economists. This point was attested to by 
Durbin who, writing in 1935, noted that the term had been ‘applied indiscriminately 
to [both] large-scale and fundamental changes in economic institutions … and to the 
comparatively small alterations which the centralisation of the British milk industry 
invokes’.103 
 
There were certainly clear differences in approach and emphasis. Amongst the 
‘capitalist’ planners, PEP’s research-driven proposals tended to focus on lasting 
structural reforms whereas the NFY was quite deliberately short-term and drew upon 
the type of incremental suggestions that had been put forward since the 1920s. In 
1935, for example, the group urged the government to launch a policy of positive 
improvisation to meet the economic challenges being faced. According to an 
enthusiastic Macmillan, who became a leading figure within the NFY despite being 
increasingly ostracised by his party, much of this was simply an attempt to 
rationalise the ‘piecemeal planning’ that was already accepted practice within many 
industries.
104
 This remains an important point. Indeed, as Durbin suggested, the 
1930s saw the implementation of many measures – often described in terms of 
‘rationalisation’ – that might best be regarded as practical experiments in planning. 
The transfer of powers from the government into the hands of quasi-autonomous 
Trade Associations was, for example, symbolic of a previously unparalleled degree 
of co-operation between the state and industry.
105
 The growth of such bodies was 
regarded by Macmillan as a case in point and led PEP to later describe the 1930s as 
having witnessed a greater degree of state intervention ‘than at any other period in 
modern history’.106 Even those who were opposed to such changes – for example, the 
progressive Socialist Clarity Group (SCG) which was adamant that Trade 
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Associations had been ‘emasculated’ by vested interests – believed that they 
provided a machinery of control that made planning possible.
107
 Thus, although 
Mosley may have tried to draw a simple distinction between planners and their 
opponents to attract support to his New Party, it seemed, for Durbin, ‘almost … true 
to say that “we are all planners now”’.108 This may have been so, but any agreement 
rested upon a complicated network of different understandings and left the exact 
mechanics open to interpretation.
109
 
 
* 
 
For Sidney and Beatrice Webb, two individuals who had first considered the 
‘collectivist alternative’ in the 1889 collection of Fabian Essays, a clue to these 
unanswered questions lay in an understanding of the USSR’s economic system. 
Despite lacking much economic or technical detail, their optimistic, at times almost 
reverential, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? defined planning in terms of 
real resources and identified it as the ‘most significant trait’ of Stalin’s 
communism.
110
 Critics, too, adopted a similar characterisation. For F.A. Hayek, a 
figure who bemoaned the ‘interventionalist chaos’ of the 1930s from a very different 
perspective, planning was quite simply ‘the central direction of all economic 
activity’.111 In a view heavily influenced by Barone’s essay, it appeared not as a call 
for greater co-ordination, but as an all-encompassing – and inflexible – system of 
resource budgeting and allocation; a system of prioritisation that would rely on 
detailed plans and tight controls.
112
 It was this conception of planning that Hayek 
sought to counter within a famous series of publications that combined economic and 
philosophical arguments relating to the moral implications of planning: a series that 
was crowned by 1944’s semi-populist polemic The Road to Serfdom and collated in a 
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1949 edited collection called Individualism and Economic Order. Although his 
philosophical arguments would become increasingly important within the debate 
surrounding controls (and are considered in later chapters), Hayek’s earliest critiques 
were ostensibly focused on practicalities. Arguing that the economy had to be 
understood as the sum of a complex series of individual decisions, he contended that 
it would be impossible for a planner to maintain order as no central body would ever 
be able to calculate, comprehend or replicate these millions of small, interrelated, 
movements. Moreover, hinting at later philosophical arguments, Hayek argued that – 
even if this were possible – the knowledge that would have to be possessed would be 
implicitly bound by the planner’s initial perspective and would thus inhibit any real 
choice.
113
 
 
This technical appraisal captivated the London Economics Club and spurred a flurry 
of articles within the London School of Economics (LSE)’s Economica journal.114 
Nonetheless, its warnings did not exert much popular resonance at this point. Indeed, 
for all of his later infamy, Hayek would remain a fairly peripheral figure until after 
the Second World War. His marginality is exemplified by Macmillan’s 1938 clarion 
call The Middle Way. Drawing upon his writing with the YMCA and more recent 
work undertaken as chairman of the Industrial Reorganisation League, this included 
a remarkably Hayekian passage on liberty but continued to push for an empirically-
grounded plan defined by a central Economic Council that would gather, collate and 
interpret statistical information.
115
 Hayek’s intervention was, therefore, perhaps most 
notable for helping to stoke an intensely academic debate regarding practical 
methods of calculation. In fact, with this point, he may have even influenced more 
left-leaning economists. Durbin, to give another example, who worked alongside 
Hayek at the LSE, shared some of his scepticism and similarly emphasised the 
importance of resource allocation and democratic freedom.
116
 However, he 
maintained that his colleague – though sincere – had come to a ‘series of horrific 
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conclusions’ because he had ‘not asked himself with sufficient determination what he 
means by the phrase “economic planning”’ and had relied instead on the type of 
outmoded ‘gosplan’ model described by the Webbs.117 Written in 1945, just after he 
had been elected the Labour MP for Edmonton on the platform that he was ‘the man 
with a plan’, Durbin’s review was fighting a very political point.118 It was, however, 
a point that remained grounded in a detailed economic understanding and a more 
practical knowledge gained from co-chairing the Fabian Society’s Industrial Group 
alongside the industrial manager Austen Albu. 
 
In a marked contrast to the Hayek’s dystopian model, Durbin viewed planning 
simply as a method of securing priorities. It was, he explained, ‘a principle of 
administration and not an inflexible budget of production’.119 Indeed, responding to 
the claim that all planners would be bound by inherent prejudices, Durbin argued that 
the economy would always be controlled by somebody and that the most important 
question was who held responsibility for these controls. Setting out his approach in 
The Politics of Democratic Socialism – a highly personal text that was drafted during 
1938-39 and was intended to sit alongside a companion volume on The Economics of 
Democratic Socialism – Durbin rejected the Webbs by noting that capitalism had 
provided an ‘expanding and stable’ economy but sought to question what he saw as a 
‘separation of privilege and responsibility’.120 Drawing upon a Marxist distinction 
between ownership and control, whilst embracing a belief in the fundamental 
importance of freedom, this text sought to highlight the differences between long-
term interests and short-term gain. In doing so, Durbin chastised unplanned 
capitalism for restricting freedom and sought to re-frame planning as a method: 
 
Whereby the virtues of capitalism – rationalism and mobility – can be 
combined with democratic needs – security and equality – by the extension 
of the activity of the State upon an ever-widening and consistent basis.
121
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This was a case of shifting responsibility, not of restricting choice.
122
 Although 
Durbin’s untimely death in September 1948 ensured that the eagerly anticipated 
Economics of Democratic Socialism was never to be completed, these preparatory 
ideas were feted by his colleagues and became quietly influential within policy 
making circles. The attention he paid to the distinction between ownership and 
control would remain particularly important. Indeed, pre-empting James Burnham’s 
Managerial Revolution, a hypothetical study of a self-interested managerial society 
which suggested that legal changes of ownership might prove to be irrelevant unless 
accompanied by internal reforms, they can be seen to have influenced figures as 
diverse as Crossman, Tony Crosland and Hugh Gaitskell.
123
 With this in mind, 
Durbin himself would later be ‘rediscovered’ as having held a remarkably clear idea 
of what planning would actually entail.
124
 
 
The belief that planning could respond to public opinion whilst still maintaining a 
view of the economy as a whole was not held by Durbin alone. His NFRB colleague 
Douglas Jay had, in fact, already set out his own interpretation of The Socialist 
Case.
125
 Jay’s text would become a notable point of debate when it was republished 
in 1947. This will be explored in Chapter Four. Yet it should be noted here that his 
belief that there were some instances where ‘the gentleman in Whitehall really does 
know better what is good for the people than the people know themselves’ – a phrase 
infamously misquoted as ‘the Gentleman in Whitehall knows best’ – stood in 
contrast to a general argument that emphasised devolution and was built upon co-
operation.
126
 This model was perhaps most clearly articulated by Barbara Wootton in 
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a series of texts that began with 1934’s Plan or No Plan and ended with 1945’s 
Freedom Under Planning. In a head-on critique of Hayek that might now be labelled 
as an exercise in behavioural economics, she set out a vision based upon the setting 
of certain overarching priorities within which individual choices would be 
maintained. An explicitly ‘democratic’ proposal, she stressed that this would allow 
for an active engagement between planners and the public.
127
 For Albu, who 
provided the theoretical foundation of the SCG alongside his more practical work 
with the Fabian society, the ‘fundamental aim’ was to allow ‘each individual member 
[of society] to live the fullest possible life with the greatest possible freedom’. 
Planning would, in this sense, rest upon a positive interpretation of controls as the 
mechanism of democratic choice.
128
 Other, purely political accounts, took a similar 
line. Hugh Dalton, for example, the future Chancellor whose patronage of the NFRB 
had encouraged much of Labour’s thinking after 1931, believed that planning would 
increase choice by ‘releasing [the nation’s] creative forces’ whilst party publications 
stressed that planning would restrict ‘private control’.129 Both points were repeated 
by Harold Laski, the socialist intellectual who had moved the ‘Planned Economic 
Democracy’ motion, during a Fabian lecture that concluded with the assertion that 
planning would place ‘pivotal economic controls’ in the hands of ‘the 
community’.130 
 
Again, though, this vision of planning as a method of co-operation was not simply 
Labour-focused; instead, it drew upon a similar spirit of co-operation and 
pragmatism that had been extolled by the NFY. Reviewing The Socialist Case, for 
example, The Economist noted that, as ‘an economist with no time for the slogans of 
loose thinking’, Jay seemed to be closer to apparently sceptical economists like 
Lionel Robbins than to avowedly left wing thinkers.
131
 Furthermore, whilst Durbin, 
Jay and Wootton were all consciously ‘socialist’, they were also critical of the binary 
debate between those who viewed planning solely in terms of allocation for 
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muddling a polemic attack against these ends with a critique of the broader means.
132
 
This was certainly the view of James Meade, the future head of the government’s 
Economic Section (EC(S)), who believed that their flexible and democratic model of 
planning had the potential to provide a ‘genuine middle way’.133 Despite this 
confidence, Durbin’s charge that Hayek had not sufficiently defined “economic 
planning” did hint at continued ambiguities. Most importantly, their ponderings had 
left a crucial methodological question only partially answered: namely, how would 
you put a plan – democratic or otherwise – into practice? This omission was central 
to Hayek’s charge that no one was yet ‘intellectually equipped to improve the 
workings of our economic system’ and underpins many of the historical accounts 
sketched out above.
134
 As will be seen in Chapters Three and Five, when one looks 
back at these debates from the perspective of later developments, it is clear that this 
lack of clarity did feed into planning’s apparent failure. Indeed, as an 
uncompromising Toye has suggested, these early debates were merely evidence of a 
startlingly naïve understanding of what such a policy would mean in practice.
135
 
 
* 
 
Amongst the theorists, there were, as might be expected, differences in emphasis. 
Nicholson and PEP, through its futuristically-titled Tec Plan subgroup, had continued 
to push the role of expertise and suggested in 1932 that government and industry 
might liaise with an autonomous committee of technocrats charged with working 
individual priorities into a larger national plan. Like Wootton and Durbin after them, 
this took care to stress the distinction between means and ends and presented 
planning as being little more than a mechanical task.
136
 Macmillan, however, pushed 
instead for an arguably more corporatist solution whereby responsibility would be 
devolved to autonomous Industrial Boards – an idea that PEP also embraced in later 
calls for the ‘Self Government of Industry’. Linked to a broader call for the diffusion 
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of property, this did include a democratic element. But it would have represented a 
clear shift in responsibility away from the state.
137
 An entirely contrasting view was 
taken by Cole who believed that the centrality of the issue meant that a high-level 
‘Planning Minister’ would have to be given responsibility so that the plan remained 
answerable to Parliament. Despite having earned a reputation for being a somewhat 
utopian left-winger in the early 1930s, this interest in representation led Cole into a 
much more pragmatic stance as the decade went on and his main contribution to later 
debates was a call for the radical reform of the civil service.
138
 As shown by 
Elizabeth Durbin, the other members of the NFRB had also devoted much time and 
effort to the question of implementation. Although it is not possible to replicate the 
intricacies of their debates in the space available, it must be noted that even amongst 
this group there were clear differences in opinion – especially regarding mechanisms 
of control.
139
 
 
On this crucial question, and one which has been given less attention than those 
surrounding the institutions, debates over the relationship between direct controls and 
the price mechanism loom large. Jay and Durbin, in line with their emphasis on 
choice, advocated a broadly market-based approach and stressed that planning was 
not about replacing all existing economic indices. Indeed, influenced by Albu, who 
continued to draw upon his business experience, they saw that economic control 
would be dependent upon a psychological approach that provided new incentives and 
engaged with the ‘human factor’.140 Wootton, though, despite her own emphasis on 
co-operation, maintained that there would have to be a degree of manipulation if this 
was ever to be a practical success.
141
 A number of these issues were also taken up by 
the economist Henry Dickinson in a 1939 study of the Economics of Socialism. A 
familiar voice within debates over the possibility of ‘market socialism’, Dickinson 
used this text to suggest that licences and quotas could be used as a supplementary 
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means of prioritising production so as to create a ‘beautiful system of economic 
equilibrium’ that combined the power of the market with the foresight of planning.142 
This was an optimistic hope. Nonetheless, his insistence that such a system would 
also require manpower planning was unlikely to have been accepted without 
qualification. Indeed, although Wootton later suggested that a wage policy could be 
used to indirectly influence the labour force, the New Fabians’ faith in democratic 
choice left them hostile to any suggestion that workers could be treated akin to 
materials. Even Cole, with a defiance that symbolised his growing convergence with 
this liberal ideal, noted in 1944 that the direction of labour was a ‘Nazi remedy’ 
entirely ‘inconsistent with the requirements of a democracy’.143 It will be shown in 
Chapter Five that this led some of the New Fabians into their own optimistic 
adoption of information sharing as a means of enlightened public control. 
 
For all of their differences, however, these early suggestions were united by what 
Ritschel has called an ‘axiomatic conviction’ that a wider, and more rational, 
economic view could only ever be achieved by some form of overarching planning 
department.
144
 The literature is certainly peppered with references to ‘central 
planners’, ‘Economic Planning Boards’, and ‘Supreme Planning Authorities’. 
Nonetheless, as Toye reminds us, although Barone had shown that such organisations 
were theoretically possible, the form that they would take, or the exact role that they 
would play, was never really defined.
145
 Likewise, though Colin Clark had been 
confident in 1931 that planning would ‘cut across’ established thinking, the 
relationship between it and older economic ideals remained similarly uncertain. The 
link with nationalisation remained especially problematic. Indeed, despite the later 
confidence of The Case for Nationalisation and Control, not to mention the clear 
distinction between ownership and control drawn by Durbin in The Politics of 
Democratic Socialism, many of the Labour Party’s earliest planning proposals had 
reiterated their commitment to widespread public ownership.
146
 It was, therefore, 
perhaps unsurprising that many within the party – and especially those at the grass 
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roots – continued to view ownership and control as virtually synonymous.147 With 
this in mind, it was perhaps also unsurprising that the party’s later insistence that 
successful planning could avoid the need for a wholesale change in patterns of 
ownership should have become an obvious point of tension.
148
 It was a tension that 
erupted in 1944 when the party policy makers’ apparent ignorance of ownership led 
to a volatile Conference reaction and an infamous resolution put forward by Ian 
Mikardo – who was later to be linked with Crossman and Keep Left – that called for 
the National Executive Committee (NEC) to define its socialism in ‘simple terms’.149 
 
The only areas of real agreement – ones that united the likes of Durbin and Meade 
with those who viewed planning more inflexibly – regarded the constant collation of 
information and the centrality of investment. Both issues had been present 
throughout. Boothby had, for instance, suggested the adoption of an American-model 
of surveying industry to determine developments whilst the Liberal’s ‘Yellow Book’ 
had matched its call for ‘a programme of national development’ with the practical 
suggestion of a specialist staff to deal with the ‘complex economic problems of 
modern administration’.150 This later point was expanded upon by PEP and Tec Plan 
in 1932 with the drawing up of detailed proposals for what they dubbed a Central 
Statistical Authority to deal with the flow of information.
151
 Both issues were also 
central to the NFRB’s theoretical vision. Like PEP, Durbin stressed that plans were 
best regarded as flexible surveys and forecasts that would allow for ‘conscious 
foresight’ and the exchange of information between spheres of finance and 
production.
152
 Wootton, like her NFRB colleague, similarly stressed the need for 
greater understanding – although, in her view, and betraying her position regarding 
resource allocation, this should not simply be about measuring the current system but 
should aim towards the adding up of priorities.
153
 Again, though, the precise powers 
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that would be needed had not been so easily defined. Moreover, there was 
acknowledged to be a risk, exemplified by the ‘Gentleman in Whitehall’ and Cole’s 
emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty, that an emphasis on technical knowledge 
would hinder the aim of democratisation. As Crossman noted in 1939, it would not 
be possible to plan democratically if the planners were ‘far removed from the life and 
ideas of the mass of the people’.154 It was for this reason that Jay sought to move 
beyond the Hayekian notion of physical controls by advocating the potential role of 
redistributive taxation and stressing that any intervention would have to be 
‘intelligent, not comprehensive’.155 
 
His emphasis upon an active financial policy was indicative of a broader desire to 
harness the market through the control of investment. Although similar ideas would 
later become synonymous with the work of John Maynard Keynes, they had, in fact, 
formed a key part of the research undertaken into planning. The need for 
macroeconomic stability to be matched by a National Investment Board (NIB) was 
particularly well-versed by planning’s adherents and was widely seen as forming the 
necessary foundations for ‘basic’ control over this vital economic lever.156 It was also 
an issue upon which considerable thought had been given to the actual mechanism of 
control. Indeed, it was the only issue that Clark had considered when sponsored by 
the NFRB to investigate proposals for a ‘Planning Machinery’.157 In an interesting 
parallel with Dickinson’s proposals and the actual control mechanisms that would be 
developed under the Emergency Powers Act, a NIB was envisaged as a licensing 
body that would be responsible for the flow of capital. It would neither hold nor issue 
investments, but would be charged with examining requests and deciding their fate 
with reference to a set of defined priorities.
158
 As such, the proposal offered a clear 
point of convergence for the various interwar theorists. It was, as suggested by PEP 
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and Tec Plan, a non-partisan and nominally ‘scientific’ approach that would be 
administered by experts. As with Macmillan’s Middle Way, it would allow for 
industry to maintain its own plans at a sub-aggregate level. Like Durbin, Jay and 
Wootton’s proposals, it would not directly impinge upon consumer choice. And, 
given that it would not decide the priorities, Parliament would retain overall 
responsibility. As Wootton noted, it would be a way of ‘changing the oil without 
redesigning the engine’.159 
 
All of these themes were carried into Labour’s Immediate Programme – a notably 
Fabian policy statement that was drafted by Durbin, embellished upon by Dalton and 
published in 1937. Although the statement predates some of the works already cited, 
this document was effectively the culmination of the NFRB’s research and would 
provide the foundation for Labour’s ‘Planned Economic Democracy’ motion, as well 
as underpinning Let us Face the Future.
160
 As it would, therefore, feed directly into 
later attempts to put planning theory into practice, it provides a suitable point with 
which to take stock. In line with its author’s interests, the proposals included centred 
upon a financial understanding of planning and its call for a NIB was the primary 
mechanism of control proposed.
161
 Fittingly, however, the deliberately brief 
Immediate Programme also avoided a number of key questions. It may have stressed 
that finance would be brought into ‘a national plan’ alongside trade, industry and 
agriculture but little detail was given to the exact relationship. Moreover, having 
been unable to expand beyond the broad invocation of a NIB, an imposing 
introductory section that proposed Labour would ‘plan the economic life of the 
nation … industry by industry’ was dropped after the second draft.162 Most 
importantly, it only partially addressed the problem that one could have controls 
without necessarily being able to exercise control. Of course, the Immediate 
Programme was not to be the only influence on proposals in 1945. It was also 
possible, at least after 1939, for planning’s political supporters to look directly to the 
wartime system for practical inspiration. And, despite this being less flexible than the 
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theoretical model set out above, it will be shown in Chapter Two that many did just 
that. 
 
-IV- 
 
The interwar period might tend to be viewed through a predominantly ‘Keynesian’ 
lens but it is clear that much economic debate was defined by a more hands-on vision 
of economic planning. It is also clear that this debate was not a simple one. Instead, it 
was built upon differing interpretations that operated on a number of levels and 
which included subtle differences of opinion. As Ritschel’s study concludes, 
planning was an issue defined only by its ‘ideological fragmentation’.163 Put simply, 
planning was always conceived as a two stage process based around the wish to 
identify and attain certain priorities. As Britain contemplated its long transition to 
peace, most – though not all – economists interpreted this in a relatively flexible 
way. But numerous questions remained unanswered. Investment was widely 
regarded as crucial, but the exact mechanics of a NIB were less discussed; it was not 
clear whether the process should be proactive or reactive; the relationship between 
planning, private and public enterprise had not been considered in any great depth; 
and, although some commentators favoured a purely financial approach or one based 
on co-operation, most continued to allude to some form of control. An apparent 
inability to act on these uncertainties after 1945 would ensure that planning’s history 
has been defined in terms of failure and retreat. Most significantly, however, the very 
existence of such uncertainties is evidence that planning had always been a contested 
concept. Thus, although both sides of the debate were ostensibly committed to 
remarkably similar objectives, this should not be seen as symbolising an all-
embracing ‘consensus’. Instead, it is to emphasise the shared framework and context 
within which such differences were played out. Most importantly, it is to emphasise 
that despite the clear rhetorical divisions, these debates remained ill-defined and did 
little to clarify concepts of planning, or its control. 
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Chapter Two 
The Development of Economic Controls 
Improvisation and Adaptation, c.1939-1947 
 
It is perhaps an inevitable weakness of the human mind to conclude that the 
remedy for the glaring inefficiencies of the operation of economic planning in 
war-time was to improve the methods of planning and co-ordination … yet it 
is one of the ironies of planning that the more ambitious the system of co-
ordination constructed, the less likely it was to be successful.  
 
Ely Devons, ‘Economic Planning in War and Peace’, The Manchester School of 
Economic and Social Studies, 16:1(1948), 1-28 (p. 19).  
 
 
Despite the best efforts of those historians, economists and former administrators 
noted in the last chapter, the economic reality and evolution of economic controls 
after 1945 remains less than clear. Although most accounts point to a gradual 
diminution in the importance of such measures during the course of the long 
transition to peace, it has been shown that the scale, timing, importance, impact and 
reasons for this movement have all been the subject of numerous interpretations. 
Along with Chapter Three, this chapter attempts to offer a focused overview of 
developments within the system. Building upon the broad framework established by 
Ely Devons in 1952, they will combine a ‘high-level’ intellectual history with the 
personal insights of administrators to chart these changes against a background of 
continued misunderstanding and transitional problems. This will eventually 
encompass wartime and post-war shortages, recurrent fears regarding inflation, 
attempts to balance Britain’s trade, the 1947 fuel and convertibility crises, attempts 
to reform the system after 1947, reactions to the Korean War and efforts to better 
manage growth in the early 1950s. Of course, ending in 1947, this chapter examines 
developments during the earlier part of this period. It will, nevertheless, continue to 
question the narrative of retreat by looking in more detail at the controls that were 
assumed to underpin the act of planning. And, in doing so, it will challenge the 
assumption that planning’s failings before 1947 were the result of an intellectual 
impasse exacerbated by obstructive officials and an inability to engage with experts. 
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Before beginning this survey, it is worth noting that there are a number of obvious 
differences between the role of such expertise in theory and practice. When 
considering the economy, the former tends towards the abstract by building 
theoretical models that describe broad developments, whilst the latter attempts to 
apply such knowledge in order to identify and resolve specific problems.
1
 Though 
complementary, these branches should not be seen as analogous and – even with a 
growing interest in the application of ideas – a tendency towards the separation of 
each had grown during the 1930s.
2
 The reason for this was multifaceted. But it was 
broadly accepted that the dynamic nature and sociological underpinnings of 
economics meant that it was clearly differentiated from the natural sciences. As 
Lionel Robbins put it during an anniversary lecture to the LSE, ‘knowledge has its 
limits’.3 This point was also of great interest to Alec Cairncross and Ely Devons. 
Although an enthusiastic proponent of such expertise, Cairncross, who could draw 
upon his wartime experience as well as that gained as the government’s Chief 
Economic Advisor between 1964 and 1969, similarly maintained that practical 
decision making often turned upon ‘a balance of considerations among which 
economic factors are not decisive’.4 Devons’ view was slightly different. In fact, 
from a rather more sceptical perspective, he would maintain in an essay on personal 
knowledge that it was entirely unclear as to what exactly ‘one applied in applied 
economics’.5 All three agreed, however, that it was often the simplest things – or, to 
adopt a more theoretical term, ‘common-sense axioms’ – that mattered the most. 
This observation remains important and will be returned to at the end of the next 
chapter. Before this, however, it is necessary to understand how the theories explored 
in Chapter One played out in practice. 
 
-I- 
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The broad apparatus of controls legislated for by the wide ranging 1939 Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act provides an obvious example of the distinction between ideas 
and their application. In theory, the statutory powers enforced by each of the 687 
separate Defence Regulations ratified under the Act were designed to enable a three 
stage process of surveying, planning and programming that would allow for the 
central direction of all vital resources and productive capacity. The legal framework 
certainly ensured that an extensive apparatus of controls could be established within 
days of war being declared.
6
 However, with individual materials covered by their 
own bespoke systems of regulation, this complex web of positive and negative 
controls was entirely dependent upon its careful co-ordination with a range of more 
practical measures.
7
 Amongst the most important developments, one which followed 
Enrico Barone’s logic, had been the creation between April and July 1939 of a 
distinct Ministry of Supply.
8
 Split into fourteen sections that were individually 
responsible for certain groups of material, the Ministry exercised its power through 
the granting of government contracts, the direct allocation of some materials and a 
complex system of stated priorities that were enforced regionally and aimed to 
encourage distribution in line with an annotated list of manufacturers known as 
Register 392.
9
 To facilitate this work, Britain was divided into thirteen separate 
administrative areas under the oversight of Area Boards and regional directors who 
co-ordinated the work of individual controllers.
10
 Amongst the first recruited was the 
ambitious Chairman of the British Metal Corporation (BMC), and a future Minister 
of Production, President of the Board of Trade and front-bench Conservative 
economic spokesperson, Oliver Lyttelton. These moves were supplemented by the 
extension of existing price controls, the introduction of powers for compulsory 
purchase, and the development of a national scheme for the compulsory salvage of 
                                                 
6
 J. Backman and L. Fishman, ‘British Wartime Control of Copper, Lead and Zinc’, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 55:2 (1941), 210-38 (pp. 210-11). 
7
 Kew, The National Archives (TNA), T 230/12, Robbins, ‘Notes on the Present State of Economic 
Co-ordination’, Oct 1940. 
 
8
 H. Hartley, ‘British War Controls – The Legal Framework’, The Manchester School of Economic 
and Social Studies (The Manchester School), 11:2 (1940), 163-76 (p. 163) and J.D. Scott and R. 
Hughes, The Administration of War Production (London, 1955), pp. 68-78 and 213-232. 
9
 TNA, T 230/13, Robinson, ‘Pre-War and War-Time Government Controls’, 13 Dec 1941, pp. 7-14. 
10
 Backman and Fishman, ‘British Wartime Control of Copper’, pp. 222-3 and ‘British Wartime 
Control of Aluminium’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 56:1 (1941), 18-48 (p. 23). 
52 
 
 
metal, paper, rags and food waste. A broader survey of economic co-ordination was 
also undertaken by the National Government’s economic advisor Lord Stamp and a 
small number of academic economists were subsequently drafted into Whitehall to 
help him instigate the three stage process that came to underpin Labour’s later calls 
for a policy based upon a ‘knowledge of economic fact and circumstance’.11 
 
In a marked contrast to the First World War, these developments had been discussed 
in advance and were widely accepted. Such preparations have received relatively 
little historical attention. But, starting in the mid-1920s with attempts to learn lessons 
from the earlier conflict, it is clear that they fed into increasingly detailed planning as 
rearmament stepped up.
12
 Much of this took place behind closed doors with the 
Production Supply Organisation and the Board of Trade’s own Supply Organisation 
building detailed estimates, collating statistical returns and beginning to stockpile 
essential resources.
13
 Nevertheless, reflecting contemporary fears about the 
devastating potential of aerial warfare, an open panel of industrialists was also 
convened in 1938 to advise the government on the planning of aircraft production.
14
 
The involvement of such figures reflected an agreement struck in 1925 that existing 
structures would form the basis of any wartime system and that many controls – like 
those requiring the collection of statistics and trade returns – would initially be 
established on a voluntary basis.
15
 It was for this reason that Trade Associations and 
combines, many of which had already been given government encouragement, 
became central, whilst Whitehall’s role was conceived primarily in terms of co-
ordination. Lyttelton’s recruitment provides a particularly apt case. In fact, having set 
out plans whereby the responsibility for trading all non-ferrous metals would be 
transferred to the BMC, essentially transforming the company into a control, 
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Lyttelton, who had been made an official advisor in 1937, held the government to 
ransom by threatening non-co-operation if his proposals were refused. His antics, 
which were not helped by his dealings with the German metals giant Frankfurter 
Metallgeschellschaft, with whom he held a London directorship, led to complaints 
from other industrialists and did little to endear him to established civil servants.
16
 
Crucially, though, his preference for maintaining established channels of control was 
reflected by Stamp, who had earlier claimed that it would be ‘impossible to make a 
businessman work harder … by standing next to him with a revolver’.17 Thus, this 
was just one example of the Emergency Powers Act representing anything but a 
radical change in practice. 
 
The intelligence necessary to ensure that this system of autonomous control worked 
was the key consideration of Stamp’s survey and led to the creation, in December 
1939, a full three months after most controls had been set up, of the Central 
Economic Information Service (CEIS). This interdepartmental body of advisors – 
which was split into the Central Statistical Office (CSO) and Economic Section 
(EC(S)) in late 1940 – was made up of academics drafted from various universities 
and was charged with offering ‘a general conspectus of the economic system’ 
through the collation and analysis of ‘basic economic data’.18 As it developed, the 
CEIS and its successor bodies would also help to shape the determination of wartime 
priorities through their circulation of an influential paper on ‘Urgent Economic 
Problems’ and were later given responsibility for drafting the 1944 White Paper on 
Employment Policy. Drawing in a wide range of ‘specialists’ – including those like 
Evan Durbin and Max Nicholson who had been so influential during the 1930s – 
they certainly provide this chapter with an interesting link between theory and 
practice. Even more interestingly, although to be entirely expected considering the 
small number of professional economists available, apparently hostile individuals 
like John Jewkes and Lionel Robbins were amongst those involved, with both men 
serving as director during the course of the conflict. Beginning its work with a survey 
of war finance, an issue that had also been taken up by John Maynard Keynes, the 
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CEIS soon turned its attention to strategies for the efficient utilisation of raw 
materials and productive capacity.
19
 This reflected, as Robbins later noted, a belief 
that success in war was ‘essentially a matter of command over resources’.20 As might 
be expected, this move was most obvious in those sectors described as being 
‘essential’. To return to the example of aircraft production, for instance, a sector 
where output targets had been set at their most optimistic levels, financial limitations 
were replaced by those of capacity as early as 1938.
21
 A similar approach was 
adopted with timber which, despite the absence of any pre-war mechanism, was 
immediately transferred to a system of compulsory purchase and allocation by 
licence.
22
 
 
* 
 
When looked at with hindsight, the emphasis placed upon real resources and the 
apparent ‘conversion’ of former critics can be seen to have legitimised planning’s 
utility. The wartime system appeared, as noted by Stephen Brooke and Jim 
Tomlinson, to be both the realisation of many of the pre-war proposals sketched out 
in Chapter One and to offer a vision for the future.
23
 Examining the case of steel in 
July 1942, for example, the Labour Party’s Research Department (LPRD) noted that 
the process of control through detailed co-operation with private firms might offer an 
alternative to nationalisation within this vital industry.
24
 Two years later, much was 
also made of Lyttelton’s confident assertion that industrial production had been 
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increased by around 40 per cent when compared to pre-war figures.
25
 These 
successes helped wartime planning – when loosely defined – capture the public 
imagination in a way that had been unimaginable during the interwar period.
26
 It 
should, therefore, come as no surprise that the more overtly party-political 
discussions briefly mentioned at the outset of Chapter One fed directly upon this 
context. In 1941, for example, Labour summed up its first year in coalition by noting 
that ‘persuasion is giving way to planning’ and promising to harness the ‘surprising 
change’ in Britain’s economic organisation.27 The situation, explained the prominent 
MP James Griffiths in 1943 during a buoyant speech to the Fabian Society, had 
changed considerably since 1939. He saw that the choice was no longer one between 
planning or not, but over the type and aims of a plan.
28
 This approach would define 
Labour’s campaigning in the 1945 General Election and underpinned its rhetorical 
invocations of ‘the controls that won the war’.29 Nonetheless, the context also 
provided a basis for more practical thoughts about the structure such planning would 
take. Indeed, even Griffiths’ speech, though primarily an example of political 
oratory, attempted to flesh out its vision by isolating the need for basic controls over 
investment, priorities, regional development and trade.
30
 
 
Of course, the relationship between planning in war – with its overriding objective of 
military production – and peace was less than clear. But, for Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
wartime head of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) and future Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, it was simply incontestable that the war had ‘developed many 
mechanisms for political and economic co-operation’ that could be harnessed at its 
end.
31
 He, like Barbara Wootton and the other democratic planners, instead sought to 
differentiate between questions of means and ends. The objective, he argued, was an 
issue for the electorate, but the process was one for the experts to work out in 
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advance.
32
 Although Cripps – who had been expelled from the Labour Party in 1939 
and spent the years between then and 1945 as the Independent MP for Bristol West – 
remained unconnected from the detail of party policy making, this statement remains 
significant as he was to become virtually synonymous with Labour’s post-1945 
economic policies. Richard Toye, for instance – whose PhD thesis was based upon 
Cripps’ as then unreleased personal papers – sees him as the key to understanding 
planning’s development in the years before 1951 as his was quite simply the most 
articulate vision of an otherwise ambiguous concept.
33
 Even at this point, the spirit of 
his statement reflected efforts by the ‘experts’ sitting on Labour’s Social and 
Economic Transformation, Machinery of Government and Post-War Finance 
subcommittees to work out the detail. Like Cripps, much of their work looked 
directly to the wartime system for inspiration and the phrase ‘we are already doing it’ 
was commonly used.
34
 It was in this context that Douglas Jay – who had entered 
Whitehall as a temporary civil servant in 1940 – underwent a fairly well-known 
conversion towards an acceptance of selective physical controls as a means of 
democratic planning.35 Thus, according to Herbert Morrison, who maintained that he 
had ‘learnt a lot from the war’, a ‘prophetic vision’ was able to be substituted with a 
‘clear table of priorities’.36 To borrow a phrase from Brooke, the creation of such an 
extensive apparatus of control appeared to have delivered the very ‘building blocks 
of socialism’.37 
 
The MAP, in particular, appeared to offer something of a blueprint to the planners 
and Cripps would continually return to the experience he gained at its head. Jewkes, 
who was moved to the department from the CEIS in 1940 and served as the director 
of its planning department until 1944, would later maintain that it had become a 
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fairly tiresome example of democratic planning in action.
38
 In fact, within months of 
his taking office, whilst visiting Jewkes in the MAP’s Whitehall Chart Room, Cripps 
is said to have exclaimed that its activities proved there was ‘no limit in theory … to 
economic planning’.39 Founded in May 1940, the department can certainly be seen as 
a microcosm of the broader system and was symbolic of the unprecedented level of 
government intervention brought about by the war. Embodying the scientific nature 
of wartime planning, it was responsible for co-ordinating the manufacture of a 
modern, highly specialised, interdependent, and not to mention vitally important, 
range of products – from aero-engines and propellers to radios and radar – that were 
financed by the state but designed and built by numerous private firms.
40
 This was an 
enormous undertaking, with over 1.8 million individuals employed within the sector 
at its peak – a figure which represented almost one third of all manufacturing 
workers.
41
 Throughout his tenure, Cripps placed a great deal of emphasis on planning 
as a collaborative partnership between the state and both sides of the industry. 
Embarking on a wide-ranging tour of manufacturers, he instigated a tripartite model 
of Joint Production Consultative Committees in what was arguably the first attempt 
in Britain ‘to plan from the ground up’ and to which Toye has devoted some 
attention.
42
 For Peter Clarke, writing in his intricate biography of the future 
Chancellor, this experience marked the first ‘realisation of his talents as an executive 
minister’ and saw him win over many of his sceptical subordinates.43 Given this, 
Cripps’ confident assertion to an audience at the University of Aberdeen that ‘It can 
be done’, seemed easily justified.44 
 
-II- 
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The realities of the wartime system have, however, since been subjected to a more 
rigorous appraisal. Alongside more recent historical accounts, it was noted in the 
Introduction that the experience gained by those drafted into the system’s 
administration provided the impetus for a number of fascinating earlier studies that 
can be read alongside W.K. Hancock’s series of official histories.45 The wartime 
system would remain a lasting point of reference for many former specialists who, as 
recorded by Lyttelton, were ‘bound … by the indelible experience of those times’.46 
Many, like Devons, who was transferred by Jewkes to the CEIS as a statistician and 
would replace him as director of planning at the MAP in 1944, would use this 
experience as a lens through which to analyse post-war developments or would 
directly reflect upon their wartime role within later publications. Given the later 
invocations of the MAP as an example of success, it is significant that a number of 
these accounts were rooted in experience gained in that department’s bureaucratic 
hinterland. The MAP had, in fact, been home to a notable collection of economists 
and statisticians with Cairncross, David Champernowne, Walter Hagenbuch, Frank 
Paish, Brian Tew, Thomas Wilson, Devons and Jewkes filling some of the 
department’s 949 executive and 107 administrative positions. Crucially, the personal 
papers and recollections of such figures provide some of the most detailed surviving 
records from a department within which most early work was conducted via 
telephone or without written notes and for which ‘a large sack’ of files was lost at 
some point after 1949.
47
 This was not quite the mice eaten files about which Devons’ 
warned, but it was not far off. Moreover, and further questioning the claim that 
Devons and Jewkes were somehow ‘exceptional’ in their scepticism, the accounts 
tend to converge around a two common themes. Firstly, that the system was less 
‘planned’ than often presumed and, secondly, that it lacked the definitive objective 
and sense of direction so often attributed to it. 
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On the first point, and re-acknowledged by more recent historical investigations, the 
ambiguities regarding planning and controls highlighted earlier ensured that many 
questions remained unanswered as the war began.
48
 The function of most controls, 
Joel Hurstfield conceded, was ‘never fully defined’ because it had been ‘impossible 
to [fully] prepare for total war’.49 Indeed, despite the interwar discussions, high-
profile calls for a wholesale reorganisation of the machinery of government and 
warnings about ‘unintelligent priorities’ from William Beveridge, much of the early 
apparatus drew upon those ‘piecemeal’ practices earlier identified by Harold 
Macmillan.
50
 The priority system in force until May 1940 – and mentioned with 
regard to the Ministry of Supply – provides the most obvious example. It was 
theoretically an exercise in meticulous co-ordination that worked by assigning 
‘certificates’ or ‘symbols’ to certain goods with reference to the CEIS’ surveys, 
Register 392 and the various statistical returns submitted by individual firms. Once 
the priorities had been decided, enforcement would be devolved to a regional level 
where Area Boards made up of departmental representatives would arbitrate over 
individual claims. The production decisions would then be devolved to those 
autonomous materials-specific controllers – initially known as Controls with a 
capital ‘C’ – responsible for supervising the use of productive capacity, distributing 
materials, fixing prices and granting licences for the materials required.
51
 However, 
as inferred by the example of Lyttelton’s Non-Ferrous Metals Control, the reality 
was never quite so neat. Not only were many of the Controls drawn from existing 
Trade Associations, but the system remained reliant on self-enforcement, was 
quantified in financial terms, left certain raw materials entirely uncontrolled and took 
place within a relatively open market.
52
 Even more remarkably, individual priority 
decisions were rarely co-ordinated, relied upon an informal process of 
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interdepartmental bidding and left government departments personally exempt from 
the licensing system.
53
 
 
To give a sense of what this looked like in practice it is worth considering the 
evolution of one Control in a little more detail. Aluminium, a material which made 
up around 75 per cent of each plane produced by the MAP, provides a particularly 
useful example. Integrated into the Ministry of Supply’s priority system on 1 
September 1939 and enforced by licence a week later, the Aluminium Control was 
amongst the first to be set up. In keeping with a general policy to disperse 
administrative functions beyond London, it was initially based at the Raven Hotel in 
the market town of Shrewsbury and was made up of four controllers drawn from the 
monopolistic British Aluminium Company (BAC) and supported by a small staff of 
20.
54
 As the aluminium industry had been a virtual monopoly before 1939, the 
supply-side of this equation was carried into state control relatively smoothly.
55
 
Given its importance to aircraft production, the priority decisions surrounding its use 
were also relatively straightforward. The Control’s main function was, therefore, to 
administer ‘acquisition licences’ that permitted the purchase of metal in either its 
unwrought, alloy or scrap form (in other cases ‘disposal’ licences were also 
required). This became a parallel form of currency with firms required to submit a 
detailed ‘schedule of orders’ in order to gain a licence. So that decisions could be 
made with reference to those centrally defined priorities outlined above, each request 
had to set out specific materials requirements whilst indicating at each request’s end 
use. Given that the aluminium at stake was often required for the manufacture of 
intricate aircraft components, and that the Control required each firm involved to 
schedule every stage of production thereafter, the quantity of paperwork generated 
by this process was immense. A 1941 review estimated that the 150 applications 
received each day meant that around 10 000 scheduled customers were being 
considered at any one time (many of which would overlap).
56
 One must also 
remember that each firm had to submit separate licence requests for each material it 
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needed, and that these would be considered by each individual Control. Thus, even 
an ostensibly straightforward restriction rested on an inherently complex web of 
decision making. 
 
Given that each of its constituent parts operated slightly differently, the system as a 
whole was even more complicated. It was, however, still possible to draw a number 
of more general conclusions. Indeed, even within the system’s first six weeks of 
operation, the economic journalist Richard ‘Otto’ Clarke, who had been brought into 
Whitehall via the Ministry of Information and Ministry of Economic Warfare, felt 
inclined to publish a damming indictment of the current system which he saw as 
being wastefully segregated.
57
 This point was not lost on Evan Durbin when he was 
made responsible for drafting an EC(S) memorandum on the priority system in July 
1941. Designed as a reference text that could be sent to the USA, this adopted a 
fairly detached and surprisingly light hearted tone whilst identifying a number of 
very practical failings. Firstly, in a phrase that was later echoed by Hurstfield, Durbin 
noted that there had ‘never been any definition of the precise significance that should 
be attached to any [priority] symbol’. Secondly, he saw that there was little relation 
between priority decisions and available supplies: estimating that in some cases the 
stated priorities equated to 1000 per cent of available capacity. The relationship 
between departments was also brought to question as he doubted that they would 
ever ‘play fair’ when it came to allocating priorities to their own sectors.58 This point 
was not lost on external commentators. Jack Stafford, for instance, a pre-war 
colleague of Devons who was later drafted into Whitehall himself, had pointed out in 
1940 that a ‘tug-of-war of departmental interests’ had left the system blighted by a 
form of priority inflation as certificates were extended to such an extent that they 
became meaningless.
59
 For Austin Robinson, a founding member of the CEIS, some 
of the blame lay with individual controllers who he accused of being ‘unduly 
secretive’ and unwilling to ‘submit to detailed supervision’.60 For Durbin, however, 
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it was not that the state’s controls were too loose or that the reliance on self-
enforcement was open to abuse. The confusion was, in his view, ‘an unsurmountable 
[sic] difficulty’ within a system which was simply unable to cross-reference or co-
ordinate the action of individual Controls.
61
 
 
* 
 
Although the sources remain fragmented and comparisons with other departments 
hard to draw, the MAP provides another vivid example of the difficulties being 
faced. Initially based in the private house of its head, the press magnate Lord 
Beaverbrook, and staffed by a potent mixture of civil servants, industrialists, former 
members of the Air Ministry and Express-group journalists, the MAP was defined by 
its self-confidence, an emphasis on exhortation, suspicion at official practices and a 
virulent hostility towards bureaucracy and ‘red tape’.62 Lacking a clear organisational 
structure and operating without formal records, John Scott and Richard Hughes, in 
their civil history of wartime administration, concluded that the department’s ‘very 
essence … was its lack of definition’.63 In a fevered atmosphere that promoted 
production at all costs, it was not until 2 October 1940 that a single programme for 
production was drawn up; even then, the author was forced to admit that it had not 
incorporated ‘any of the more refined processes of statistics’.64 Given the complexity 
of each of its products, and the length of time taken in research and development, this 
enthusiastic disregard for forward planning had potentially damaging long term 
implications. For example, recalling Beaverbrook’s insistence that a prototype 
aircraft should be made available two months ahead of schedule during a 1941 
interview with Mass Observation (M-O), the head of a large engineering firm 
recalled that: 
 
The whole factory was organized into getting the ’plane ready in two 
days. The whole production schedule was disorganised, the assembly 
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line stripped, everything concentrated on the ’plane. By a stupendous 
effort … [it] was ready within two days, flown to the aerodrome, and 
handed over to the R.A.F. The job Beaverbrook had asked for had 
been done, though the factory would be interfered with for weeks 
after.
65
 
 
This was not a vision of planning that would have been recognised by the 
enthusiastic interwar theorists of the last chapter. Indeed, it was not even one 
recognised by Jewkes, whose relationship with the department began with the 
drafting of a damning report into its structure: a report that recommended an 
ambitious scheme of reorganisation and led to its author’s appointment at the head of 
a new planning directorate – given the coded title DDGstatsP – in September 1941.66 
 
As Jewkes realised, a number of the MAP’s problems could be explained by 
weaknesses in its statistical data. Similar problems, though most pronounced 
regarding small firms, were widely regarded as afflicting the entire war economy.
67
 
In October 1940, for example, Robbins had described a ‘lamentable’ and somewhat 
chaotic situation in a broad review on the subject for the EC(S). Stressing that 
‘conspicuous gaps’ in the available data had encouraged open competition for 
resources, he warned that Departmental Priority Officers had tended to wait for 
shortages to occur rather than taking preventative action to increase supplies and had 
failed to realise that scarcity meant it was impossible to increase production in one 
area without inhibiting others.
68
 It was because of such problems that Devons and 
Cairncross were transferred into the MAP. Having conducted a number of 
investigations for the CEIS from their shared office in the attic of a Whitehall 
townhouse, both would have been well aware of the situation that they would face. 
Indeed, Cairncross had even conducted a series of interviews with various Controls 
in an earlier attempt to make sense of the system.
69
 Looking back at these 
investigations after three years at the MAP, he remembered that it had been ‘almost 
impossible to obtain a comprehensive statement of outstanding contracts at a given 
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date, or to discover what cumulative deliveries of any component had been made up 
to that date’ such was the ‘primitive state’ of the available statistics.70 The situation 
was, bizarrely, somewhat self-inflicted; having preferred to see targets as an 
incentive rather than a guide, MAP figures before 1942 bore little relation to reality 
and it was privately accepted that those published were between 15 and 45 per cent 
above the level that might actually be attained.
71
 Cairncross would, therefore, delight 
in the absurdity of a system that had left 300 propellerless Wellington bombers 
stranded on a beach in Blackpool and remained adamant that most of the individuals 
involved simply did not understand how to co-ordinate a production programme.
72
  
 
The relationship between the MAP and other departments was another point of 
concern. In the summer of 1940, for example, at the height of the Battle of Britain, 
Beaverbrook had issued a series of ‘super priorities’ in an attempt to requisition 
materials and machine tools from the Ministry of Supply without informing the 
newly appointed Herbert Morrison. This action, which was eventually ‘torpedoed’ by 
a Ministry of Supply Controller, exacerbated a tension between two departments 
which saw themselves as the key to Britain’s war effort.73 Relations with other 
divisions were scarcely better. Indeed, even Beaverbrook’s sympathetic successor, 
John Moore-Brazabon, was forced to admit that it was ‘rather ridiculous’ that the 
MAP had been ‘scarcely on speaking terms’ with either the Air Ministry or RAF 
when he took over in late 1940.
74
 Reflecting on his experience as a Board of Trade 
Priority Officer, in an essay for Norman Chester’s Lessons of the British War 
Economy, the historian Richard Pares stressed that this reliance on personal contacts 
had left guiding principles ‘indeterminate’ and ensured that central directives often 
had very little influence on the behaviour of individual Controls.
75
 Lyttelton, like 
many of his contemporaries, had certainly sought to circumvent official channels by 
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exploiting an ‘extensive network of personal contacts’.76 This was a particular point 
of concern for planning’s enthusiasts. The New Fabians, for example, who held a 
special conference on the subject in 1940, regularly questioned the ‘fear of treading 
on the toes of private enterprise’ in their Fabian Quarterly. Aluminium Control was 
subjected to a particularly vehement critique for having enforced an inflated regime 
of price controls that guaranteed the BAC was paid £94 per ton of metal produced.
77
 
The idea that the system was beset by self-interest would, of course, become a 
central component of Arnold Rogow and Peter Shore’s influential critique, but even 
the established voice of The Economist noted that: 
 
It is a waste of talent to use a business man where his experience prevents 
him from being open-minded, and where his inescapable self-interest is a 
drag on that energy in ruthlessness that is so often needed … How could it 
have been imagined that the best method was to leave each to whip 
himself?
78
 
 
Though partially responsible, this indictment was shared by Robbins who accepted 
that the system was unworkable in the long term and had failed to increase production 
‘as rapidly as was hoped’.79 
 
* 
 
When set against these initial uncertainties, the period 1940-42 represented a notable 
triumph of co-ordination with the priorities system superseded by one that included a 
greater degree of central allocation. Pioneered by the Ministry of Supply, the new 
process drew the departmental Priority Officers into a strengthened committee, 
reconfigured the Area Boards and integrated new subcommittees for materials, 
capacity, works and manpower.
80
 This high level reorganisation sat alongside 
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attempts to rationalise individual Controls. Responsibility for Aluminium, for 
example, was passed from the Ministry of Supply to the MAP in August 1940 and 
was integrated into a new Light Metal Control at Banbury in 1941.
81
 The move, 
which coincided with a shift from voluntary to statutory enforcement and the issuing 
of more flexible Open Licences to key firms, was an explicit attempt to cut out some 
of the earlier repetition.
82
 Thanks to the detailed work of Devons and Harry 
Campion, these changes also paved the way for a ‘revolution’ in the collation of 
statistics.
83
 With the circulation of a series of secret Economic Surveys, planning had, 
it seemed, finally been fully embraced.
84
 The situation at the MAP, which was 
considered in detail by Postan, Scott and Hughes, also suggests that it was something 
of a success with the number of finished aircraft roughly doubling between April 
1940 and November 1942.
85
 In contrast to the department’s haphazard early 
development under Beaverbrook, Cripps attempted to bring further stability after this 
date by enforcing an explicitly ‘realistic’ approach working from a base level of 
available airframes and aero-engines. The position of the DDGstatsP was also 
strengthened and key variables like holidays, sickness and absenteeism were taken 
into account for the first time. This careful approach won the confidence of key 
figures like Air Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman who returned to the department as chief 
executive having left during Beaverbrook’s term.86 It also made Cripps seem, to 
Devons at least, ‘too clever to be a Minister’.87 Crucially, however, fundamental 
questions remained unanswered, and practical difficulties lingered on. 
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The physical realities of wartime economic planning had certainly surprised many of 
those drafted into its administration. Like the system of quasi-autonomous Controls, 
the central administration had been something of an improvisation with offices 
hastily converted in a former residential house and accommodation requisitioned 
from the University of London’s Bedford College (although Robbins would claim 
that many colleagues often slept at their desks).
88
 Alec Cairncross would recollect 
that this created a cramped college-like atmosphere where most business took place 
off the record and previously eminent economists were forced to share desk space, 
typewriters and rudimentary calculating machines.
89
 A strong sense of the surreal can 
be traced throughout his – and many of his colleagues – often darkly humorous 
recollections. It was, he claimed, not always clear who was in charge and the top 
official involved at the outset – the somewhat eccentric Francis Hemming – was also 
the acting Secretary of the Zoological Society of London (whose Regent’s Park 
gardens were located just six hundred metres from Bedford College). This was a 
situation where hasty decisions, involving millions of pounds – and the lives of 
service personnel – were seen to have been taken on the basis of ‘imperfectly 
remembered figures, and calculations scribbled on the backs of envelopes’.90 For 
Durbin, the overcrowded, unplanned and ‘squalid’ conditions endured were matched 
only by the ‘obstructive’ attitudes and ‘intellectual isolation’ of the more permanent 
civil servants.
91
 This point may well have been contested by Robbins, who 
maintained that the specialists had ‘become part of the machine’, or Robinson, who 
Cairncross described as being ‘addicted to administration’, but an unwillingness to 
play by the rules is repeated elsewhere.
92
 Indeed, as explained by Devons, the 
rigorous monotony and ‘bureaucratic ennui’ of official committee meetings provided 
a constant source of discontent with participants either detaching themselves from 
proceedings completely, or finding subversive ways to liven them up.
93
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Recollections from those at the MAP again provide plentiful evidence of a situation 
that appeared, in Cairncross’ words, to be ‘one gigantic muddle’.94 Reflecting on his 
time in the department, Devons – who was broadly supportive of wartime planning – 
remained adamant that its committees simply lacked the overarching scope and clear 
sense of priority that had been envisioned by the likes of Durbin, Wootton and Jay. 
Their views were, in his words, ‘a complete travesty of the way in which planning 
operated during the war’.95 There were a number of very practical reasons as to why 
this might have been the case. To begin with, it should not be overlooked that the 
MAP’s workforce had grown rapidly after 1940. Moreover, this growth, from just 
under 8 000 during the Battle of Britain to 21 113 in 1944, was incredibly uneven, 
with nine times as many executive positions as there were administrative ones.
96
 As 
Jewkes explained in a measured critique for the EC(S), the burden exerted upon 
these administrators was merely exacerbated by continuing ‘blind spots’ – rubber, for 
example, remained free from any form of restriction until 1942 – and the concurrent 
retention of both priority licensing and allocation systems of control.
97
 In accordance 
with the emphasis many of the interwar theorists had placed on information, other 
problems could be attributed a ‘consciousness of imperfect knowledge’.98 Indeed, 
even after the Ministry’s rationalisation, Jewkes would privately complain that 
aircraft planning was akin to ‘gazing into the crystal’.99 Not only did responsibility 
for data collection remain in the hands of the Production Directorate, but a reliance 
on cumulative delivery figures hindered attempts at the formulation of a single 
production programme. As Devons grudgingly concluded, the collation, tabulation 
and analysis of statistics was still regarded as ‘inferior, degrading and routine’ by 
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many at the centre and – perhaps more importantly – by the firms themselves.100 
Given that every forecast relied upon this information, such weaknesses cultivated an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion and led to a process of ‘statistical bargaining’ that 
rested on a general rule of thumb rather than any detailed understanding.
101
 
 
The continued reliance on private firms and former Trade Associations raised further 
questions. Indeed, although the system of direct allocations introduced after 1940 
was a more stringent method of control than the earlier priority system, many firms 
started out with unaccountable stocks and a lack of restrictions over end uses ensured 
that it remained relatively blunt. As most schemes worked in allocations of weight, 
they were also imperfect guides for the planners who were charged with ensuring the 
production of specific components.
102
 Such questions were particularly important for 
the MAP which was almost entirely reliant on private firms for production. This, as 
Robinson noted in a detailed review conducted in 1942, was inevitable given the 
technical knowledge that industrialists brought with them.
103
 Nonetheless, he also 
recognised that their role had become ‘a matter of widespread discussion’ and was 
marred by accusations of self-interest.
104
 For M-O, who conducted their own, highly 
critical, report into war production during 1942, this was seen to have been worsened 
by an overconfident approach to public relations that had obscured the difficulties 
faced.
105
 This was not without justification. In fact, even in an era of ‘realistic 
planning’, it was rare for companies to meet the optimistic estimates that had helped 
them to win licences.
106
 Competition between firms also continued a wasteful 
duplication of functions, with over thirty separate airframes (including twelve 
different designs of Spitfire) being produced concurrently during November 1942.
107
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It was because of such problems that Cripps would take the controversial decision to 
nationalise two firms that he saw as having failed in March 1943.
108
 The problems 
were, however, not limited to private firms. Not only was the definition of those raw 
materials being controlled subjected to notable debate, but intradepartmental 
relationships were just as confused with the MAP’s planners being barred from 
dealing directly with the Air Ministry by their own Production Department.
109
 
Reliant upon a personal friendship between Devons and his opposite number, 
Caincross recalled that the MAP had been unable to see the planning directorate ‘as 
anything more than a kind of publishing house’ with ‘no central place in organizing 
the production of aircraft’.110 
 
Practical problems were obviously important, but the difficulties were arguably even 
more complex. Challenging the view that every problem could be explained by a 
paucity of information, Robinson – despite later being characterised as a 
‘gosplanner’ – admitted that ‘no amount of statistical investigation could have 
yielded … forecasts of the accuracy that some laymen would like to believe 
possible’.111 Indeed, as was recognised by Devons, the statistical gaps that beset the 
MAP’s Chart Room were just one symptom of a more fundamental weakness within 
a system that aimed for the multifaceted co-ordination of interdependent and 
constantly evolving products in a fluid environment beset by uncertainty and 
demanding of rapid decisions.
112
 This point was clearly echoed by some of his 
contemporaries. Macmillan, for example, who served as Morrison’s Parliamentary 
Secretary at the Ministry of Supply between 1940 and 1942 and helped shape the 
control of allocations, noted a perfectly co-ordinated ‘machine would … have to be a 
large and complicated one’ that was able to be cope with requirements that changed 
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on an hourly basis.
113
 Chester, another former Manchester academic who was drafted 
into the CEIS in a bid to promote greater efficiency and who would later publish a 
handful of seminal analyses of British political administration, was similarly adamant 
that the sheer complexity of the system ensured that its administration was 
essentially impossible.
114
 Cairncross, too, believed that decisions taken at one level 
often failed to reach those responsible for implementation. This was seen to have 
created a ‘casino-like atmosphere’ where major decisions were taken ‘unconsciously 
and by default’ by officials and junior employees who were often ‘uncertain of their 
function’ and unaware of the implications.115 This would be particularly vexatious 
for those, like Wootton and Austen Albu, who had stressed that democratic plans 
could be defined via an open process of two-way consultation.
116
 But it was also 
fairly troubling for Postan who questioned whether the example provided by the 
MAP was one of planning at all and noted that their activities seemed to have been 
limited to ‘closing the gap’ via the careful control of resources.117 
 
Although he saw the MAP’s administrative confusion as an inevitable result of the 
‘number of interrelated variables that could be comprehended by one brain’, Devons 
was well aware that decisions – whether informed or in ignorance – still had to be 
made.
118
 In fact, like Cairncross, he presented doing nothing as being a choice in 
itself. Thus, although planning seemed to imply greater centralisation, Devons 
maintained that devolution was an inevitable process and the subsequent tension 
between those in Whitehall and those at the periphery lie at the heart of his analysis. 
Drawing upon his nascent interest in social anthropology and management practices, 
his wartime diaries and post-war writings emphasise the relative autonomy and 
arbitrariness of his work, the role of administrative politicking, the importance of 
tacit knowledge and continued conflicts over competing objectives.
119
 The MAP 
                                                 
113
 Bodleian Library, MACMILLAN, c. 268, Macmillan, ‘The Industrial Capacity Committee of 
Supply Planning’, 29 May 1941. 
114
 D.N. Chester, ‘The Central Machinery for Economic Policy’, in Lessons of the British War 
Economy, ed. D.N. Chester (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 5-33 (pp. 19-31). See also: W.J.M. Mackenzie and 
J.W. Grove, Central Administration in Britain (London, 1957), p. 350. 
115
 Cairncross, Wartime Planning, p. 19. 
116
 Barbara Wootton , Freedom Under Planning (London, 1945), p. 110. 
117
 Postan, British War Production, pp. 452 and 4. 
118
 Devons, ‘The Problem of Co-ordination’, p. 114 and ‘Economic Planning in War and Peace’, p. 19. 
119
 Devons, Planning in Practice, p. 14. 
72 
 
 
was, put simply by Cairncross, built upon an atmosphere of ‘rumour and gossip’.120 
It was for this reason that Devons would present planning as being a caucus-like 
political activity that rested upon personal relationships, political manoeuvring, a 
degree of secrecy and one’s ability to ‘play the game’.121 Despite their attempts to 
develop a more rational mechanism, this point seems to have been well-recognised 
by the EC(S) and the likes of Macmillan. The latter was certainly keen to maintain 
the Ministry of Supply’s bargaining power and argued passionately against the loss 
of departmental ‘prestige’ that eventually accompanied the transfer of responsibility 
for the control of aluminium to the MAP.
122
 It should be remembered that even 
Cripps’ realistic programme was primarily built upon exhortation and the personal 
relationships fostered during his extensive tour of aircraft factories.
123
 But, instead of 
giving into despair, Devons – like Jewkes and Cairncross – appeared to revel in the 
sense of absurdity. ‘The best planners’ were, in his view, ‘those who realised that 
complete and overall planning … was quite impossible’.124 
 
-III- 
 
The day-to-day administration of the war economy may have remained unclear, but 
thoughts had already begun to focus upon the transitional needs of the immediate 
post-war by this point. Such moves had begun in late 1941 when Robinson circulated 
a detailed draft report on existing controls – of which passing reference has already 
been made – to the other members of the EC(S) and was continued through the early 
spring of 1942 when he began to draw up a range of proposals for the system’s 
future. Robinson, who had embarked on a ‘fact-finding’ mission and collated a 
number of detailed appendices relating to specific materials, stressed that all future 
plans would have to consider immediate relaxations, the reinforcement of strategic 
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measures and the relationship between positive and negative controls.
125
 
Underpinning this report was a growing realisation that the transition to peace was 
likely to be marred by a build-up of excess demand, continued shortages and severe 
dislocation. As Robbins noted in a separate memorandum, the current problems were 
‘likely to be child’s play’ compared to those that would emerge once the ‘the straight 
jacket’ of wartime production was removed.126 Unsurprisingly, then, Robinson’s 
tentative conclusions embodied a growing belief that many controls would have to be 
maintained – albeit in a simplified form. This recommendation was echoed by the 
socialist economic historian R.H. Tawney who had been employed by the 
government to examine the impact of decontrol after the First World War and 
warned that the experience of inflation proved that rapid decontrol was a ‘danger to 
be avoided’.127 It was also repeated by Lord Woolton, the former industrialist and 
future Conservative Party Chairman, who as Minister of Reconstruction called for 
‘careful planning’ whilst urging that present ‘obstacles’ should be removed.128 Like 
Woolton, who longed for a new mechanism of ‘ascertaining industrial opinion’, 
Robinson also attempted to elaborate on the positive function of long-term planning. 
Stressing that new techniques still had to be found, he noted that the ultimate aim of 
any such action was to make planning – in the wartime sense – unnecessary.129 
 
Robinson’s papers represent the first attempt to make sense of the system as a 
coherent whole and were consciously written to spark discussion. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, they highlighted a number of unresolved issues. Despite the 
importance attached to the interrelationship between positive and negative controls, 
the constitution of the former remained a particular point of uncertainty and 
Robinson was forced to admit that his first draft had unconsciously managed to avoid 
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the questions it had raised.
130
 His final report was no less clear with its appendices 
referring to licences and allocations – usually classified as negative in that they 
restricted the working of the price mechanism –  as positive controls in so far as they 
offered new incentives.
131
 The question of priorities was also identified as being 
particularly troublesome. Recognising that ‘thousands of individual applications’ 
would have to be considered – and without the supposed clarity of objectives 
provided by the war – it was stressed that a mechanism for further decentralisation 
would have to be developed.
132
 Nonetheless, the administrative burden of such an 
apparatus and the nature of the relationship between government, industry and 
experts formed further points of debate – especially as it was realised that most of the 
specialist personnel were, by their very nature, in temporary positions.
133
 Further 
questions surrounding the timing, sequence and extent of decontrol remained unclear 
and it was openly admitted by Robinson that much of his thinking over the length of 
the transition had been a matter of ‘guess work’.134 His belief that planning should 
aim for a more efficient equilibrium was also criticised by Meade who noted that 
‘stabilization was not an end in itself’ and called on the EC(S) to pay further 
attention to defining those positive measures that would be needed in the longer 
term.
135
 
 
With the practical questions raised by the system continuing to excite attention, 
Meade’s was not the only voice promoting further theoretical deliberation. In 1942, 
for instance, Durbin set out to elaborate upon his belief that planning would ‘greatly 
improve the efficiency of our industry’ in his ‘Case for Socialism’ whilst the Fabian 
Quarterly began to publish a series of short ‘points for planners’ alongside the more 
detailed work of Joan Robinson and David Worswick. With greater potential 
significance, the year also saw G.D.H. Cole hold the first in a series of secretive 
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conferences on reconstruction under the auspices of Oxford’s Nuffield College. 
Bringing together a wide range of opinion – including Durbin, Beveridge, Robert 
Boothby, the reformist Conservative MP Quintin Hogg, the industrialist Sam 
Courtauld, the head of the Trade Unions’ Congress (TUC) Walter Citrine and the left 
leaning economists Thomas Balogh and Nicholas Kaldor – these conferences 
provided a forum for debates over the nature of Britain’s post-war economic future 
and led to a number of publications including a report on Employment Policy and the 
Organisation of Industry that predated the more famous White Paper bearing part of 
its name. Interestingly, a number of those involved drew upon wartime experiences 
to amend an earlier outright opposition to controls.
136
 Such shifts sat alongside 
broader attempts to elucidate alternative approaches. Balogh’s ‘Outline of a Plan’, 
which was published in 1944 alongside a collection of essays drawn from the high-
brow World Review, was one such example and combined its call for selective 
controls with measures to direct capital investment and promote efficiency.
137
 Not 
everybody agreed. Indeed, although some industrialists were clear that ‘some 
freedom must be sacrificed’, 120 others had signed an alternative plan promoting a 
hierarchy of Trade Associations and a smaller number formed their own pressure 
group called Aims of Industry to promote a wholly free market approach.
138
 The 
publication of F.A. Hayek’s explicitly philosophical The Road to Serfdom in 1944 – 
a text that was supposedly written on behalf of those like Jewkes and Robbins who 
had been ‘silenced’ by their role in government – further stoked the discussion and 
led directly into the rebuttals from Durbin and Wootton considered in Chapter One. 
 
Many of the ideas being discussed at the Nuffield conferences were reflected in 
Labour’s official policy making channels. Also devoting considerable attention to 
such questions, they were similarly keen to point out successes within the wartime 
system but took equal care to stress that a faith in planning did not mean that the 
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party was simply in favour of maintaining existing controls. In another interesting 
synergy, their faith was encapsulated by Cole in an influential policy statement 
entitled The Old World and the New Society which married a vivid critique of pre-
war instability with a call for scientific post-war planning.
139
 Echoing the language of 
Durbin, Jay and Wootton, the pamphlet attempted to address questions of flexibility 
and took great care to underline its commitment to democratic choice by invoking 
the benefits of ‘community planned production’.140 This emphasis was reiterated by 
Harold Laski as Labour’s ‘Planned Economic Democracy’ motion was tabled at that 
year’s conference and, again, in 1944 when Morrison called for a ‘ladder of controls’ 
that would allow relaxation at lower levels.
141
 Even the pugnacious Emanuel 
Shinwell, who was not often associated with flexibility, carefully differentiated 
between ‘wise planning’ and ‘innumerable forms’.142 However, like the theorists, the 
party appeared less clear on exactly those that would be required and its vision of the 
future was as retrospective as its description of The Old World. A short 1944 
blueprint, Full Employment and Financial Policy, which drew heavily upon the 
rhetoric of the earlier statement, attempted to offer some clarity with proposals for 
licensing investment and controls over the location of industry but remained fairly 
vague.
143
 Instead, its wording, like that of the 1942 planning resolution, caused 
confusion amongst the wider party and led many to question whether it actually 
represented a renunciation of their commitment to nationalisation – this was not 
helped when Hugh Dalton misleadingly described it as a ‘Keynesian’ proposal.144 
With detailed internal memoranda simply failing to define the ‘essential controls’ 
that they referenced, this all hinted at a more fundamental muddle.
145
 
 
Back in the committee rooms of Whitehall, with the drafting of the White Paper on 
Employment Policy well underway, 1944 saw attention refocus on the more practical 
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problems posed by the detailed apparatus of control legislated under DR55. By this 
date, an imminent end to hostilities was being widely predicted and a gentle three 
stage process of transition had begun to be sketched out by the EC(S). Working 
within these parameters, a short paper on decontrol had also been circulated by 
Chester in an attempt to promote further discussion about those restrictions that 
could be removed.
146
 In an effort to add further detail to his plans, Woolton’s 
Ministry of Reconstruction was charged with undertaking a new investigation under 
the aegis of its Organisation of Industry sub-committee (R(OI)) and an informal 
interdepartmental Committee on Controls. Continuing to be given practical support 
by the EC(S), this move reflected a new sense of urgency. Nonetheless, their 
eventual findings also testified to continued uncertainties and an increasingly 
stringent criticism of the current system. Woolton, in particular, having canvassed 
views from industry was particularly critical and hoped that a ‘jolly good batch’ of 
controls could be removed.
147
 Nonetheless, testifying to the confusion, Chester, 
despite having agreed that many controls would be unworkable in peacetime, 
believed that Woolton had failed to account for the interrelationship between 
different measures and had not properly considered departmental needs.
148
 This point 
was important. Indeed, despite Woolton continuing to push for relaxation, not to 
mention the EC(S)’s own preference for positive measures, it had become 
increasingly obvious from departmental fact-finding that ‘most of the existing 
controls’ would have to be continued.149 The R(OI)’s ‘practicable’ interim report – 
which was partially drafted by Jewkes, who was himself fast becoming a vocal critic 
– embodied this tension and prefaced its recommendation for the renewal of DR55 
with the warning that controls were a ‘vexatious interference’ that could ‘frustrate 
the whole process of reconstruction’.150 Even this was not enough for Jewkes, who 
felt compelled to contradict his official recommendations in a lengthy personal 
memorandum to Woolton.
151
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Amongst the most interesting issues highlighted by this report were the practical 
difficulties that had faced those attempting to review a system of autonomous 
Controls. In fact, despite his continued involvement as an advisor, Chester railed 
against findings that he unflatteringly described as ‘a collection of departmental 
observations’ and maintained that ‘Ministers [would] not find a great deal of 
guidance’ in the committee’s work.152 Although this was a stringently held 
interpretation, other admitted that they had been unable to take a holistic view. 
Norman Brook, for example, who as Woolton’s Permanent Secretary had chaired the 
R(OI), noted with some despair that individual departments had failed to engage with 
the process and warned that his terms of reference had been based upon a number of 
seemingly arbitrary assumptions about the nature of the transition.
153
 Despite further 
redrafting by the EC(S), these problems ensured that it was not until October 1944 
that an amended summary of the R(OI) investigation was presented to Cabinet. 
There, it was cautiously agreed that there could be no simple relaxation so long as 
materials were scarce; instead, every control would have to be judged according to 
its own individual purpose and with regards to the ‘essential contribution which it 
makes towards the general objective of national policy’.154 As Woolton had 
personally informed Churchill in advance of the Cabinet’s meeting, this would mean 
that 87 Defence Regulations would be immediately relaxed, 27 would be removed 
soon after the end of hostilities, 21 would be restricted in scope, but at least 175 – 
including the wide ranging DR55 – would have to be retained for an unspecified 
amount of time.
155
 These recommendations were subsequently delivered to 
Parliament by Churchill in an account that sought to disassociate controls from more 
fundamental questions regarding planning and stressed they were just one part of a 
broader partnership between the government and society.
156
 As will be seen in 
Chapter Four, there was an interesting political motive behind this move. But, for all 
of its problems, his intervention ensured that the R(OI)’s report would underpin the 
government’s policy towards controls throughout the long transition period. 
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That it was able to do so can also be traced to a decision to write a cautious 
commitment to their retention into later drafts of Employment Policy (which, 
confusingly, the R(OI) then used to justify its recommendations in their final 
ministerial report). Accepted across the political spectrum, this White Paper 
embodied much of the thinking that had taken place since 1942. It accepted a degree 
of planning so as to counter expected inflationary pressure and agreed that many 
controls would be retained ‘so long as supplies [were] abnormally short’ in order that 
investment could be focused on essential production and the expansion of exports 
encouraged.
157
 Its recommendations would be reiterated just days before the Wartime 
Coalition fell apart, with the Cabinet agreeing on 4 May 1945 – despite reservations 
regarding the timeframe and its preamble – that this would be best achieved by the 
transfer of emergency legislation into a new Supplies and Services (Transitional 
Powers) Act.
158
 Following an argument developed in detail by Keith Middlemas, the 
ideas established by Employment Policy are also widely regarded as having set out a 
political framework that would define the post-war period, with the document often 
invoked as a defining symbol of political consensus.
159
 Meade, who drafted the 
White Paper under Jewkes’ guidance, certainly agreed that it cut across established 
political boundaries.
160
 However, given that he had maintained a deliberate opacity 
throughout its drafting, the extent to which it provided either of the main parties with 
anything more than a very broad framework can be brought to question. It was this 
profound lack of clarity that had led the Labour Party to offer its own views with 
Full Employment. Nonetheless, even as late as April 1945, with Labour ministers 
pushing the Cabinet to accept the draft Supplies and Services Act, the LPRD was 
forced to admit that it too had never properly considered those controls that would be 
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required and was forced to draw upon a TUC Interim Report on Post-War 
Reconstruction as the only available guide.
161
 
 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Conservatives appeared to 
be similarly uncertain about the future. Despite offering his own ‘Four Year Plan’ for 
recovery in 1943, Churchill’s insistence that the immediate war effort should be his 
government’s primary aim is well-worn within a broader historiography that has also 
emphasised the winding-up of much of the Conservatives’ policy making machinery 
after 1939.
162
 The role of the party’s Research Department had certainly been limited 
to the collation of a few press clippings and the endorsement of the London Chamber 
of Commerce’s assessment that controls should only be used ‘where it can be shown 
that the object cannot be achieved in a less disturbing way’.163 The party was not, 
however, entirely dormant during this period and its Post-War Policy Consultative 
Committee (PWPCC) did consider the issue of controls as part of an investigation 
that involved a wide-ranging consultation with industrialists and certain unspecified 
‘experts’. Their findings, published in 1944 as a booklet on The Future of British 
Industry would provide a basis for the policy making conducted after 1945. With the 
primary emphasis placed upon human relations and the need for greater co-operation 
between the state and private firms, controls – excepting those over the location of 
industry – were presented as purely transitory measures. They had, in the report’s 
words, ‘no intrinsic virtue in themselves’. Instead, it was argued, private industry 
should enjoy the ‘maximum freedom’ within a set of ‘straightforward rules’ that 
protected societal interests.
164
 It was, however, also admitted that this was not a 
‘detailed political programme’ and that the broader call for co-operation had not been 
developed to any depth (except to note that the Board of Trade should be turned into 
a Ministry for Industry and Commerce).
165
 Moreover, as John Ramsden reminds us 
in his detailed history of the party, the PWPCC’s work was never explicitly endorsed 
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by the leadership, was not included in any manifesto and was not published until late 
June 1945.
166
 
 
That month’s election campaign, which will be explored in Chapter Four, symbolised 
the extent of their uncertainty. Like Labour, the Conservatives’ manifesto accepted 
the recommendations put forward by Employment Policy and reminded its readers 
that some of them had been included in Churchill’s own ‘Four Year Plan’.167 Yet, 
both Churchill and Lyttelton stressed that they were wholly opposed to most controls 
and, in language that implicitly invoked Hayek’s newly-published The Road to 
Serfdom, the party contended that such measures reeked of totalitarianism and risked 
inflicting a ‘bureaucratic torpor’ upon the economy.168 As will be seen later, this 
would come to define the Conservatives’ opposition to controls after 1945. 
Nonetheless, at this point, with Hayek’s conclusions still to reach a truly mass 
audience, the most overtly hostile activity was confined to the political fringes 
through the activities of groupings like the National League for Freedom, the Society 
for Individualists, Aims of Industry and the laissez-faire Progress Trust.
169
 Moreover, 
other Conservatives had taken a much more conciliatory view, with the genial Peter 
Thorneycroft seeking to engage Meade in an academic discussion about the potential 
role for flexible planning within a democratic system.
170
 Taking a characteristically 
centrist stance, Anthony Eden maintained that the party was not against all such 
measures but was adamant that they must remain temporary expedients lest the 
nation fall ‘into a state of mind where [they] are thought good for their own sake’.171 
For a post-war generation of ‘New Conservatives’, this would later be seen as a 
practical example of their own Middle Way.
172
 But, slightly more cynically, it could 
also be seen as evidence of a party that had been left facing in two directions. For 
Richard Crossman, it was evidence that Eden was literally ‘thoughtless’ whilst his 
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party ‘floated rudderless under a flapping sail of good intentions’.173 Given that even 
Churchill would refer to a widespread ‘concern within and without the Party at the 
supposed lack of Conservative policy’, this view was not as extreme as it seemed.174 
 
-IV- 
 
These shared uncertainties became all the more significant following the 
unconditional surrender of German forces on Monday 7 May. Popularly celebrated 
as Victory in Europe (VE) day, this marked – at least for those economists in 
Whitehall – the start of Stage II: the initial period of reconversion that would run 
until the end of the war in the Pacific and allow the gradual running down of war 
production. Following the acceptance of the R(OI)’s recommendations, the task of 
defining the exact controls that would be needed during this stage had passed to an 
informal Working Party on Economic Controls (EC). Outdoing Woolton’s 
predictions, they had identified 179 Defence Regulations that were removed 
overnight. Even so, their subsequent investigation was beset by its own contextual 
problems. Indeed, somewhat ironically for a working party charged with better 
defining the ‘transition’, the EC was twice forced to revise its findings when the 
swift Japanese surrender following the previously inconceivable bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that earlier temporal assumptions of a smooth two 
year readjustment were indeed dramatically wrong.
175
 Any understanding of British 
controls policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s can only be understood when 
considered within this context. The transition from a global conflict was necessarily 
determined by the facts and there was certainly no shortage of them.
176
 Britain faced 
a severe excess demand for raw materials, fuel and manpower;  its trade figures stood 
at just a third of the pre-war level; its debts were £3000m higher; its foreign assets 
had been squeezed and currency and gold reserves depleted; the favourable lend-
lease agreement with the USA was terminated just days after the Japanese surrender; 
and a $5bn dollar loan granted by Washington in the autumn was secured only after 
protracted negotiations and was contingent upon a pledge to make sterling fully 
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convertible.
177
 With this, attaining a balance of payments – particularly to ‘hard’ 
currency areas – became a preoccupation and it became increasingly obvious that 
domestic consumption would have to be constrained and exports increased by 
between 50 and 75 per cent in order to afford vital foodstuffs, raw materials, 
machinery and plant.
178
 
 
This situation would have impeded any government. Nonetheless, when, on 26 July, 
two and a half months after VE day and three weeks after the majority of electors 
had cast their vote, Clement Attlee became the Prime Minister of a majority Labour 
government, the relationship between the apparatus of controls that sought to keep 
this context in hand and Labour’s commitment to ‘plan from the ground up’ came to 
the fore once again. For all of their confident rhetoric, it has been shown that many 
of those uncertainties and debates begun in the 1930s had yet to be fully exorcised.
179
 
Indeed, assessing the situation from an autobiographical perspective, Cairncross 
would later recollect that ‘Nobody in Whitehall, whether officials or Ministers, 
seemed to have much idea of what was to be planned, or how’.180 Cairncross, who 
briefly served as a freelance advisor before moving to the Board of Trade in 1946, 
would continue to battle against this ignorance, but many of his colleagues – 
including Devons and Jewkes – took this opportunity to return to a more ‘civilised 
existence’. It is for this reason that Peter Hennessy and Keir Thorpe have both 
suggested that the steady drift of these young specialists away from Whitehall after 7 
May was the main reason for continuing uncertainty.
181
 The centrality that both place 
on expertise was, as noted, certainly stressed at the time. Echoing the theorists 
mentioned in the last chapter, Cripps’ believed specialist knowledge to be a precursor 
to successful planning whilst discussions between Meade and the Treasury’s 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, not to mention the Employment Policy 
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white paper, had placed economists at their heart.
182
 However, when maintaining a 
specific focus on controls, rather than on the more nebulous faith in planning, the 
argument does miss a couple of important points. 
 
Drawing upon distinctions between theory and practice, it must firstly be 
remembered that the link between planning and controls had never been assured. 
This was explicitly recognised by Employment Policy’s call for ‘new techniques’ to 
be found.
183
 Secondly, as has been made evident, many of Hennessy’s specialists had 
felt constrained by their wartime duties and, despite their administrative roles, had 
been unable to develop a particularly coherent system. An early critique published by 
Jewkes that sought to highlight a profound lack of clarity amongst his 
contemporaries certainly casts doubt on whether things would have been any clearer 
had he and other former colleagues remained.
184
 It should also be considered that, 
although one can detect hints of internal tension – for example within Meade’s 
personal diaries or his successor’s open criticism of the ‘very poor’ inheritance left 
by the EC(S) – it had always been envisaged that many would depart leaving a 
‘revolving door’ of specialists moving between government, industry and academic 
institutions.
185
 In contrast to the related claim that Labour’s policies were 
undermined by a bureaucratic obstinacy, Bridges – who headed the civil service – 
was also particularly keen that many of the ‘younger people’ should stay on.186 A 
significant number would heed his call with Dow, Nita Watts, Ronnie Tress, 
Nicholson and Robinson amongst those who joined Cairncross in extending their 
service. This ensured that those inside the system continued to look beyond its 
bounds to help clarify their approach. Robinson, for example, continued to edit the 
Economic Journal whilst the highly-enthused Meade continually drew upon a 
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flexible and democratic approach that had been given new weight by the twenty-nine 
chapters of Abba P. Lerner’s intricately technical The Economics of Control.187 The 
new government, too, consciously referred to academic sources and immediately 
considered a LPRD memorandum produced by Worswick that drew attention to the 
need for a degree of relaxation alongside ‘a full, authoritative account of the working 
of … controls’.188 Furthermore, despite its overt hostility, even Jewkes’ essay is 
evidence that planning remained academically in vogue. 
 
It would, however, be a mistake to claim that confusion had no impact. Indeed, to 
give a fairly innocuous example, Robinson spent his first month at the post-war 
Board of Trade without an office pass due to a series of administrative errors.
189
 On a 
more fundamental level, Worswick’s paper obviously rested upon the fact that the 
system had ‘been shrouded in obscurity during the war’ and that it was still necessary 
to define individual controls.
190
 The drafting of the Supplies and Services 
(Transitional Powers) Act – which was the first piece of legislation to be introduced 
by Labour – provides a further case in point. Echoing the logic of the 1939 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, it would allow ‘the application of certain Defence 
Regulations for purposes connected with the maintenance [of] control and [the] 
regulation of supplies and service besides the purposes for which Defence 
Regulations may be made’.191 In doing so it merely legislated for controls without 
fully defining what they constituted. Such an outcome had been partly anticipated. 
Indeed, even in 1941, Robinson had complained that – beyond a minimum level of 
agreement – questions over retention would ultimately be coloured by the exact aims 
of a post-war government.
192
 Nonetheless, this did not stop the issue becoming the 
subject of controversy with the draft Bill painted as a blank cheque for 
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‘totalitarianism’. As will be explored in Chapter Four, the reality was less 
contentious than sometimes claimed. But it is worth noting here that concerns were 
raised that a number of Labour members – including Cripps, who had been appointed 
President of the Board of Trade and was slowly turning the department into a 
Ministry for Industry whilst pushing for the adoption of a ‘National Plan’ – were 
fixated with constructing what Meade light-heartedly referred to as a ‘gosplan’.193 
The very fact that his joking comment was able to become a potent issue highlighted 
that an exact definition of planning remained elusive. 
 
This situation had not been for want of trying. In fact, even before July’s election 
result became known, preparations for a comprehensive survey had begun and a 
group of high level civil servants had met to discuss the problems and possibilities 
faced.
194
 Their recommendations fed into a summer of detailed discussion and – 
given an additional political impetus by Cripps – eventually led to the creation of an 
Official Steering Committee on Economic Development (ED).
195
 With the decision 
not to set up any form of distinct National Investment Board (NIB), it was this body 
that would oversee planning policy from November 1945 until it was gradually 
superseded in 1947. Much of the work drew upon existing practice. The decision to 
pursue a long term survey of resources and expenditure was, for example, based on 
the three stage process set out by Robbins in October 1940 whilst the collation and 
presentation of statistics continued to draw upon the methods devised by Devons.
196
 
Cripps, too, recreated at the Board of Trade a number of the innovations he had 
introduced at the MAP and called for even greater co-operation between the state and 
both sides of industry.
197
 Indeed, despite his ‘gosplan’ tendencies, Cripps had fully 
accepted Meade’s belief that planning must move beyond ‘negative and restrictive 
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controls’ and had overseen this being written into the memorandum that underpinned 
the ED.
198
 He would even express dismay that the new Supplies and Services Act – 
which had been set back by the rapid Japanese surrender – was too focused on 
restrictive controls and might not be suitable for economic planning.
199
 This 
coincided with two important shifts. The first was a move from thinking about 
Controls as embodied by individual controllers, towards a more impersonal system 
of agencies ‘sponsored’ by departments. The second was the beginning of a 
departmental process of decontrol that saw another 48 Defence Regulations removed 
by 9 October and included the abolition of almost all controls over the labour market. 
As Morrison told Parliament, ‘where the public interest requires that [controls] 
should be modified or withdrawn, then we shall modify or withdraw them’.200 
 
This initial flurry of activity set out an approach to planning that would define 
government policy until 1951.
201
 But, despite seeking to move beyond the wartime 
system, Meade’s proposals had focused upon the role that would be played by his 
colleagues in the EC(S) and the CSO and was less than clear on the mechanics of 
implementation. Possibly explained by his preferences for financial restrictions and a 
lack of first-hand experience in administration, his suggestions regarding controls 
were, according to the Lord President’s Office, remarkably ‘unexceptional’.202 As a 
result, responsibility for the efficient running of the system was instead charged to 
the Lord President’s own Industrial Subcommittee (LP(I)).203 Also a new body, this 
replaced the wartime R(OI) and inherited the EC’s ill-fated report, which was 
belatedly considered by an ad hoc Cabinet committee in the same week as Meade’s 
planning paper. This report formed the basis of another key memorandum bearing 
Morrison’s signature: a paper boldly entitled ‘The Future of Economic Controls’ that 
set out the dual intention that some controls would be used ‘deliberately’ as 
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instruments of policy whilst others – especially at lower levels – would be relaxed.204 
Yet, despite its forward facing title, this was, more accurately, the reflection of an 
already agreed policy and remained solely focused on the application of wartime 
controls during the initial transition. Accepted as a guide for the first six months 
only, it moved, in theoretical terms, little beyond Morrison’s earlier call for a 
graduated ‘ladder of controls’. The main step forward was, therefore, practical rather 
than fundamental with the creation of another new body that was given responsibility 
for keeping the system under constant review. And so, in early winter 1945, the LP(I) 
set up an interdepartmental Official Committee on Controls (OC) under Nicholson’s 
chairmanship as a permanent replacement for the informal EC. 
 
Nicholson, who continued to act as the Lord President’s chief advisor, was 
immediately charged with undertaking an ‘urgent review’ of current controls and 
asked to provide a forum for lower level relaxations.
205
 An attempt to modify 
existing mechanisms, there can be little doubt that Morrison, who had overseen the 
changes made at the Ministry of Supply, would have recognised the similarity 
between the OC’s approach and that spearheaded by Macmillan in May 1940. 
Nevertheless, like the EC and LP(I) before it, the committee was to be short-lived. 
Wound up within a year of its inauguration, Nicholson later noted that it had 
succumbed to the continued shroud of obscurity surrounding controls policy.
206
 This 
failure exemplifies the inherent difficulties that accompanied the enforced separation 
of planning and controls policy. On the one hand, responsibility for the long term 
function of controls had been assumed by the ED. On the other, relaxations towards 
the base of the ‘ladder’ were never fully co-ordinated with any high-level plan. The 
initiative remained within individual departments. Moreover, in spite of the obvious 
desire to replace the wartime framework, uncertainty over the future direction of 
policy meant that many departments were unwilling to give up their individual rungs 
on the ladder.
207
 Instead, fundamental questions regarding the suitability of such 
‘negative and restrictive’ instruments remained unanswered. This was, it must be 
stressed, recognised by many of those entrusted with the task of administration. Party 
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to discussions in the LP(I), for example, John Maud, a pre-war lecturer in politics 
who had served in the Ministry of Reconstruction before becoming Morrison’s 
official secretary, remained adamant that – as with the R(OI) – a fundamental point 
had been missed in discussions where the word ‘restriction’ had deliberately been 
avoided but from which no alternative mechanism had emerged.
208
 Sir John Henry 
Woods, a senior civil servant working under Cripps at the Board of Trade, similarly 
questioned whether the controls being employed were suitable for making 
adjustments ‘with the speed and certainty required’.209 
 
-V- 
 
In public it was being claimed that a coherent planning apparatus was rapidly 
replacing the wartime system. This was, as described by an enthusiastic Kenneth 
Morgan, an exciting time where ‘the Gentleman in Whitehall dominated the 
collective ethos’.210 Speaking at Labour’s Annual Conference in June 1946, for 
instance, Laski used the Chairman’s Address to assert that the ‘age of Socialist 
Planning ha[d] arrived’.211 Four months later, Morrison gave the public a glimpse at 
its inner workings during a well-received speech to the Institute of Public 
Administration. Although dismissed by Toye as a ‘banality’, this speech is notable 
for the unprecedented level of detail given and was widely regarded by 
contemporaries as seminal.
212
 Publically explaining the structure and relationship 
between the various steering committees for the first time, Morrison sketched out a 
five stage democratic plan that revolved around an empirical survey of resources, the 
combination of this data with production estimates, the widespread discussion of 
these forecasts to work out priorities and co-operation with industry to see them 
realised.
213
 He admitted that this was a ‘very large and complicated business’ and 
                                                 
208
 TNA, CAB 124/687, Maud to Morrison, 13 Sept 1945. Despite Morrison hoping that he would be 
given a full time planning role, Maud was promoted to Permanent Secretary of the Board of Education 
later in 1945 and would be spared further involvement in such matters until he was transferred to the 
Economic Planning Board in 1952. 
209
 TNA, CAB 134/186, ED(46)7:2, 8
 
Oct 1946. 
210
 Morgan, The People’s Peace, p. 30. 
211
 Labour Party, Report of the 45th Annual Conference (London, 1946), p. 178. 
212
 For reactions, see: The Economist, 26 Oct 1946; The Times, 18 Oct 1946 and Jewkes, ‘Variety 
Amongst the Planners’, p. 100. For Toye’s view, see: Labour and the Planned Economy, p. 194. 
213
 Herbert Morrison, ‘Economic Planning’, Public Administration, 15:1 (1947), 3-9  
90 
 
 
that it would never be exact. But, emulating Durbin and building on Meade, it was 
argued that the highlighting of ‘gaps’ would be a useful exercise nevertheless.214 
Most importantly, Morrison stressed that it was to be a co-operative exercise. He 
clearly stated that this was not – whatever Morgan would later claim – about ‘control 
by a few people sitting in Whitehall’.215 Instead, his vision was closely aligned with 
that which had been put forward by the NFRB and is considered further in Chapter 
Four. In another useful link between ideas and their application, the speech itself was 
considered in detail by the ED and encapsulated a belief that some level of planning 
– whether flexible, inflexible, the basis of a New Society, or simply a framework to 
help Britain readjust to peace – was both inevitable and possible.216 Yet, as Toye 
suggests, it also left the questions raised by Woods entirely unanswered. 
 
On the question of alternative mechanisms of control, Morrison drew upon the long 
series of government reviews outlined above and his own wartime writings to 
emphasise that negative controls were entirely transitional and that ‘alternative ways’ 
would be adopted in the longer term.
217
 But the nature of these alternatives remained 
uncertain and Morrison was unable to develop upon his earlier pledge that ‘good will 
and resourcefulness’ would replace many of them.218 As a result, The Financial 
Times described how a ‘veneer of planning gospel’ seemed to have been laid over ‘a 
vast deal of higgledy-piggeldy departmental practice’.219 Accepting this premise, The 
Economist warned that Morrison was simply in danger of promising too much and 
contrasted his optimism about the mechanics with less positive forecasts that were 
released just two days after his address.
220
 Planning’s inevitability was brought into 
even sharper focus three months later when a succession of crises fed into a 
burgeoning academic critique of the government’s approach. From 21 January 1947, 
with Morrison bed-ridden by illness, severe snowfall brought many coal mines and a 
large part of the transport network to a grinding halt. This – exacerbated by an earlier 
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failure to build adequate coal reserves – led to a serious fuel crisis, saw production 
stall and made two million workers temporarily unemployed.
221
 In the medium term, 
the weather led to a fall in exports worth c. £200m and upset the balance of trade. 
Perhaps more permanently, it dented international confidence in the run up to sterling 
being made convertible and may have contributed to the flood of investors who 
would ditch the pound in favour of the dollar when this policy was finally carried 
through on 15 July. The fact that Morrison’s Public Administration address had 
anticipated that a shortage of miners could lead to factory closures did not make the 
situation any less damaging.
222
 That similar warnings from Jay had been ignored 
since late 1945 merely added to the sense of confusion.
223
 As Morrison later 
admitted, it was all evidence of a ‘conflict of priorities’ within a system that his 
government had yet to master.
224
 
 
A number of those economists who had been involved within the wartime system 
were keen to offer their personal reflections on this situation. Writing in the Lloyds 
Bank Review, for example, Robbins drew upon his CEIS experience to identify 
‘defective’ planning as the root cause given that demand had been allowed to outstrip 
supply.
225
 He had, with more potential impact, earlier written to The Times to 
complain that any ‘competent person’ would have seen the crisis as inevitable.226 
Many of his contemporaries agreed. The industrialist Edwin Plowden, who had 
joined the MAP from the BAC in 1942 and remained the department’s Chief 
Executive after 1945, was adamant that the government had become complacent and 
overly optimistic about its ability to manage the economy.
227
 This was expanded 
upon by Devons, who pointed out that a pent up inflationary pressure had been 
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provoked by the very system of controls designed to suppress it.
228
 This argument 
had been explored in detail by W. Manning Dacey and J.R. Hicks at the height of the 
financial crisis. Referring primarily to the fuel situation, both criticised the 
government’s continued use of controls for failing to tackle the root causes of 
inflation whilst fostering an artificial level of demand that led to an accident-prone 
‘empty economy’ and the imposition of further controls.229 Hugh Gaitskell, working 
under Shinwell at the Ministry of Fuel and Power (MFP), came to a more personal 
conclusion when he traced his department’s failing back to a Minister whom he 
characterised as impulsive, over confident, ignorant of statistics and entirely unable 
to comprehend the system’s working. He noted bluntly that, ‘As an administrator … 
S. is hardly a starter. He has no conception of either organisation or planning’.230 The 
Economist, in an argument that would form the basis of Rogow and Shore’s later 
critique, was similarly adamant that those at the top had spent very little time 
considering their actions.
231
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Jewkes presented this vicious 
cycle of ever-increasing inflation, controls, austerity, inflation and controls as a 
‘classic example of planning in crisis’.232 
 
His characteristically acerbic Ordeal by Planning provided an important link 
between these questions and more mundane issues thrown up by the administration 
of controls. Again, these were well-recognised in Whitehall, with the OC’s report 
including a whole section devoted to ‘irksomeness’ and the EC(S) having warned 
that productivity was being ‘blocked by controls’ since 1945.233 As was explained by 
the Conservative economic spokesperson Oliver Stanley, a one-time member of 
Macmillan’s YMCA and former President of the Board of Trade, during a thoughtful 
Parliamentary analysis: 
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Everyone knows how it works. Civil Servants in Departments do not add 
controls and permits simply for the sake of doing so, but when the Minister 
has given a general directive as to what his objective is, somebody thinks of 
some way in which that objective can be avoided, and so a new provision has 
to go in to deal with the evasion … until in the end … you get a system 
which may be far more elaborate, cumbersome and burdensome than the 
general purposes of the control require.
234
 
 
Moreover, with a continued division of responsibility between departments, some 
materials remained concurrently controlled by separate allocation, production, 
disposal, export and price controls. With firms still obliged to submit requests for 
each material required and over one thousand different types of licensing 
arrangement in operation, it was no wonder that Chester relayed to the readers of 
Public Administration his belief that the system was ‘grossly overloaded’.235 Nor was 
it surprising that the Federation of British Industries (FBI) should have accused 
controls of having ‘sapped initiative’.236 Indeed, although many of FBI’s members 
accepted the principle of intervention – with some, like Courtauld, who just 
happened to be Rab Butler’s father-in-law, even enthusing about the possibilities of 
‘planning with a small “p”’ – the inherited system of self-regulation built upon 
detailed licence requests was rightly seen to be mired in red tape.
237
 It was, for 
instance, often the case that manufacturing firms could find their licence requests 
accepted by two departments before being rejected by a third. According to 
Lyttelton, who had joined Stanley on the Conservatives’ front bench, private industry 
had found itself trapped in a ‘game of battledore and shuttlecock between 
government departments’.238 
 
Nowhere was this truer than in the building industry, where poor co-ordination 
between different government agencies had led to a huge oversupply of building 
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licences during the course of 1946. Operating over demand, rather than supply, the 
issue of new permits had failed to take either material stocks or the availability of 
manpower into account. In fact, with Harold Wilson, at this point a junior minister at 
the Ministry of Works, admitting that: 
 
In spite of the ring fence placed around the building materials industry … 
The rate of wastage … is nearly 50 per cent of the whole labour force, 
 
the programme had been allowed to proceed at a ratio of one builder per house 
started.
239
 In spite of this, an ambitious new housing programme, calling for the 
completion of 240 000 new homes within a year, had been published in January 
1947. Coinciding with the industrial retrenchment forced by the fuel crisis, it was 
admitted that ‘it [had] not been possible to arrange for any increased [softwood] 
supplies’. Yet, even with these estimated to be 25 per cent below target, the Ministry 
of Works stressed that it was ‘not proposed … to limit the total housing programme 
because of uncertainty as to this single factor’.240 This would have disastrous 
consequences. Indeed, despite the existence of 187 574 incomplete builds, not to 
mention an additional 100 000 sites that had been given provisional licences, no 
further action was taken to limit the supply of permits, to encourage co-operation 
between different construction companies, or to co-ordinate the housing programme 
with controls over industrial building.
241
 This backlog ensured that the rate of new 
builds continued to outstrip the number of completed properties in every month 
before November 1947. With scarce labour and materials pumped into sites that had 
no hope of being completed, the programme was completed 41 per cent below target. 
For Nathan Rosenburg, who completed a PhD on the subject under Worswick’s 
guidance, ‘This [was] a very strange planning’.242 
 
Such failings fed into a more populist critique. Indeed, so incensed was he by the 
ensuing crisis, the Oxford economist Roy Harrod would even interrupt his summer 
holiday – and work on a biographical study of Keynes – to produce a highly-charged 
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account called Are These Hardships Necessary? which linked an attack on industrial 
controls with criticism of more overt consumer regulations.
243
 Drawing upon aspects 
of the ‘empty economy’ thesis, he stressed in a follow-up essay, that it was 
particularly damming that the government seemed to have ‘no plan at all … only a 
multitude of unrelated and uncoordinated restrictions, interferences and controls’.244 
Talking to one of his party’s MPs, David Clarke, the head of the Conservative 
Party’s Research Department, stressed that this was, ‘rather like screwing down the 
safety valve whilst you go on stoking the boilers’.245 Keen that such arguments 
should be put to a wider public, he later encapsulated these thoughts in a measured 
public lecture that took the example of steel allocations, a mechanism which the 
government had been using as a de facto control of investment, to explain how initial 
attempts to schedule the orders of over 6 000 firms – which meant considering 
around 20 000 end users – had led an inexperienced staff to grant licences for twenty 
per cent more steel than was actually available. The scheme was, he noted with 
relish, eventually scrapped and started again.
246
 There were a couple of exceptions to 
this hostile turn. Balogh, for one, maintained that the situation could be explained by 
inconsistent relaxation and stressed that only stronger controls would avoid ‘curing 
inflation by inflation’.247 The Keep Left group, with whom Balogh would later be 
aligned, similarly called for ‘a greater sense of urgency’ and tighter controls.248 
Nonetheless, with many of the problems rooted in decisions that that had been taken 
as the apparatus had been hastily constructed after August 1939, or when it was 
hastily adapted six years later, Stanley had been perhaps closest to the mark when he 
noted in 1946 that it was more important for a wholesale examination of the entire 
apparatus to be undertaken first.
249
 
 
-VI- 
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This chapter has shown that, as Britain moved through the crises of 1947, the 
relationship between planning and controls continued to beguile. The situation is 
aptly summarised by a note sent from Ronnie Tress to Alec Cairncross on 21 June. 
In it, he questioned the whole concept of a transition given that nobody seemed to 
know where they were transitioning to. Officials, he argued, were being asked to 
both overcome short term problems and construct a long term plan on the 
assumption that: 
 
controls are to tide us over ... [that] we must use what machinery we have, we can’t 
have any new controls and it isn’t worth rationalising the whole construction.250 
 
Six months later he would raise these fears again during a public address to the 
Manchester Statistical Society which criticised the ‘dangerous and wasteful’ 
practices that he was partially responsible for.
251
 The machinery was, as it had been 
since August 1939, certainly far from coherent. It was one that operated across a 
number of levels and was made up of hundreds of individual controls that were each 
as specific as the materials being controlled and the departments responsible for 
controlling them. As had been pre-empted by Cripps in the debate over the Supplies 
and Services Act, the failure to move beyond this blunt, complex and – in many 
respects – arbitrary conception of planning can, therefore, be regarded as the 
principal reason for failings before 1947. But to view this simply as an intellectual 
failure or to blame those who sought to put the policy into practice would be to miss 
the point. Even without a single blueprint, ‘planning’ continued to excite much 
thought. Morrison’s 1946 Institute of Public Administration speech was, to give but 
one example, clearly influenced by a range of theories echoing Durbin’s notion of 
planning as foresight, Meade’s liberal-socialism and Jay’s emphasis on consumer 
sovereignty.
252
 It should also be remembered that this machinery had been something 
of a success and had enjoyed a far more rational development than had been the case 
during the First World War.
253
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This was, however, as Tress recognised, a story of improvisation and pragmatism. As 
Hurstfield’s measured account conceded, the apparatus was ‘never fashioned into the 
perfect instrument’ because ‘the difficulties of fully co-ordinating and directing so 
diverse and powerful a group of controls proved insuperable’.254 Writing with half a 
century’s hindsight, Toye has presented this as one part of a wider paradox wherein 
seemingly complementary practical and ideological motives for a degree of planning 
contradicted each other in practice and were hindered by a belief that planning was 
already occurring.
255
 This chapter has shown that his paradox was perhaps even more 
intractable when viewed from within. Some level of control was obviously 
necessary, but the complex, decentralised and interlocking nature of the apparatus 
seemed, to those involved, to have rendered any holistic review impossible. Thus, 
whereas Toye suggests that the planners failed to fully utilise the controls available, 
it was perhaps more important that they still struggled to comprehend them and had 
been unable to resolve Devons’ tension between centralisation and devolution. It was 
in this sense, to return to Morrison’s speech, that The Economist questioned whether 
the picture was ‘as deliberately planned as Mr Morrison makes out’. Like those in 
Whitehall, if notably more poetic, it concluded that the system’s real impetus lay in 
‘the outer departmental darkness, away from the planners’ fluorescent lights, out 
where the winds of unplanned economic pressure blow’.256 Whilst the fuel crisis 
proved this thesis to be broadly correct, it was with industrial controls that the 
analysis was most apt. Indeed, just weeks after Morrison’s triumphant speech, the 
OC imploded after having failed to integrate departmental procedures and another 
editorial in The Economist asked rhetorically ‘Where is the Overall Plan?’.257 To 
label this as obstruction would be to mistake weariness with hostility. 
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Chapter Three 
The Development of Economic Controls 
Rethinking and Reaction, c.1947-1955 
 
There are perhaps two main features of  interest in this description. The first is 
the close resemblance which the basic methods of planning today bear to 
wartime methods. … The second striking feature of the economic planning 
machinery under both recent governments is perhaps the most puzzling. It may 
be expressed in the form of a question: How does the system manage to work 
at all? 
  
R.S. Milne, ‘Britain’s Economic Planning Machinery’, The American Political Science 
Review, 46:2 (1952), 406-421 (pp. 420-1). 
 
 
The last chapter has shown that – despite contrary political opinion – the economic 
controls originally established by the 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act did not 
provide a simple framework within which planning could be achieved. Instead, 
prevalent confusions and differences of opinion ensured that there was no single 
point of reference for even the most enthusiastic of planners. Nonetheless, even if it 
is agreed with The Economist that the period before 1947 was one of controls 
without an overall plan, it has also been noted that the years that follow are often 
portrayed in terms of a definitive retreat from both. Looking back from 1955, the 
Conservative Chancellor Rab Butler pointed to a ‘long march to freedom’ in which:  
 
We have burned our identity cards, torn up our ration books, halved the 
number of snoopers, decimated the number of forms and said good riddance to 
nearly two-thirds of the remaining war-time regulations.
1 
 
Delivered in the run up to a General Election, Butler was obviously fighting a party-
political point and his speech carefully obscured a wider belief that – even by 1950 – 
Britain had moved inevitably towards rapid decontrol. The last years of Labour’s 
administration are, as noted in Chapter One, often defined in terms of consolidation 
and retreat. They are years that remain synonymous with Harold Wilson’s infamous 
Bonfires of Controls and Sir Stafford Cripps’ statement in 1950 that the Budget was 
                                                 
1
 Conservative Central Office (CCO), The Campaign Guide: 1955 (London, 1955), p. 68. 
99 
 
 
now his ‘most important control’.2 In contrast to the severe dislocation of the 
immediate transition, these years – excepting the shock of devaluation and 
inflationary pressure of the early 1950s – also appear to show remarkably steady 
progress. Industrial output had improved beyond official expectations, 40 per cent up 
on 1946 figures by 1950, exports were 75 per cent higher than pre-war figures and 
balance of payments problems had been put into temporary abeyance by 
devaluation.
3
 It is for these reasons that both of David Worswick and Peter Ady’s 
influential edited collections identified them as a distinct phase in Britain’s economic 
history – albeit one that was soon challenged by an economic literature that remains 
dominated by accounts of ‘muddling through’.4 
 
The following pages will consider these themes by continuing the overview begun in 
Chapter Two. The chapter will show that attempts to rationalise the system following 
the fuel crisis did lead to an increased emphasis on decontrol, with the proportion of 
materials subject to allocation falling from two thirds in 1948 to a half in 1950 and 
being almost negligible in 1955.
5
 Yet, it will also demonstrate that the framework of 
controls provided for by Defence Regulation 55 (DR55) would remain in place 
throughout this period and that it continued to pose questions even as Britain finally 
exited its transition to peace. Industrial controls were something of an anomaly 
within a landscape of progress. To analyse why this should have been the case, the 
chapter will continue to work within the framework established by Ely Devons in 
1952 to examine developments against a background of uncertainty and continued 
transitional problems. As might be inferred from the phrase ‘muddling through’, 
confusion over the economy was certainly not constrained by electoral boundaries 
and Butler has been subjected to as much criticism as Herbert Morrison had before 
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him.
6
 The context, too, and especially the impact of escalating military intervention 
on the previously obscure Korean peninsula after 27 June 1950, looms large. The 
growing sense of panic certainly disrupted the transition and, as had been the case in 
1939, raw materials prospects overshadowed policy making – forcing a notable 
extension of controls.
7
 Many of these measures were short-lived, but it would be a 
mistake to see them simply as temporary expedients. Instead, even within a period 
that would become defined by the Orwellian-sounding concept of ‘rethinking’, there 
was a marked degree of continuity. Most importantly, controls continued to raise 
important questions and were defined by what Christopher Dow, echoing the 
religious language of Chapter One, described as a ‘primitive faith’.8 
 
-I- 
 
Although it is contended that the overall picture of this period would remain framed 
by uncertainty, it began with two detailed attempts to sketch out the landscape within 
which economic controls would operate. The first was the result of a programme of 
work that had been undertaken by the Economic Section (EC(S)) and Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) in the eighteen months following July 1945. In an answer to 
the rhetorical question that ended the last chapter, both bodies had sought to adapt 
their wartime practice of collating quarterly statistical surveys to meet post-war 
demands and had drafted a broad Economic Survey for 1946 during the early winter 
of 1945. As will be seen in Chapter Five, attempts to publish this document were 
eventually abandoned and it would remain unseen by the public despite calls for 
‘maximum publicity’.9 Just over a year later, however, at the point the fuel crisis 
broke in February 1947, an Economic Survey for 1947 was published. Akin to the 
work of Jean Monnet in France, it was intended to form the first part of a long-term 
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plan for both real and financial resources whilst also fostering public engagement in 
the project.
10
 To this end, it was given a preface to clarify the approach taken, 
debated in the House of Commons, accompanied by a popular version entitled The 
Battle for Output, given a partisan redrafting by Douglas Jay as Labour’s Plan for 
1947 and used to underpin Michael Young’s Labour’s Plan for Plenty. Nonetheless, 
it was the eloquent preface, which promoted a flexible approach that would use ‘a 
number of methods … to influence the use of resources in the desired direction, 
without interfering with democratic freedoms’, that would become the Survey’s most 
lasting legacy.
11
 
 
Neatly encapsulating an approach that linked the pre-war writings of the New Fabian 
Research Bureau (NFRB) with the experience gained by wartime specialists, the 
Survey has since become something of a historiographical landmark.
12
 Its vision of a 
flexible and co-operative version of planning crowned the mood of optimism that 
had existed before 1947 and chimed perfectly with ideas put forward by Sir Oliver 
Franks in a series of three reflective lectures delivered to the LSE during February 
and March of that year.
13
 It was, for this reason, welcomed by Hugh Dalton as a ‘real 
start to central planning’.14 But, alongside the fuel crisis, the Survey also provides the 
historian with further insight into the inherent tensions surrounding this economic 
ideal. Speaking at a Fabian lecture later in 1947, Douglas Jay set out the Survey’s 
rationale in terms of ‘plans’ and ‘priorities’. It was not, he stressed, ‘an impossible 
statistical blueprint for the daily lives of 45 million human beings’ but a general 
statement of aims and guide for their achievement.
15
 This may have been so, but as 
David Champernowne, another economist to have spent the war at the MAP noted in 
the Oxford Institute of Statistics’ Bulletin: 
 
A careful reader will find that high priority is given to: Coal, power, transport, 
steel, other basic industries and services, textiles and other consumption goods 
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and services, manufactured goods, export goods and services, raw materials, 
capital equipment, shipping, shipbuilding, agriculture, building, building 
materials, defence and public services; and that the following are major 
objectives: Increase of labour force, increase of output per man-year, 
redistribution of labour, reduction of costs and prices, maintenance and raising 
the standard of living, preservation of democratic freedom and free choice, 
short-term gains and full employment.
16
 
 
Not only did this absurd litany of priorities fail to reassure increasingly sceptical 
commentators, but they also ensured a lack of coherence with an almost unnoticed 
‘long-term plan’ that was published later that year.17 The 1947 Survey can, therefore, 
be seen as embodying a debilitating unwillingness to take difficult decisions.
18
  
 
This was particularly evident regarding controls. Indeed, despite its preface, the 1947 
Survey actually said very little about the instruments that it would use to attain its 
long list of objectives. Instead, it merely sketched out the system that had been 
inherited in 1945 whilst noting that such ‘controls cannot by themselves … make 
very fine adjustments’.19 Jay’s Fabian lecture was equally indeterminate, ending with 
a call for ‘purposive improvisation’, whilst his party-political Plan for 1947 
remained focused entirely on the immediate need for transitional controls.
20
 So, 
despite being hailed as a great step forward, Otto Clarke noted that it was a ‘rather 
peculiar document’ that reminded him of ‘bricks without straw’.21 This caught the 
interest of Devons and John Jewkes who, writing a joint review of the Survey, noted 
that it seemed an ‘uneasy marriage’ between two fundamentally conflicting ideals.22 
Devons would further explore the lack of an alternative mechanism during a faculty 
seminar paper given in Manchester later that year. Reflecting upon his statistical 
revolution, he noted there that the detailed process of collating facts and producing 
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documents that were privately referred to as plans may have actually exacerbated the 
problem being faced. ‘It is very easy’, he noted, ‘for those doing the planning to 
deceive themselves into thinking that they are the masters and that events are 
conforming to their plans’.23 This point had not been missed by his former 
colleagues. Indeed, speaking a year later, David Butt, an experienced members of the 
EC(S), similarly denounced the ‘sham precision’ of figures that he maintained had 
emerged ‘like ectoplasm’ from a dangerous process of forecasting he labelled as 
‘Numerology’.24 He concluded that ‘plans … seem to be very much what Cathedrals 
are to the Church: they have an inspiring effect for the faithful in a wicked world’.25 
Ronnie Tress, too, maintained that the ‘possession of facts [was] not enough’.26 Yet, 
despite such words, later editions were subject to similar strains. In 1948, the second 
public Survey also enjoyed a favourable redrafting; a year later, production and 
export targets were ‘recast in a more general form’; and, by 1951, the targets had 
given way to ‘requirements’, ‘prospects’ and ‘estimates’.27 
 
* 
 
The second sketch, which was outlined by the Conservative Party’s Research 
Department (CRD), sought to fill the void left by the government. Indeed, although 
the momentum of the initial transition – whether positive or negative – had lain with 
the Labour government, the opposition had not been entirely absent from the story. It 
had, in fact, spent the years after 1945 seeking to develop an economically sound and 
politically attractive alternative that reconciled the tension of that year’s election 
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campaign. The party’s stance on industrial issues was seen to be particularly 
important and it was recognised that a degree of active intervention was now 
inevitable. Yet, somewhat more politically, and especially when set against the 
increasingly fraught context of 1947, they were also keen to portray the current 
system as in desperate need of change. Controls, although not seen to be quite as 
vital as industrial relations, were particularly important to both strands of this 
thinking and the issue was implicit within most of the party’s discussions. In October 
1946, debates surrounding their continuation were central to the formation of a high 
level Industrial Policy Committee (CIPC) under Rab Butler’s chairmanship that 
would complement the work of a separate Trade and Industry Committee headed by 
Oliver Lyttelton.
28
 In a symbolic gesture, the CIPC would never be given definitive 
terms of reference, but Winston Churchill’s Shadow Cabinet was under no illusion 
that ‘the future of controls’ would form an important strand of its work.29 The key 
question it had to resolve was, as explored by John Ramsden, remarkably similar to 
that which had haunted the party in 1945: namely, the reconciliation of calls for 
decontrol with the acceptance that some controls would have to be retained.
30
 As 
Anthony Eden explained to an audience in Plymouth just days before the CIPC was 
assembled, ‘Conservative industrial policy’ meant reconciling a vision of ‘freedom 
with order’.31 
 
The exact nature of Eden’s vision was considered at greater length by Quintin Hogg 
in his influential, if slightly disjointed, The Case for Conservatism which was written 
between December 1946 and March 1947. Drawing upon Eden’s nascent call for a 
‘property owning democracy’ – a notion that had been put forward by Harold 
Macmillan, Robert Boothby and other ‘capitalist planners’ during the 1930s – Hogg 
used a philosophical opening section to set out a vision wherein economic power 
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would be devolved to unleash ‘organic’ enterprise.32 Significantly, however, (and 
drawing upon the wider acceptance of ‘planning with a small “p”’ outlined at the end 
of the last chapter) a decentralised ‘Conservative planning’ that would exert 
influence, ensure general standards and advise on certain objectives was central to 
Hogg’s vision.33 In February 1947, as the first public Economic Survey was released, 
this theme was developed even more forcefully when Hogg joined a group of fifty 
Conservative MPs and candidates who – alongside forty seven Liberals, five 
National Liberals, two Ulster Unionists and two Independents – organised under the 
auspices of the Design for Freedom Committee. The group, which published a 
pamphlet in its own name, offered a distinctly libertarian version of planning that 
would reconcile ‘the will to plan ahead’ with a ‘spirit of enterprise and adventure’ by 
setting out a framework for development whilst entrusting the public to deliver. This 
was, in effect, a return to the idealism of the early democratic planners coupled with 
a vehement rejection of an approach ‘which seeks to control the situation by granting 
licences’.34 It was, in this sense, echoed by The Case for Conservatism’s own 
stringent attack on controls, which were presented by Hogg in his book’s polemical 
second half as an issue that clearly differentiated between ‘socialist’ and 
Conservative planning.
35
 
 
The ideas put forward within Design for Freedom were a deliberate attempt to 
change the parameters of debate and – especially as it had also attracted the 
signatures of the young CRD members Derek Heathcoat-Amery, Reggie Maudling 
and Peter Thorneycroft – it should come as no surprise that its dual emphasis on 
planning and freedom fed into the CIPC’s work. On the first point, Thorneycroft 
himself noted in a draft introductory section that ‘classic “laissez-faire” theory does 
not … work satisfactorily in practice’ and floated the term ‘Conservative planning’ 
to describe his intentions.
36
 This was continued as the CIPC began to construct a 
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more detailed vision of co-operative planning under the banner of ‘National 
Housekeeping’.37 And it was here that the second point emerged clearly. Indeed, 
unlike Labour’s approach in office – which was accused of being ‘made in 
Whitehall’ – ‘Housekeeping’ was envisaged as a balance between encouragement 
from the centre and individual initiative. It was, noted Thorneycroft, not simply 
about making laws but ‘an attitude of mind’.38 Drawing their own parallel with 
Franks’ lectures, the CIPC was also clearly influenced by past experience and its 
calls for co-operation were grounded in a priority-based model that echoed the 
wartime Ministry of Supply.
39
 These ideas were eventually encapsulated in a 
weighty policy statement called the Industrial Charter and published in May 1947. 
Calling for the devolution of economic decision making and a spirit of ‘free 
opportunity, incentives and justice’, this argued that current controls frustrated 
industry and had a tendency to ‘breed like rabbits’. But, in contrast to the ambiguous 
stance of 1945, the principle of state intervention was overtly accepted.
40
 As was 
explained by Butler in a supplementary pamphlet, the word ‘planning’ remained 
contentious, but ‘The conception of strong Government policy in economic matters 
[was at] … the very centre of the Conservative tradition’.41 
 
Butler’s commitment ensured that the Industrial Charter – like the Economic Survey 
before it – would become a landmark.42 Although the document itself adopted a 
measured tone, the emphasis placed on deliberate planning within its press and in 
supplementary material was certainly striking. David Eccles – who noted that he 
preferred to ‘call a spade a spade’ – summed up this mood with the assertion that it 
represented a Conservative ‘experiment in the control of our economic destiny’.43 
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The belief that this should represent a ‘true partnership’ was equally significant. So, 
too, the fact that this commitment saw members of the CIPC embark on a national 
fact-finding mission and undertake a two month consultation process which 
culminated in a series of focus groups.
44
 The questions that continued to surround 
industrial controls were, however, much more familiar. The CIPC’s consultation with 
industrialists had, in fact, highlighted a range of very practical concerns centred on 
what Franks’ memorably described as their ‘wooliness, inertia and rigidity’.45 A 
meeting held in London at the end of January set the tone with criticism ‘not of the 
controls themselves, but of the manner in which they were worked, their complexity, 
their slowness, the need to consult several departments and the low quality of 
personnel’.46 Echoing the complaints considered at the end of the last chapter, this 
would feed into Butler’s castigation of the present system as ‘controls without 
planning’ and Lyttelton’s belief that a new approach would have to ‘do things’ rather 
than restrict them. But, to employ a familiar phrase, the exact nature of this positive 
vision was still far from clear and the Charter’s picture of collaboration and 
devolved responsibility remained complicated by its acceptance of the continued 
need for some of the existing system. It was, Butler later admitted, ‘vague where it 
might have been specific’.47 Of course, it had been hoped that the CIPC would 
overcome some of these issues. But, with no easy answers found, the committee 
simply drew upon Oliver Stanley’s earlier suggestion and called for an investigation 
to be undertaken so that a greater degree of flexibility could be introduced.
48
 
 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Industrial Charter did not silence 
earlier criticism about a lack of a clear policy. Indeed, for all of its apparent 
significance, the document was not officially adopted for five months and was then 
notoriously met by Churchill’s assertion that he did ‘not agree with a word’ of its 
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content.
49
 The party’s Treasurer, Christopher Holland-Martin, also took a very 
different line noting that his interpretation of the pledge to maintain controls over 
‘any necessity of life’ was that: 
 
[This] does not cover all controls. With the assistance of a restored price 
mechanism we believe that this pledge can be fulfilled.
50
 
  
But the problem with any policy for decontrol, David Clarke explained to one Tory 
MP on the very same day, was that the party risked ‘commit[ing] ourselves to taking 
off particular controls without having full knowledge of the[ir] relative importance 
and interlocking nature’.51 With this in mind, it was mooted that the CRD should 
undertake a ‘full-dress examination’ of the entire system to isolate ‘concrete 
examples’ of those that were either ‘unnecessary now … not justified by their results 
[or] would be unnecessary if a Conservative Government altered policy in other 
directions’. This led, in December 1947, to the circulation of lengthy memorandum 
with the equally lengthy working title of ‘Controls or parts of controls which could 
be removed or amended and examples of the confusion they cause’. The findings 
were, however, strongly denounced by those who were asked for their comments. In 
the CRD, Enoch Powell and John Wyndham criticised the haphazard methodology 
whilst Maudling thought it provided conclusive proof that it was ‘impossible to 
produce [such] a list’.52 Indeed, without access to government departments, the 
examination had been undertaken by simply reviewing newspaper reports and even 
the party’s politically-minded Tactical Committee warned that ‘one or two examples 
[were] quite contrary to known fact’.53 
 
-II- 
 
Back in Whitehall, the weaknesses exposed by the fuel crisis had led to a more 
practical reassessment of planning practice. At a departmental level, the Ministry of 
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Fuel and Power (MFP) tightened its procedures from March 1947, with industrial 
requirements carefully controlled in relation to individual colliery production 
figures.
54
 To ensure that this was coherent, a new committee that brought together 
ministers, officials, controllers and industrial representatives was also set up. 
Unconsciously emulating the Conservative’s calls for delegated planning, this drew 
clear inspiration from wartime practice and was, Hugh Gaitskell believed, a 
successful way of avoiding political manoeuvre whilst maintaining political 
impetus.
55
 Gaitskell himself would replace Emmanuel Shinwell at the top of the MFP 
in October. A very similar model was adopted at an interdepartmental level with the 
formation of an advisory Economic Planning Board (EPB) that was designed to 
provide a link between industry and the various planning departments.
56
 This, 
alongside the creation of an autonomous Central Economic Planning Staff (CEPS), 
the appointment of Edwin Plowden as Chief Planner, the replacement of James 
Meade with Robert Hall and the creation of a Ministry of Economic Affairs under 
Cripps, has since been regarded as an important attempt to improve co-ordination.
57
 
The new bodies took over many of the Official Steering Committee on Economic 
Development (ED) and Lord President’s responsibilities and coincided with a fresh 
influx of specialists – including the Labour-friendly economists Robin Marris and 
Kenneth Berrill. This, in turn, led to a renewed interest in long term planning and 
even saw attempts to undertake a detailed ‘level of industry plan’ for November 
1947.
58
 Such moves were vigorously opposed by Lyttelton who claimed that such 
centralisation was the ‘last refuge of administrative incompetence’.59 But, for Austin 
Robinson, who was appointed the head of the CEPS, it was quite simply the 
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‘meaningful’ start of planning in Britain.60 Supporting both views, not to mention the 
idea that this was the precursor to a retreat, Keir Thorpe has described these moves 
as representing ‘the zenith of real planning’.61 
 
Alongside these organisational changes in personnel, 1947 also saw a real attempt to 
instigate a positive alternative to the licence-based system of industrial controls that 
had been adapted in 1945. Indeed, painfully aware that the current apparatus 
continued to be blighted by a form of permit inflation, high level moves were made 
to tighten controls higher up the ladder. Thus, drawing upon ideas put forward by 
Jay, and echoing those interwar calls for a National Investment Board (NIB), the use 
of steel allocations as a control of investment was gradually reformed and co-
ordinated with a system of building licences that would be overseen by a brand new 
Investment Programmes Committee (IPC).
62
 This process would work in a very 
similar way to the wartime priority system. The IPC, which was staffed by a number 
of non-departmental advisors including Plowden, Hall and Alec Cairncross, would 
assign objectives and a range of subcommittees – including the already existing 
Capital Issues Committee (CIC) – would be responsible for ensuring that these were 
met. As in 1940, this would also involve individual departments bidding for permits 
on behalf of the industries that they sponsored. Unlike its earlier incarnations, 
however, the IPC hoped to promote growth rather than restrict it. Indeed, it aimed to 
use a range of physical and fiscal controls to ensure a ‘smoother and more 
continuous flow of materials’.63 To come back to the link between theory and 
practice, this was remarkably close to the conscious exchange of information that 
Durbin had promoted in 1942.
64
 Nonetheless, as both Hall and Plowden would 
realise, these structural changes may have promoted positive intervention, but they 
had done little to address a continued reliance upon negative controls. It was for this 
reason that one of Plowden’s first acts as Chief Planning Officer had been to 
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approach the EC(S) with questions about the entire philosophy behind the 
government’s approach.65 
 
In a bid to make sense of this, Hall asked the EC(S) to undertake a short survey of 
the system in an attempt to ascertain the suitability of controls as instruments of 
planning. It was at this point that Tress – whom Robinson had made responsible for 
writing the long term plan – wrote to Cairncross with his concern that ‘the 
machinery’ was increasingly unsuitable. Cairncross agreed that a lack of clarity 
regarding future policy was the main stumbling block to progress and noted that 
restrictive controls did nothing ‘to bring [a] controlled item into line with the overall 
plan’.66 Their fears would prove to be well-founded. With no mechanism to promote 
changes in the labour market, the new system proved to be a fairly inexact way of 
planning development. Moreover, still reliant upon self-regulated statistical returns 
and a clumsy set of controls that could be traced back to Defence Regulation 56A, 
the IPC would struggle to exert much influence over the private sector and estimated 
in 1953 that 37.8 per cent of all investment remained entirely unaccountable.
67
 Yet, 
in 1947, the EC(S) as a whole conceded that such controls were the only way to 
implement an administrative plan in the short term. As their eventual note to 
Plowden explained, it might be theoretically possible to enforce just one or two 
strategic controls but the complexity of the apparatus meant that many more had to 
be kept as ‘insurances’ in practice.68 With little immediate room for manoeuvre and 
no clear answer regarding the fundamental aim of their actions, the government 
simply renewed a revised Supplies and Services (Extended Powers) Act in August 
1947. Worryingly, though, and despite the scepticism of many officials, the IPC’s 
‘wholly factitious air of exactness’ exacerbated a political belief that planning was 
being carried out. The government appeared to have fallen into a trap of ‘mystical 
foreknowledge’ about which Jay had warned in his Fabian Lecture.69 The extent to 
which this represented a great step forward remains open to question as a result.
70
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* 
 
As with his role at the MAP, much has been made of Cripps’ importance within this 
new arrangement. His strong working relationships with Hall and Plowden, and the 
extent to which shared wartime experiences shaped their approach is certainly 
significant. So, too, was the political drive that he provided – especially as he also 
took charge of the Treasury that November.
71
 But of more importance to this thesis 
was Cripps’ replacement at the Board of Trade by the thirty one year old former 
economic advisor Harold Wilson. Wilson, who had gained a reputation as an able 
administrator, would gain political prominence during late 1948 and early 1949 with 
the announcement of two self-styled Bonfires of Controls. Described by The Times 
as a significant ‘clearing [of] the jungle’, these highly visible announcements would 
consign over one hundred pieces of legislation, the requirement for a million 
licences, restrictions covering almost 130 different categories of material, and 1300 
jobs to ashes.
72
 When read alongside the continued philosophical tension highlighted 
in the last paragraphs, the apparent lack of an alternative mechanism and increasingly 
open spats between planners, Wilson’s actions have often been interpreted as an 
important marker of Labour’s retreat from planning.73 Coinciding with a passionate 
debate surrounding the publication of the interim policy statement titled Labour 
Believes in Britain and Morrison’s call for the party to prepare for a ‘victory of 
consolidation’, Wilson’s actions were seen by the Keep Left group to have begun an 
‘epidemic of decontrol’.74 It will be shown in Chapters Four and Five that there was 
certainly a political dimension to his announcements. But, without wanting to delve 
too deeply into these debates, it is relevant that the accusation of retreat can be 
countered on a number of levels. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically and in a testament 
to the density of the jungle’s foliage, it is suggested here that it was only when the 
party embarked on this process that it began to think about the strategic controls 
required for successful planning. 
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The process that culminated with the first Bonfire began on 5 November 1947. On 
this date, as plans for the IPC were being finalised, the first meeting of a newly 
inaugurated Government Organisation Committee (GOC) agreed that, because there 
was no ‘up to date’ information, an interdepartmental review of controls was vital. 
After much discussion, their recommendations were consolidated a month later when 
it was decided that department-led investigations should be conducted within the 
Board of Trade, Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Food, MFP and Ministry of 
Agriculture. The Committee – which was chaired by Sir Edward Bridges – called for 
the appointment of independent Examiners to survey the mechanics of control and 
set about establishing an official Co-ordinating Committee (CC) under P.D. Proctor 
to oversee enquiries and a higher-level Controls and Efficiency Committee (CE) to 
consider any policy issues ‘thrown up’ by the investigations.75 In both of the GOC’s 
meetings, the impetus came from Sir John Henry Woods, the Permanent Secretary of 
the Board of Trade, whose position was clearly set out in a memorandum circulated 
in early December. Tacitly drawing upon the context set out at the end of Chapter 
Two, he sketched out a number of problems inherent within the current system and 
drew attention to overlapping restrictions, wasted manpower and a ‘widespread 
feeling that many controls … create hampering frictions and delays’.76 In line with 
those who have identified obstinate officials as the main barriers to reform, this 
intervention has led many historians – for instance Bernard Alford, Rodney Lowe 
and Neil Rollings in their guide to Labour’s post war planning policy – to attribute 
the Bonfires to a combination of administrative overload and traditional laissez-faire 
attitudes within the department.
77
 Such a view is understandable, especially given 
that Woods’ would even speak publically about the difficulties faced: he admitted 
during an address to the Institute for Public Administration that the current system 
left little time to plan ahead or even ‘examine in the necessary detail the many 
controls [administered]’.78 Yet, despite his indictments, Woods’ was clear that the 
drive for decontrol had come, not from within the department, but from its new 
President. 
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Like Plowden, Wilson had, in fact, questioned his department’s ‘philosophy of 
control’ immediately after taking up his position and had discussed the need to 
streamline the system with the Chancellor before the GOC made its initial 
recommendations.
79
 Indeed, far from pushing the issue, Woods’ would even 
complain to Bridges that he was ‘being very severely heckled by the President, who 
is most anxious to press on’.80 His initial reasons for doing so were economic and 
reflected the reality of planning within the Board of Trade. Wilson, it should be 
noted, had already gained first-hand knowledge of the system’s intricacies whilst 
working as a Junior Minister at the Board. Moreover, he had been confronted with a 
damming twenty two page report into its ‘gaps and faults’ within weeks of his 
promotion. This showed, to take just one example, that the production of electric 
fires – controlled by both licence and material allocation – had stalled as, although 
309 000 fires were licensed by the Ministry of Supply in January and February 1947, 
no materials had been allocated by the Board for their manufacture.
81
 For Cairncross, 
who had collected the examples during a series of telephone calls, this was indicative 
of a system that had never been defined and within which ‘none of the instruments 
[work] properly’.82 Such irrationalities would have been almost laughable were it not 
for the fact that – as explained in Chapter Two – they were also seen to have 
hindered the attempts to expand export production and tended to discourage 
innovation by sheltering inefficient firms from competition.
83
 It was in this context 
that the Board discussed the possibility of opening formal channels of 
communication with industrial groups to consider specific proposals for decontrol 
and suggested that an independent ‘Inspector General of Controls’ could be 
appointed to review the entire apparatus. The similarities between this and the 
approach earlier recommended by Stanley remain striking. 
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The investigation undertaken by Lawrence Merriam – a former Plastics Controller 
appointed to examine the system – during the course of 1948 highlighted the need for 
continued reform. Like Cairncross’ initial summary, and David Clarke’s later 
critique, his examination of the Board’s complex licensing procedures drew attention 
to a number of inconsistencies and the increasingly anachronistic use of wartime 
legislation. In June 1948, speaking at a special Nuffield Conference devoted to 
‘Government Controls of Industry and Trade’, Merriam admitted that he did not 
think that there was anyone at the Board who actually knew what the department 
controlled and decried the ‘rigour mortis’ of a system that was privately referred to 
as a ‘standstill’ measure.84 Like those industrialists interviewed by the CIPC, and in a 
link back to Devons’ belief that it was often the simplest things that mattered, he paid 
particular attention to the staffing and co-ordination of the system.
85
 This focus was 
continued into a later investigation by Morrison and echoed the findings of a 1945 
review into the civil service that had concluded that ‘sloppiness in detail [was] much 
more inconvenient … than the proper use of “red tape”’.86 Interestingly, though, 
despite the fact that much criticism of this sloppiness had come from business, or a 
business-orientated perspective, Merriam also identified a number of more systemic 
issues. With responsibility for the system’s application still resting with industry, the 
quota-based licensing scheme was now found to be ‘featherbedding’ many producers 
from competition by establishing priority decisions on pre-war production figures. 
This made it almost impossible for new firms to compete for priority decisions. Even 
more troublingly, even the most inefficient firm was then guaranteed profits due to 
the statutory fixing of costs on a price-maxima basis. With many established 
companies even lobbying Wilson for the system’s retention, it was not particularly 
surprising that Merriam was ‘appalled to find out how much industry likes control’.87 
With these examples in mind, Wilson, too, would become an outspoken critic of a 
system that he later described as being little more than state-endorsed cartelism.
88
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Unfortunately for Merriam, however, the Bonfires did not represent a simple 
rationalisation and were beset by their own administrative difficulties. A particularly 
vivid example of this can be found in his discovery that the continued licensing of 
vacuum flasks – an industry dominated by the Thermos company – necessitated the 
issue of 125 000 licences per annum, cost the Board of Trade over £10 000 to 
administer and involved a grand total of 131 staff whilst failing to meet any of its 
objectives.
89
 It will be shown in Chapter Five that this example would come back to 
haunt Wilson. Nonetheless, given that the Ministry of Agriculture forced the Board 
to delay any decontrol for six months whilst an alternative mechanism was devised, 
it also testifies to some of the difficulties Merriam faced. As The Economist 
satirically noted, the fact that it had taken ‘an official examiner to find out that the 
permit scheme for the distribution of thermos flasks had become a complete farce’ 
suggested that controllers were often the last people to realise that they were 
superfluous to requirement.
90
 This was not the only difficulty. Indeed, the sheer scale 
of Merriam’s task ensured that his focus was limited only to the ‘dry wood that made 
easy burning’ whilst his investigation did little to consider the relationship between 
controls and planning.
91
 Moreover, as with the vacuum flasks, many of the statutory 
regulations he removed were merely replaced by voluntary agreements, or so-called 
‘persuasive’ controls.92 Hopes that independent examination would allow for an 
overarching view to be ascertained – Cairncross had even hoped it could lead to the 
creation of a definitive ‘Dictionary of Controls’ – were also dashed in a process that 
struggled to achieve any degree of co-ordination. As the CC conceded in the weeks 
before the first Bonfire, the system simply remained too complex for its examination 
to have made ‘any very great contribution’.93 In decontrol, as in control, the tension 
of devolved responsibility remained. It was for this reason that Cripps would later 
complain that the progress made had been ‘satisfactory’ at best.94 
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In spite of this it would be wrong to suggest that the independent examiners’ efforts 
were entirely wasted. Not only did their hard work help to reduce the proportion of 
materials being controlled from two thirds to one half by 1950 but it had also offered 
a chance to clarify objectives. At a party level, Wilson joined Durbin and the young 
Peter Shore on a new Privately Owned Industry subcommittee which met for the first 
time in early spring 1948 to discuss ideas that would become Labour Believes in 
Britain and eventually formed the backbone of the party’s 1950 manifesto. This 
group would, in October 1948, produce the Labour Party Research Department 
(LPRD)’s first reference paper on control but, returning to the theme active co-
operation, its first action had been to consider a memorandum that called on 
government to ‘regard industry not as a very small boy who must be told sharply 
what to do and how not to do it, but as a grown up partner’.95 This was symbolic of a 
broader shift in emphasis and a greater realisation that successful planning was 
dependent upon more than the nominal control provided by the current apparatus. 
With the encouragement of Michael Young – the head of the LPRD and a former 
secretary of Political and Economic Planning (PEP) – this theme was continued into 
the autumn and encapsulated in a paper that keenly sought to stimulate thoughts 
regarding alternative measures of control.
96
 This process of rethinking continued to 
draw upon academic sources, with the sympathetic Worswick offering his 
professional view in a series of detailed papers that urged the party to prioritise 
planning over ownership, to promote efficiency and to begin thinking of industry as a 
coherent whole.
97
 This mood was continued into government with a working group 
set up to consider the effectiveness of the IPC accepting that its future role would 
have to be conceived in terms of influence rather than wholesale control.
98
 The new 
climate even led the Ministry of Supply to conduct a series of internal histories in a 
bid to understand how the wartime system had worked in practice.
99
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It is, then, somewhat ironic that these changes in tone should have tended to be 
examined in relation to retreat. Indeed, although the calls to embrace an ‘effective 
partnership between Government and industry’ led to a minor revolt amongst the 
rank-and-file, with twelve MPs putting their name to Keeping Left, Martin Francis 
has shown that the reality was far less contentious.
100
 In fact, with a loosely-defined 
notion of ‘planning’ remaining at the heart of the party’s vision, the idea that existing 
controls could be made unnecessary was really not that different to the line taken by 
Durbin and Jay before the war. Moreover, rather than expressing outright opposition, 
early sections of Keeping Left were rather more conciliatory. Written by Thomas 
Balogh and informed by Barbara Castle, who had witnessed the irrationality of 
present arrangements first hand as Wilson’s Parliamentary Secretary, their work 
actually praised the rationalisation that had taken place within departments and called 
for further reform lest controls ‘be operated in such a way as to weaken the forces of 
competition’.101 Richard Crossman agreed and actually wrote to Morrison 
congratulating him on his consolidation speech, noting that it was ‘a positive process’ 
that would help match ‘basic equality and freedom for initiative’.102 Even Nye 
Bevan’s famous ‘Socialism is the language of priorities’ speech at Labour’s 1949 
Annual Conference called for the ‘setting free’ of investment.103 It would, though, 
still be a mistake to view these arguably more realistic appraisals as marking a great 
step forward. Indeed, the proposals never extended beyond the retention of building 
licences, the control of foreign trade and an ill-defined call for Development 
Councils as a means of fostering positive control through co-operation.
104
 As 
Morrison noted, this would, just like the IPC, continue to be based upon the Supplies 
and Services Act. Thus, despite the repeated attempts to establish a new framework 
and calls for a ‘fresh’, ‘persuasive’ and ‘bold’ policy towards private industry, 
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Labour Believes provides a further example of a failure to move away from the 
wartime system of controls and actually begin planning.
105
 
 
-III- 
 
The Labour government’s troubles continued to be exacerbated by an economic 
situation that had forced – in the words of the CEPS’ Robin Marris – a ‘hectic pre-
occupation with daily problems’.106 The European Recovery Programme, negotiated 
during early 1948, may have helped to calm fears surrounding Britain’s balance of 
payments, but it had not removed the need to significantly raise exports and 
production. Drawing on his continued links with those inside the apparatus, Norman 
Chester would note in 1952 that this had left ‘many of the leading people … worn 
out and much less fit than when they started’.107 It was darkly fitting that Cripps, who 
was still seen to embody planning, was himself hospitalised with the illness that 
would eventually lead to his death. Against this frantic background, Plowden again 
questioned his colleagues’ entire approach. Despite continued moves towards the 
relaxation of materials licences, he was particularly sceptical about the faith being 
placed in the control of building and capital given that he felt the IPC and CEPS had 
failed to make use of ‘improved statistical material’ and did ‘not even know the 
[current] volume of investment’.108 Though taking place off centre stage, such 
inconsistencies were picked up by professional commentators and The Economist 
chastised Labour’s approach following the publication of Labour Believes for being 
contrived and composed ‘largely of wind’.109 It was, however, only with the 
imminent expiration of the transitional powers that attention was focused on the need 
to harness these gusts. Thus, on 20 July 1949, nine months after the LPRD had called 
for renewed action, well after the last Bonfire had been extinguished, and a full four 
years after initial investigations had begun, Sir Bernard Gilbert chaired the first 
meeting of a new Committee on Economic Controls (CEC) that aimed to finally 
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define an alternative to the constant renewal of emergency legislation. This began a 
process that would manifest itself in the proposal for, and the eventual abandonment 
of, an Economic Planning Bill – the history of which has been traced in detail by 
Rollings and will be briefly considered below.
110
 
 
Gilbert’s new committee had, in essence, inherited the policy-forming functions of 
the CE – which he had also chaired – and assumed de facto responsibility for the 
more practical work of the CC. Its initial aim appeared simple. It would finally 
define what constituted a control and work out which measures would be needed in 
the longer term.
111
 This task proved far from easy. In fact, after struggling to liaise 
with recalcitrant departments, the committee’s cautious final report, which was 
considered by Morrison and Attlee at the beginning of March 1950 but not passed to 
the Cabinet, merely recommended that future powers would need to be ‘broadly 
similar’ to those currently employed whilst overtly questioning their efficacy.112 Like 
those academics who castigated the system from without, Gilbert, who would 
become responsible for overall economic policy in 1953, has since been 
characterised as something of a cynic. George Peden, for instance, in an appraisal 
that rekindled Samuel Brittan’s infamous critique, has claimed that he was symbolic 
of the outdated ‘Treasury’ mind-set that afflicted many officials of his generation.113 
In private, questions were certainly raised about his failure to co-ordinate the CEC’s 
interdepartmental approach, its ‘superficial findings’ and the extent to which he had 
remained ‘wholly defeatist’. Yet Gilbert’s pessimism should not be confused with 
outright opposition. Instead, it arguably reflected the understandable exasperation of 
a man who had effectively been responsible for the Treasury’s policy towards 
controls since 1944 and had continually struggled to make sense of a system that still 
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defied rational analysis. Indeed, it should be remembered that the situation was, in 
the words of the former chair of the CC, ‘rather a muddle’.114 
 
On 30 March 1950, with current legislation due to expire on the 10 December and 
against the uncertain Parliamentary backdrop that followed that year’s General 
Election, the Cabinet finally considered the issue when Morrison tabled proposals for 
what he billed as a permanent ‘Economic Controls Bill’. As in 1945, this raised 
serious political questions but Morrison was adamant that the alternative – a 
continued reliance on the renewal of emergency legislation – would continue to 
exacerbate planning’s uncertainties.115 In an attempt to push matters forward, 
Morrison had already launched a further investigation by appointing a committee of 
officials to consider those ‘long-term powers’ that should be passed to the 
Emergency Legislation Committee (ELC).
116
 Despite this new energy, however, the 
process continued to be headed by Gilbert and much of it drew directly upon the 
muddle left by the CEC (their renamed final report was eventually adopted on 21 
April). Thus, the ELC were instructed to draw up a new Bill that would permanently 
legislate for a range of powers that were ‘the same as present’ whilst also pursuing a 
temporary Act that would renew exactly the same legislation for a limited period.
117
 
The outcome of the first process, confidently entitled ‘A Bill for Economic Planning 
and Full Employment’, was finally presented to Cabinet on 25 July. It was, in spite 
of Gilbert’s earlier indictment that such an ‘apparatus would not be effective’, 
entirely based upon those controls ‘of a negative and restrictive character’ that were 
already being employed.
118
 It was also, as Morrison conceded, liable to the criticism 
of being a ‘transitional measure under the cloak of a permanent [one]’.119 This was 
certainly the view of, a still less-than-impressed, Gilbert who noted that the problem 
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was ‘more than a difficulty or imperfection in drafting’ but symbolic of a 
fundamental lack of understanding.
120
 
 
Again, however, such failings were not for a want of trying, with proposals for a 
positive alternative to the current system exciting the attention of a number of 
thinkers. Evan Durbin’s incomplete The Economics of Democratic Socialism – which 
Brooke has used to contest the idea that planning was an intellectual failure – 
provides the most famous example of this continued theoretical attention. But even 
after his untimely death in 1948, other attempts were made. The clearest was, in fact, 
published a year later by the Manchester economist Arthur Lewis. Drawing on the 
Hayekian critique of allocations, and a preference for – to coin Robbins – ‘overall 
financial planning’, Lewis’ detailed text set out a process of defining objectives, 
surveying, identifying problems, publicity and enactment solely through budgetary 
controls.
121
 From a more explicitly socialist perspective, Young would call on his 
colleagues to ‘plan the instruments of control’ whilst Austen Albu (who had taken 
Durbin’s seat in Edmonton) and Joan Mitchell both continued to consider how 
planning might practically manage investment within the private sector.
122
 These 
ideas would become quietly influential during the 1950s. As noted above, even Keep 
Left had sought to embrace less physical methods of control. Despite having earlier 
claimed that controls were needed to ‘enforce efficiency’, Balogh, who reviewed 
Lewis’ Principles of Economic Planning for the group, was clearly influenced by this 
possibility and maintained that lessons had to be learnt from the difficulties in 
administering the current system.
123
 In government, too, Gaitskell, who was 
increasingly deputising for the terminally ill Cripps, had begun to push for more 
attention to be paid to what he later termed the ‘boosting demand type’ of control.124 
Indeed, seeking to adopt a more holistic view of the subject, he returned to those 
questions surrounding the ‘philosophy of controls’ and called on the EC(S) to begin a 
new round of thinking lest the government allow criticism of specific examples lead 
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it to ignore broader themes.
125
 It was even suggested that they should consider 
drafting a replacement for the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy.
126
 
 
In spite of what the CEC termed his ‘Bonfire-mindedness’, Wilson made his own 
intervention into the debate around positive controls through the promotion of a 
frankly written call-to-action entitled ‘The State and Private Industry’ in May 1950. 
Based on his experience at the Board of Trade, this paper was a clear articulation of 
the problems that continued to surround economic planning. It virulently attacked 
existing forms of control, criticised those associated with Keeping Left and lamented 
past failures to put something more suitable in their place.
127
 Even so, Wilson 
remained adamant that there were more efficient ways to plan and sought to answer 
some of the questions earlier highlighted by the LPRD by offering constructive 
proposals for a multifaceted approach that would enable greater co-operation with 
private industry.
128
 Adopting a number of ideas that Hogg had included in his Case 
for Conservatism, this was seen to require a Lewis-like approach to ensure a suitable 
economic context; the identification of the few hundred ‘key firms’ that drove the 
wider economy; a greater use of Development Councils and interaction in the 
boardroom to maintain influence; consultation with, and protection of, consumers 
interests; selective nationalisation; and the intelligent use of ‘basic’ controls over 
investment, the location of industry, imports, foreign exchange and monopolies.
129
 
Although these recommendations were considered in detail by the government and a 
separate party consultation set up at Attlee’s request, they were never fully adopted 
and have remained somewhat overlooked by historians who have tended to focus on 
his diagnosis that its subject was a ‘vacuum of socialist thought’, rather than the 
remedies he put forward.
130
 The proposal that Development Councils could act as 
positive controls was certainly optimistic. Only four such bodies were ever created 
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and even the Board of Trade questioned whether they would actually be able to exert 
influence.
131
 Nonetheless, even with these faults, ‘The State and Private Industry’ 
remains an apt piece of self-reflection, and one that would go on to define the 
controls debate throughout the 1950s.
132
 
 
* 
 
Since the publication of their Industrial Charter, the Conservatives, too, had been 
confronted with continued calls for clarification. For sceptical commentators like 
Victor Weisz, better known as the News Chronicle cartoonist ‘Vicky’, the party’s 
future plans still represented something of a blank canvas.
133
 Such accusations led to 
a growing belief amongst party members that their supposed lack of policy had held 
back electoral progress.
134
 Indeed, despite vigorous campaigning and a dramatic 
swing against Albu in the Edmonton poll forced by Durbin’s death, the party failed 
to usurp Labour in any of the spate of by-elections that took place during late 1948 
and early 1949. Abortive campaigns in South Hammersmith and Sowerby Bridge 
brought sentiments to a head and saw the letters pages of The Times and Daily Mail 
become forums of debate regarding the very essence of Conservatism.
135
 Apparently 
pushed onto the defensive, a sense of desperation emerges clearly from impassioned 
letters that urged policy-makers to clarify their position or risk becoming electorally 
extraneous.
136
 These outbursts were the public face of pressures that had been 
building since the attempt to isolate specific examples of controls that could be 
removed had been abandoned in late 1947. They also coincided with a notable shift 
in rhetoric as the party moved away from ‘planning with a small “p”’ and positioned 
itself around a call to ‘set the people free’. It will be shown in later chapters that this 
shift was as much the result of political manoeuvring as it was of any real economic 
rethinking.
137
 Even so, it also drew upon the monetarist critique of the ‘empty 
economy’ explored in the last chapter and arguments put forward by the neo-liberal 
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pressure group Aims of Industry (which met with the CRD to provide ‘concrete’ 
examples of controls that could be removed in March 1948).
138
 
 
The influence of such ideas would have important consequences for the party’s 
policy making. In spite of his own culpability in the system’s establishment, 
Lyttelton, who took up a chairmanship with the Institute of Directors in 1948, now 
began to call privately for ‘a complete reversal of our economic policy’ and urged for 
more attention to be placed on incentives.
139
 With this he hoped to provide a stark 
contrast with controls. These, Churchill asserted, publically following Lyttelton’s 
line of argument, had created an ‘artificial world’ of hidden inflationary pressure 
which had forced devaluation, damaged British prestige and hindered the balance of 
payments.
140
 This shift was borne out in 1949 policy statement The Right Road for 
Britain. Drafted by Hogg, this document would provide the basis for the 
Conservative Party’s 1950 election manifesto – which was given the related title This 
is the Road – and would subsequently define their approach throughout the 1950s. 
As demonstrated at the outset of Chapter One, the statement was highly critical of the 
‘restrictive and negative’ socialist approach to planning and the ‘cumbersome and 
inefficient’ system of controls it was seen to have imposed.141 Adopting an 
increasingly Hayekian language, decontrol was presented as being a positive 
alternative to the current system. With this, the tone was markedly less conciliatory 
than the tentative voice adopted by the CIPC. It was for this reason that Nigel Harris, 
in an early history of the Conservatives’ post-war industrial policy, concluded that 
the Industrial Charter had represented the end – rather than the beginning – of a 
distinct phase.
142
 Nevertheless, like Merriam’s investigation for the government, the 
extent of the change should not be overstated. 
 
To start with a fairly anecdotal example, radical proposals for decontrol put forward 
by Anthony Fisher – a Sussex chicken farmer who published his own Case for 
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Freedom in 1948 and later founded the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) – were 
politely dismissed by CRD for failing to consider their social consequences.
143
 The 
most important limit to such a policy being adopted was, however, an on-going lack 
of clarity about what would actually be removed.
144
 Indeed, like his Case for 
Conservatism and Eden’s ‘freedom with order’ speech, Hogg had continued to 
balance a call for greater liberty with a belief in the principle of limited intervention. 
As such, the abolition of controls was portrayed as a means of restoring incentives 
for the whole of society and not a return to predatory pre-war practices. However, the 
detail remained scant, with little information on which controls would actually be 
removed and – despite the more aggressive language – continued assurances that 
some would be maintained over essentials. The private clarification that this would 
equate to the ‘streamlining [of] those controls that remain necessary and the actual 
elimination of others which are merely trifling and petty’ was little changed from 
1947.
145
 Indeed, despite the repeated calls for action, Hogg would later concede that 
he had essentially been forced to create a policy from nothing and that the strong 
emphasis on ‘freedom’ had emerged as something of an afterthought.146 With 
remarkable similarity to the public criticism being levelled at Labour’s concurrent 
drafting of Labour Believes in Britain, he maintained that the process had done little 
more than to have ‘impregnated [it] with bromides’.147 
 
-IV- 
 
The continued ambiguity that surrounded both Conservative and Labour policies 
towards controls during the late 1940s was brought into sharp focus on the 27 June 
1950 when, two days after Kim Il Sung’s forces had stormed across the 38th Parallel, 
the Cabinet agreed to military intervention in Korea. The exact reasons for accepting 
such a distant obligation have remained somewhat contentious but, as noted at the 
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outset of this chapter, the impact on the evolution of controls seemed clear.
148
 Under 
American pressure and determined to safeguard commitments made to the UN, the 
British government pledged to uphold a £4700m rearmament programme that would 
focus upon the relatively high-value production of aircraft, radios, radar and military 
vehicles. This programme, coupled with existing external materials shortages, led to 
a spike in inflationary pressure, risked precipitating a serious balance of payments 
crisis and was matched by the reintroduction of numerous industrial controls and 
industrial ‘guidance’.149 The need for such drastic action had been well anticipated. It 
was for this reason that Labour sought to temporarily repackage the Supplies and 
Services Act as a Defence Purposes Bill and would use the government’s Production 
Committee to enforce a moratorium on ‘further relaxation’ after 21 July 1950.150 
These measures were extended after November 1951, with a temporary freeze on all 
new non-domestic building; the striking of ‘voluntary agreements’ with 
manufacturers to limit supplies to the domestic market; the tightening of exchange 
controls; and the reintroduction of steel licensing from January 1952. It was not until 
1953 that the process of decontrol began again in earnest. By that point, allocation 
controls had been extended to cover two thirds of all raw materials and regular 
reports on those enforced were being produced by the Economic Section for the 
consideration of a new Economic Steering Committee in London and policy-makers 
in the United States.
151
 It was in this light that Labour’s tentative negotiations around 
positive control were fiercely criticised by The Times and The Economist for being 
almost entirely irrelevant.
152
 
 
The practical implications of the Korean crisis appear, thus, relatively easy to trace. 
But, much like the events of 1947, or the situation in 1945, its significance can only 
be fully understood when this context is related back to the lack of clarity that had 
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inflicted controls policy throughout. The process of ‘recontrol’ was – like those 
before it – certainly far from rational. The blanket ban on decontrol was, for instance, 
pursued even though many restrictions could still have been removed. Private 
correspondence amongst officials even went so far as to suggest that the rationale 
was never economic, but could be explained by the fact Washington tended to ‘judge 
the degree of effort being made in defence matters by the number of controls being 
imposed’.153 The decision may have served an important political end but it also 
frustrated on-going attempts at clarification. Most obviously, a newly inaugurated 
Working Party on Government Purchases and Controls (GPC), set up to replace the 
CEC as a practical forum for decontrol after Gaitskell’s plea for a more rational 
approach, was left entirely unsure of its function.
154
 Wilson, who would famously 
resign a year later during a debate with Gaitskell over spending priorities, confused 
the situation further by announcing that he would continue to take action to remove 
controls over timber at the very Production Committee meeting that had announced 
the ban.
155
 For Maurice Webb, the Minster of Food, this was all evidence that a 
‘protracted’ interdepartmental structure could never offer the necessary leadership 
but merely added an additional layer of bureaucracy to a process where initiative 
remained devolved.
156
 This failure ensured that the raw materials situation remained 
Whitehall’s ‘blind spot’ well into the autumn.157 Yet, even when one turns away 
from the Korean recontrols, it is clear that a failure to fully co-ordinate individual 
actions hindered other mechanisms for review that were developed towards the end 
of Labour’s period in office. 
 
Unconnected to the GPC, a separate Economic Organisation Working Group 
(EOWG) had, in fact, been set up in the summer of 1950 to examine the ‘outward-
looking’ activities of government and the internal administration of controls. This 
was the latest part of a process that had begun with the GOC’s interdepartmental 
examinations and represented one of the most coherent attempts to understand the 
practicalities of the system to date. Between August 1950 and October 1951, it 
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embarked on an ambitious programme of research, conducting a detailed 
examination of the Treasury and collating various factual reports from other 
departments.
158
 The method was very familiar. But, in a deliberate attempt to avoid 
enforcing a ‘Treasury view’, and unlike the earlier reviews undertaken by the CE and 
CEC, it consciously avoided providing a set framework for responses. This 
symbolised the degree of faith invested in the process, but it was soon admitted by 
the EOWG’s chairman, Louis Petch, to have also led to ‘a wide variation’ that was 
‘not much use to anybody … [and] more likely to create confusion than to remove 
it’.159 The relationship between departments would, in fact, become a source of 
constant contention for Petch and led him to express ‘despair of ever getting the 
members of the Working Group to accept and follow the general approach’.160 
Nonetheless, the example also provides further evidence that the sheer complexity 
and scale of the system was as important a reason for failings. Indeed, the EOWG 
even struggled to review the Treasury’s own processes and ‘realised (with some 
shame)’ that their investigation had missed out the entire Overseas Finance division 
of the department.
161
 Given this, it was perhaps unsurprising that the group’s 
eventual conclusions – which, reflecting a pre-Korean reality, sketched out recent 
shifts towards ‘persuasive controls’ – were relegated to a ‘miserable collection of 
obvious and elemental remarks’.162 With these difficulties in mind, the Korean crisis 
is perhaps best viewed as having exacerbated an underlying weakness: evidence that 
the transition to peace had yet to be completed, not the reason for it.
163
 
 
* 
 
The evolution, and eventual abandonment, of the Economic Planning and Full 
Employment Bill provides a similarly useful example and highlights the difficulties 
faced by both the Labour and Conservative parties. Used by Rollings as evidence 
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that there was no simple drift towards decontrol, the attempt to pursue permanent 
legislation was eventually abandoned on 15 February 1951. It appeared to have been 
a casualty of the Korean War. Such a Bill had been, according to the Cabinet, simply 
inappropriate to pursue ‘in present circumstances’.164 Nonetheless, to fully 
understand the reasons behind the government’s decision, it is necessary to return to 
the decision to pursue a framework built upon the Supplies and Services Act and a 
reality that remained misunderstood. Indeed, building upon Rollings’ view, the 
decision to abandon the Bill can actually be traced back to Gaitskell’s earlier attempt 
to set out a ‘philosophy of controls’ in January 1950 and his pressing of the EC(S) to 
delineate a positive alternative to those currently enforced. His intervention – which 
described controls as ‘the defining feature of British socialism’ – was subjected to a 
fairly hostile response from the government’s economic advisors. Hall, for example, 
thought that the account was overly sentimental, Otto Clarke believed that it 
‘confused the substance of control with the shadow’ and Dow noted that Gaitskell 
was probably a ‘little late’ if he wanted to devise an entirely new policy by the end of 
the year.
165
 It was, nevertheless, also regarded as a ‘real attempt’ to set out a policy 
and did lead to a renewed interest in the subject. As Hall noted, if some controls were 
seen as essential, it was now necessary to decide which they should be.
166
 Thus, 
running in parallel to the wide-ranging EOWG, the EC(S) began to undertake its own 
investigation in an attempt to draw up a definitive ‘reference paper’ that would 
distinguish between controls and planning. 
 
The need for additional clarification was increased by Morrison’s decision to push 
forward with his draft legislation before it lapsed on the 10 December in the hope 
that ‘it might be practicable to import some more positive powers into the [Bill] at a 
later stage’.167 In a bid to do so, responsibility was transferred to a new Economic 
Powers and Full Employment Committee in October 1950, with Gilbert maintaining 
his ‘general charge’.168 This was designed to give greater semblance to the drafting 
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process and the shift in emphasis was certainly in line with those proposals put 
forward by Gaitskell and Wilson. The desire to ‘knit together positive and negative 
powers into a coherent whole’ was also supported by a number of officials, including 
Bridges, who criticised the earlier Supplies and Services based approach for having 
maintained ‘steamrollers … so long as there were nuts to crack’.169 Yet, beyond the 
semantic shift from ‘planning’ to ‘powers’, and a related debate over changing the 
Bill’s name to simply read ‘Full Employment’, the new committee was unable to 
make any substantive progress and remained bound by the fact that a positive system 
was simply no better understood than the negative one already in place. The Board of 
Trade, for example, which sought to use ‘The State and Private Industry’ as a basis 
for discussion, admitted that nothing in the current draft would have any bearing on 
his proposals. After a protracted consultation process, it eventually came to the 
unsatisfactory conclusion that the positive controls needed would depend entirely on 
the negative one included.
170
 As Gilbert continued to protest, the whole concept of 
economic planning now seemed a misnomer. Moreover, sitting alongside the 
EC(S)’s nascent review, a continued interest in bulk purchase as a means of positive 
control being pursued by the GPC and individual departmental investigations, it can 
also be seen to have added an additional layer of bureaucratic complexity. 
 
The imminent expiration of the Supplies and Services Act also focused Conservative 
attention on the need to flesh out their commitment to decontrol. Building on The 
Right Road, Churchill had opened his party’s election campaign in February 1950 
with the pledge to ‘restore … to our citizens their full personal freedom and power of 
initiative’.171 Nonetheless, as before, the detail had been scant and electoral defeat 
was matched by renewed calls for detail. For this reason, the party launched its own 
attempt to survey the government’s machinery of economic planning and set up a 
separate Advisory Committee on the ‘Liberties of the Subject’ in an attempt to 
finally work out which controls could and could not be removed.
172
 Chaired by 
David Maxwell Fyfe, a lawyer and close friend of Boothby who had completed a 
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famous report on party organisation in 1949, this committee would produce two 
separate reports and was later reconvened to brief speakers in the Parliamentary 
debate over the Defence Purposes Bill. Although somewhat legalistic, Maxwell 
Fyfe’s conclusions echoed the broader libertarian shift that the Conservatives had 
undertaken since 1947. The Supplies and Services Act was seen to ‘bestow upon the 
Executive the widest legislative power it has enjoyed in peace-time for at least three 
centuries’; there was, in short, ‘no greater menace to the liberty of the subject’.173 
Yet, in its detail, the report was remarkably similar to those undertaken in Whitehall. 
Indeed, invoking both Morrison and Bridges, it concluded that the powers provided 
by the Act were entirely disproportionate to the actual needs of the apparatus. 
Furthermore, the report also acknowledged that a number of the existing controls 
within this apparatus would need to be retained – even without the additional 
pressures exerted by the Korean War.
174
 This conclusion was also implicit within the 
CRD’s broader survey of current practice.175 It was, therefore, proposed that a future 
Conservative government should enact a specific Scarce Materials and Provisions 
Bill to permanently legislate for those still required whilst the overarching 
framework of the present Act was removed. This would, noted Maxwell Fyfe, be a 
substantial commitment but would provide a useful opportunity for further 
‘pruning’.176 
 
It is another historical irony that that the government’s attempt to follow a 
remarkably similar course of action fell victim to a political climate that was 
increasingly hostile to controls. Morrison, whose approach will be further explored in 
the following chapters, explained the rationale for the Bill’s abandonment in purely 
political terms. It was, he informed Cabinet, an attempt to avoid the ‘considerable 
[potential for] confusion if permanent powers of economic control were being taken 
for peace-time purposes while wider and overlapping powers of control, including 
economic controls, were being continued on a year-to-year basis’ and the damaging 
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prospective that those legislated ‘in the name of full employment’ might indirectly 
lead to jobs being lost as supplies were transferred from inessential work.
177
 
Although overshadowed by Korea, controls would continue to raise political 
questions during the 1951 General Election and remained prominent within a 
successful Conservative campaign that had centred on a manifesto entitled Britain 
Strong and Free.
178
 Such questions had also continued to exert an impact upon the 
presentation of broader economic policy. The Economic Survey for 1951 had, for 
example, as with its earlier incarnations, continued to struggle with the implicit 
tensions of democratic planning and was admitted to have ‘played down’ a serious 
coal shortage.
179
 Nonetheless, with their broad commitment to restore ‘freedom’, the 
incoming Conservative administration found itself faced by a similar tension. In the 
fortnight before losing office, Attlee had warned their pledge reflected ‘the depth of 
their own inexperience’ and even Hall – a figure who had grown increasingly critical 
of Labour’s ‘woolly mindedness’ – struggled to see how the new government could 
‘avoid breaking most of its electoral pledges’.180 Halls’ fears were, of course, realised 
during the new government’s first five months in office when a variety of new 
restrictions on raw materials were introduced. The need for such action was quite 
obviously related to rearmament. Once again, though, the process also drew attention 
to the practical uncertainties, inconsistencies and problems thrown up by the system 
itself. 
 
-V- 
 
The period between the abandonment of the Economic Planning and Full 
Employment Bill and the Conservatives’ extension of raw materials controls was 
certainly more than an interlude. Alongside those periodic surveys produced for 
Washington, the latest in the long line of other reviews were also completed at this 
time. This had begun, in January, with the circulation of the EC(S)’s ‘reference 
paper’, was continued by a report of the Treasury’s Information Division in March, 
included the CRD survey into planning noted above, and ended with the release of 
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the ill-fated EOWG report in October 1951. The style, tone and approach of each 
document were very different and each reflected the purpose for which it had been 
designed. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, they offer further insight into the reality of 
controls at this crucial moment in Britain’s transition to peace. They described a 
system that had evolved iteratively and was, in the words of the Conservatives’ 
survey, ‘a very long way’ from that described by the interwar theorists.181 It also 
seemed to be a long way from that which had emerged in 1939. As noted by Butt, 
who had been entrusted with the EC(S) reference paper following his complaints that 
Labour was ‘floundering about’, the gradual tightening of investment control had 
allowed many physical controls to be ‘done away with’.182 Yet, it was a system that 
continued – as the EOWG had been forcefully reminded – to be dogged by 
administrative failings and a sense of uncertainty that left it without any ‘obvious 
definition’.183 As one industrial spokesperson put it during a textiles trade 
conference, all involved need to ‘learn how to control controls and make order out of 
orders’.184 This was, when viewed from the outside, almost inevitable; the system’s 
scale, noted the Conservatives in a further religious reference, was ‘immeasurably 
greater that any met in any other walk of life, except perhaps the Roman Catholic 
Church’. The problem was that the Church ‘[did] not mind waiting a century or two 
to make a major decision’.185 The need for reform remained as clear as it had in 
1947. 
 
It is, therefore, surprising that many commentators would identify the shift in 
government with a sense of administrative inertia. Peter Hennessy and Anthony 
Seldon, for instance, see no great change to the ‘swollen’ civil service and point to 
high-level dissatisfaction surrounding the inability to close ‘ridiculous’ 
departments.
186
 Other areas, too, seemed to enjoy a notable degree of continuity with 
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the Bristol-based academic R.S. Milne pointing to a shared acceptance of the post-
1947 structural changes.
187
 Although he did not know it, the secretive IPC was also 
maintained until 1953 at the request of senior civil servants.
188
 A similar continuity 
was evident within departments. For example, at the Board of Trade, Thorneycroft 
avoided radically altering the balance between government and industry and instead 
adapted an advisory committee model pioneered by Wilson.
189
 Despite a virulent 
opposition from some ministers, the Economic Surveys were also retained. The 
Conservatives’ approach to these symbolic documents has been given some notable 
historical attention and Butler’s insistence that they should avoid ‘forecasts, 
prophecies and targets’ has often been taken as evidence of a conscious repudiation 
of past practice.
190
 Nevertheless, it should again be stressed that the Surveys were 
always intended as one stage of a much broader process – quite consciously a 
‘survey’ from which to define priorities. Furthermore, a decision taken to remove 
certain statistics was primarily political and did not mean that the figures were no 
longer being collected. Indeed, Butler would continue to invoke the Surveys and 
maintained that his Budgets were built upon their findings. For Devons, who did see 
this in terms of a retreat, it was still a clear continuation of past practice and part of 
the same ‘process of learning’ that had begun in 1947-8.191 It is also significant that, 
despite all of the anti-planning rhetoric, Plowden was retained as Chief Planning 
Officer until he was replaced by the EC(S) when it was brought into the Treasury as 
an ‘Economic and Planning Division’ in 1953. The CEPS did wither with his 
departure, but the Section were already engaged in preparations for a new ‘long term 
plan’ of investment.192 
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Although many later accounts have portrayed the Conservative’s commitment to 
decontrol as something of an anomaly within this narrative, a closer inspection of 
developments within the system suggests the need to adopt a slightly different view. 
There was a slight reorganisation of high level responsibility in November 1951 as a 
new Ministerial Economic Policy Committee was appointed to oversee policy. This 
body – which adopted a similar approach to the 1945 Steering Committee on 
Economic Development – would be responsible for implementing the post-1951 
recontrols but paid little attention to developments within individual departments. 
Moreover, in contrast to the spate of reviews that had been undertaken after 1947, the 
EOWG report was not followed up and the periodic surveys produced for the USA 
were abandoned in November 1952 after it was noted that ‘no new restrictions had 
been imposed’.193 Even those investigations that did take place – like an early 
attempt to determine Britain’s ‘Urgent Economic Problems’ – continued to be 
hindered by a departmental reluctance to provide adequate detail.
194
 These were not 
entirely new problems, but they would ensure that the impetus for decontrol 
remained incoherent and focused upon visible consumer restrictions; it was, as Butler 
later exclaimed, about identity cards and ration books. As a result, the system 
continued to operate within the Supplies and Services framework and was open to 
the same criticism that had been levelled at it during the 1940s. Duncan Sandys, for 
example, whose department sponsored the recontrol of steel, admitted that any quota 
system based upon past consumption was inherently ‘unfair’. However, he was also 
forced to concede that the very nature of the system meant that there was little scope 
for reform and called instead on the government to explain why it was not as 
‘arbitrary’ as presumed.195 As P.D. Henderson summed up in his contribution to 
Worswick’s edited collection, it was ‘not difficult to find instances where the 
Government was prepared … to maintain controls which were found irksome’.196 It 
was not until 1953, the point at which most recontrols lapsed, that a new round of 
investigations would begin. 
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This lack of change must, like Labour’s abandonment of the Economic Planning and 
Full Employment Bill, be considered in relation to the strain imposed by Korea. But, 
like that Bill, it can also be argued that the Conservatives were simply unsure about 
the alternatives. Reading as little more than a progress report, the party’s 1952 policy 
statement We Shall Win Through (the fourth full-length document in four years) 
testified to continued uncertainty.
197
 So, too, did the symbolic shift towards monetary 
methods embodied by the decision to raise the bank rate in November 1951. Indeed, 
although this action clearly separated Churchill’s administration from Attlee’s, most 
contemporary economists were adamant that it was neither that well understood nor 
particularly inventive. The EC(S), for example, satirically described it as the ‘New 
Old Monetary Policy’ whilst Dow would later point to an ‘undercurrent of doubt’.198 
And, in an interesting parallel with physical controls, Richard Kahn, an economist 
who more usually advised Labour but had worked with Lyttelton during the war and 
was asked to assess the government’s approach as part of the Radcliffe Committee 
on the Working of the Monetary System, noted that such matters appeared to have 
been based solely upon their ‘mystique’.199 The impact of the shift can also be 
questioned given that many physical restrictions were retained whilst others were 
replaced by persuasive controls. In some cases, the remnants of the former Trade 
Associations earlier integrated into the wartime system were even reformed so as to 
oversee the new ‘deregulated’ system. The abolition of steel allocations in spring 
1953 was, to give a particularly apt example, accompanied by the creation of a new 
Iron and Steel Board and saw price restrictions, voluntary agreements and physical 
controls over steel plate and tin maintained.
200
 For Worswick, this amounted to a 
policy of hiding, rather than relinquishing, restrictions; he even regarded the 
alternatives, most obviously restrictions over credit, as industrial controls ‘by another 
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name’.201 Certainly, the distinction between physical and monetary means was not 
black and white and both drew upon past practice.
202
 
 
This is not to argue that there were no differences, or that this period was marked by 
some blunt form of ‘consensus’. Such an approach would miss the clear rhetorical 
distinctions and be quite out of place in a study focused upon such technical controls. 
Nor is this to argue that the Conservative approach represented anything more of an 
intellectual failure than had Labour’s. With both Robbins and Harrod being brought 
back into advisory roles, the issue had, in fact, continued to focus cerebral energies in 
and beyond Westminster.
203
 Further reflecting an emphasis on alternatives to control, 
arguably the most interesting intervention was the publication of Richard Law’s 
powerful Return from Utopia. Law, an old friend of Lyttelton and Macmillan’s, but 
otherwise the fairly indistinguished youngest son of the twentieth century’s shortest-
serving Prime Minister, used this overtly philosophical text to combine a Hayekian 
scepticism with more practical arguments surrounding the ‘empty economy’.204 
Considered in more detail in Chapter Four, his approach also offered a positive 
vision of the price mechanism as an unobtrusive automatic regulator that resonated 
with Lyttelton and others who were anxious to avoid falling back on a wholly 
negative critique of the current system.
205
 Thus, although Law – who accepted a 
peerage in 1954 – was never at the heart of government, his views helped to foster a 
distinct intellectual climate defined by its hostility to physical methods of control. 
This climate informed the symbolic rekindling of monetary methods and fed into 
controversial discussions over convertibility, embodied by the memorably titled 
Operation ROBOT in early 1952.
 The plan, which would have ‘freed the pound’ so 
as to expunge hidden inflationary pressure, was clearly indicative of a desire to find a 
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new approach.
206
 Nonetheless, as it was never implemented, it also remains symbolic 
of ambiguities surrounding economic policy at this time and the continued 
difficulties faced in turning a theoretical vision into a practical reality. 
 
* 
 
These difficulties would come to a head in 1953 and 1954 when the government 
attempted to rationalise the department-led process of decontrol and finally remove 
the ‘socialist detritus’ left by the Supplies and Services Act. The continued 
legislation for ‘the control of … any property or undertaking’ through DR55, was an 
obvious point of contention for a government that had pledged controls ‘should not 
exceed … the demands of the present’ and continued to invoke ‘Conservative 
Freedom’.207 It was for this reason that Maxwell Fyfe, who had been made Home 
Secretary, set up an ELC Working Party on Economic Controls (EL(EC)) to launch a 
further investigation into the overall framework. Although it began life slowly, the 
investigation took a similarly broad approach to that promoted by Morrison four 
years before and – in a move that symbolised continuing procedural weaknesses – 
began by instructing departments to provide information about their current use of 
controls and the relaxations made since the last review. Interestingly the aim was, 
like that of the earlier EOWG, not to identify controls that could be removed, but to 
‘outlin[e] legislation which would be required to establish permanent powers of 
economic control’.208 From the EC(S), Hall suggested that the chance could be used 
to redraft the Bill so as to permanently legislate for credit restrictions.
209
 Yet, as had 
been the case in earlier investigations, including that undertaken by Maxwell Fyfe’s 
Advisory Committee, the very nature of the system remained an important limitation. 
On the one hand, it was recognised that any permanent ‘Emergency Powers’ would 
be unable to cover all eventualities without merely replicating those currently 
employed. On the other, the wholesale removal of any such powers would be 
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impossible whilst specific controls were still being used. The only option was seen to 
be the permanent legislation of specific controls. This point had, in fact, been 
recognised from the outset with the EL(EC)’s chairman informed that ‘It may be that 
in the end this task will be impossible, or at least impossible in a way which is 
acceptable to the present Government’.210 
 
With no chance of immediate decontrol, the EL(EC) suggested that the current 
system should be continued until the end of the Parliament with any firm decision 
regarding the removal, or extension, of legislation delayed until after that point.
211
 
Their recommendations were passed to Maxwell Fyfe who, in one of his last acts as 
Home Secretary before taking a seat in the House of Lords, somewhat reluctantly 
submitted them for the Cabinet’s consideration. Instead of seeking to repeal the 
Supplies and Services Act, he suggested that the government should manipulate the 
powers it provided to put forward an Order in Council that set out parameters for its 
future use. Not only would this serve as a ‘formal declaration of intent’, but, he 
continued, it would ‘make it awkward for a future Government to put the clock 
back’.212 Politically, the latter point was most pressing with the Act widely regarded 
in Conservative circles as having the potential to allow socialist planning to be 
brought in ‘by the flick of a switch’.213 Although acknowledged that it would not 
avoid ‘political controversy’, Maxwell Fyfe’s plan was accepted by the Cabinet on 
28 October and a White Paper regarding the Continuation of Emergency Legislation 
was put forward the following week.
214
 On 15 November, the new Home Secretary, 
Gwilym Lloyd-George, put the government’s case to the House, noted that twelve 
further Defence Regulations – including those over building – were being removed 
and set out his intention to define ‘in precise terms’ the possible uses of DR55.215 
Even so, with 69 separate Defence Regulations remaining and the Order on DR55 
able to be overturned without a fresh Act, this was arguably a symbolic move. The 
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switch remained there to be flicked and, like Morrison in 1951, the Conservatives 
found themselves stuck with a steamroller that they neither desired nor could fully 
explain. This sense of impotence fed into the founding of the IEA and led some of 
those sitting on the government’s benches, most famously Powell and the One 
Nation group, to push for a similarly radical change.
216
 
 
-VI- 
 
If the Conservatives’ ‘march to freedom’ was longer and more arduous than had been 
anticipated, so too were Labour’s attempts to re-interpret democratic planning in 
opposition. It was for this reason that the party would be famously criticised by a 
generation of left-leaning commentators for having wasted its years in opposition 
discussing old problems whilst being unable to offer an alternative.
217
 More recently, 
Tomlinson has concluded that the party remained unable to tie its vision into a 
framework for modernisation and – falling into an introspective debate on 
nationalisation – was unable to grasp the importance of the state’s relationship with 
private industry.
218
 In stark contrast to the optimism of 1945, a number of MPs, 
advisors and former Ministers certainly offered a far gloomier perspective on their 
time in office after 1951. The assertions could be quite damming. The NEC member 
Joseph Reeves, for example, believed that the party had ended up ‘temporarily 
sterile’ whilst Marris noted in a Fabian research publication that his experience at the 
CEPS suggested a lack of both ‘system and foresight’.219 This was agreed by the 
young Roy Jenkins, who, drawing upon his first-hand experience of public sector 
investment planning, conceded that the focus had been on ‘corrective’ rather than 
‘purposive’ control.220 Gaitskell, with whom Jenkins remained close, agreed and 
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included a number of stinging attacks on negative controls in an essay written for a 
special edition of the Political Quarterly.
221
 Despite his success in promoting the 
IPC, Jay similarly conceded that reform had been ‘started several times’ but was 
‘never completed’ during a review of progress for the LPRD.222 The mood was 
perhaps best captured by Crossman’s oft-quoted New Fabian Essays: a volume 
which suggested the reforms of 1945-51 had seen the successful implementation of a 
‘statist’ system but had failed to create ‘a socialist democracy’. The essayists’ 
prognosis was that the party needed to redefine its socialism, undergo a qualitative 
shift and again reformulate economic planning as a positive policy. 
 
A conscious attempt by a younger generation to restate Labour’s vision, the Essays 
encompassed a broad range of topics and tended – like Crossman – towards the 
abstract. Nonetheless, as Attlee noted in the volume’s preface, a landmark essay 
written by Albu also went some way towards answering the very practical question 
of ‘where do we go from here?’223 The essay, some of which was explored further in 
a Fabian research publication, promoted a less direct approach based around co-
operation: throwing planning’s focus onto capital investment and replacing controls 
with workplace representation, the state ownership of shares and close collaboration 
with the directors of ‘key firms’.224 These suggestions clearly drew upon interwar 
ideas about planning as foresight and reiterated the distinction between ownership 
and control that had been so central to Durbin’s Politics of Democratic Socialism 
(this was itself reissued in 1954 with a foreword from Gaitskell). The essay also 
invoked Albu’s experience as an industrial manager and many of the practical 
innovations pioneered by Cripps at the MAP. However, despite later animosity 
between the two, the content, with its emphasis on ‘key firms’, efficiency and 
deregulation so as to allow a ‘steady stream of new entrants’, was perhaps closest to 
Wilson’s unpublished ‘The State and Private Industry’. Indeed, Wilson, who served 
as Albu’s deputy on the Fabian Society’s executive during 1954, would similarly 
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extol the need for ‘ingenuity’ and a framework built upon ‘partnership’.225 Once 
again, though, the bid for clarity caught Labour in a paradox as it was concurrently 
argued that planning – from a ‘statist’ perspective – had been achieved. As a result, 
the questions raised by the essayists returned to an abstract definition of ends and 
became subsumed in renewed debates over nationalisation; the issue of controls was 
mostly missed.
226
 Thus, in 1954, whilst reflecting upon his time as Lord President in 
a study of governance that had been sparked by a conversation held with Norman 
Chester, Morrison was forced to admit that questions about how best to use the 
‘skeleton’ of controls provided by Supplies and Services remained.227 This may not 
have been an intellectual failure, but questions that had been unresolved since 1939 
remained so. 
 
Within Labour’s intricate web of policy subcommittees, a concurrent process of 
rethinking sought to take a more practical approach.
228
 In late 1952, a new Privately 
Owned Industry group was set up to reconsider ‘The State and Private Industry’; a 
Financial and Economic Policy Subcommittee was convened to address an area of 
policy that was seen to have been little changed since 1944’s Full Employment and 
Financial Policy; and Douglas Jay was put in charge of drafting a new ‘five year 
plan’.229 This work clearly drew upon the intellectual climate and, especially, the 
New Fabian Essays. Here, too, it was noted that government had allowed the party 
little time for reflection and that: 
 
Little thought had been given to the machinery of central planning. The 
structure which was developed during the war and under the Labour 
Government was in many ways a rather rough excrescent growth imposed 
on an existing departmental system and left to battle with it about plans, 
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priorities and their implementation. Much frustration and failure resulted 
from this.
230
 
 
Like the essayists, a more realistic approach to private industry was seen to be the 
necessary solution and attention returned to the importance of investment. James 
Griffith, for example, now chairing Labour’s Policy Committee, repeated Let Us Face 
the Future’s call that it should be a servant and not the master to any future plan.231 
For Albu, who was charged with submitting a paper at the Privately Owned Industry 
group’s first meeting, this would only be achieved if efforts were focused on those 
five hundred or so ‘key firms’ that drove the economy.232 Thus, as in his published 
essay, he called on Labour to internalise sub-aggregate control through government 
share ownership and co-operation to ensure that priorities were positively enforced. 
There was, he explained, no point in obtaining a ‘large number of legislative controls 
if the statistical techniques for determining what to do with them [were] inadequate’, 
or if those applying them had ‘no industrial experience’ of their own.233 
 
These ideas culminated with the publication of Challenge to Britain in 1953. Like 
Labour Believes before it, this document stressed the need for stable economic 
expansion and was highly critical of the Conservatives’ poor record of economic 
management and ‘back-to-normal’ mentality.234 In private, the authors’ accepted that 
‘negative controls … [were] inadequate for planning purposes and proposed that ‘a 
controlling interest’ could instead be gained in investment-intensive sectors.235 
According to accompanying notes distributed to party activists and MPs, this would 
clearly reinforce that Labour was ‘the party of planning’. Yet, in public, the focus 
was kept quite deliberately vague.
236
 Moreover, with the statement based upon a 
1952 pamphlet that had dealt explicitly with that year’s worsening balance of 
payments position, an argument about the ‘reckless’ dismantling of wartime controls 
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remained.
237
 This, for The Economist, was a disappointingly poor outcome for such a 
well-publicised process of rethinking. Their appraisal was not helped when the ever-
frank Maurice Webb criticised the statement for being ‘bleak, unimaginative and 
uninspired’.238 Though less overt, it was more worrying that both Arthur Lewis and 
Austin Robinson would later show that its economic modelling was also inherently 
flawed.
239
 For all of their attempted rethinking, Kahn also drew attention to the 
continued conflation of planning with physical controls within a statement full of 
‘clichés and dogma’ in an essay written for a projected second volume of New 
Fabian Essays.
240
 The inability to move away from ‘ideas bred by conditions of war’ 
could perhaps be explained by the fact that neither the party’s Financial and 
Economic Policy Subcommittee or its Privately Owned Industry group were able to 
discuss the future of such controls in the time that had been made available.
241
 Yet it 
remains ironic that that an official delegation of Wilson and Gaitskell, sent by the 
party to a 1955 ‘Economic Experts’ Conference on the Technique of Government 
Planning’ organised by the Socialist International, would warn others that ‘it would 
be unfortunate if [wartime controls] were to become identified with … long-term 
economic planning’.242 
 
-VII- 
 
As can be inferred from Butler’s ‘long march to freedom’, controls continued to raise 
political questions during the 1955 General Election. In contrast to 1950 and 51, 
however, this campaign can be seen to have signified a real demarcation point as the 
long transition from war – finally – arrived at a new normality.243 The year 
represented something of a political watershed with the Conservatives extending 
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their majority under the new leadership of Anthony Eden and Attlee stepping aside in 
the wake of defeat. He was joined on the backbenches by Morrison whilst the likes 
of Lyttelton and Hogg joined Law in the Lords. This political reshuffling was 
matched by similar changes at the top of the civil service, with both Bridges and 
Gilbert stepping down a year later.
244
 The economic questions facing their 
successors, and the social context against which they were considered, had also 
changed markedly, with the focus no longer confined to shortages of real resources. 
In this context, the government began to slowly remove, or transfer into permanent 
legislation, a number of the regulations provided for by the Supplies and Services 
Act. By 1958, the number of Defence Regulations had been cut to 42 and a new 
Emergency Laws Repeal Bill was being floated with the aim to strip away the 
‘statutory undercarriage’ of the earlier framework. Having entered another cycle of 
rethinking, Labour would publish two bold statements called Industry and Society 
and Plan for Progress during the course of 1957-8. Renewing its faith, but more 
explicitly aligned with Albu’s ideas, these stressed that planning would focus on 
aggregate decisions and that priorities would be promoted through co-operation with 
‘big firms’, efforts to increase productivity, board room control, an expansion of 
targeted public investment and the reintroduction of building licences.
245
 Presenting 
both statements to his party’s Annual Conferences, Wilson stressed that this was 
finally a ‘comprehensive policy’ to match a ‘new analysis of contemporary 
capitalism’.246 Nonetheless, with neither process a simple one, it is worth briefly 
considering both as a conclusion to this first section of the thesis. 
 
Although many activists saw Labour’s new approach as further ‘departing from the 
principles of socialism’, it remains of more importance to this account that the ideas 
were not that new.
247
 Indeed, as Tony Crosland had informed conference delegates in 
1951, it has been seen that the Attlee government had made much use of voluntary 
collaboration to plan developments in ‘key firms’.248 Even Albu’s share ownership 
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proposal, which hoped to provide a radical break with past practice, can be traced 
back to suggestions made by Sam Courtauld in 1942 and was already possible under 
Defence Regulations 55CA and 78.
249
 As a dismissive article in the Times noted, ‘no 
one possessing a normal memory or normal scepticism’ would be easily convinced 
by claims that “this time it will work”.250 Though the Conservative Party was 
similarly committed to a radical break, their moves towards an Emergency Laws 
Repeal Bill were also hindered by the tenacity of the wartime system. Indeed, with 
Gilbert delegating yet another enquiry to Petch (the despairing former head of the 
EOWG) whilst simultaneously reviewing the findings of the earlier CEC and 
EPFEC, the situation at the Treasury was remarkably similar to that of 1950.
251
 The 
fact that many controls still appeared necessary – and that the 1954 Order in Council 
had already been amended to allow for an extension of control in the wake of the 
Suez debacle – merely added to the continued confusion.252 Hence, still unable to 
fully adapt the wartime system, the 1959 Emergency Laws Repeal Act offered a 
distinctly familiar way out. Despite continued criticism from industrialists about the 
administrative burden imposed, it maintained the power to enforce the return of 
information whilst removing a subsection of the Supplies and Services Act and 
setting out new parameters for its use. Far from removing the earlier Act, the Repeal 
Bill actually renewed a modified DR55 and its ability to control any article ‘of any 
description essential to the wellbeing of the community’ for a further five years. 
Industrial controls, noted a dramatically written article in The Economist, had proven 
themselves to be the economic equivalent of the ‘nine rivers of hell’.253 
 
* 
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As Britain finally moved beyond its long transition to peace, the economic and 
administrative history of controls was, then, one that remained mired in 
misunderstanding and bound by a wartime framework that all involved had hoped to 
replace. Despite having focused upon the many attempts that were undertaken to 
rationalise the system, this chapter has shown that the history of controls after 1947 
was not simply one of retreat. Instead, like those years before it, this was a history of 
improvisation, adaptation and a realisation of just how hard it would be to attain a 
theoretical vision of planning – or, for similar reasons, freedom – in practice. The 
apparatus which remained reflected this history. Rooted in a vision of persuasive 
planning and the democratic ideals of interwar theorists, it had been shaped by 
wartime expediency, departmental practices, post-war academic debate and political 
reactions. Even with the clear shift towards decontrol, it remained multi-layered, 
decentralised and – especially after the move towards voluntary agreements – hidden 
from view. As had been the case before 1945, individual controls remained ‘small 
cogs in a great and complicated machine’.254 Moreover, echoing a point made by 
Devons in 1947, their relationship with planning remained ill-defined and their 
application entirely dependent upon a misplaced belief that they provided control.
255
 
When viewed from such a perspective, the history of controls appears to be one of 
confusion and muddle. Such a conclusion would, however, ignore the fact that such 
measures were never simply an economic or administrative issue. Indeed, for all of 
its obvious arbitrariness, both chapters have also shown that the system – if, indeed, 
it can be viewed as a system at all – was widely perceived to be significant. To better 
understand this gap between illusion and reality, it is now necessary to move beyond 
the administrative focus of the last chapters and return to the political issues first 
noted in Chapter One. It is, therefore, the continued intangibility of controls that 
provides a link between this section and the next. 
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Chapter Four 
The Politics of Controls and Freedom 
 
It is also disturbing that, in their controversy, the planners and anti-planners 
dispute over one point but are really concerned about something else more 
vital. They dispute as to whether an economic system run by the State would 
make us richer or poorer than one operated in a free society, where each man 
can choose his occupation and use his capital as he wishes. But the disputants 
have at the back of their minds a deeper question: what kind of society will go 
along with the planned economy? 
 
John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (London, 1948), p. 4. 
 
 
Whilst the last chapters have shown a remarkable degree of administrative continuity 
within an apparatus of industrial controls that was never fully understood, the next 
will explore the relationship between these developments and the system’s political 
history. This will open up the analysis quite significantly. Indeed, although it will be 
argued that ‘the controversy’ was more contrived than he cared to admit, this chapter 
will show that John Jewkes was right to draw a link between the economic history of 
controls and more fundamental questions regarding the relationship between the state 
and society. It was for this reason that Edwin Plowden, addressing the question from 
a less impassioned perspective during a 1953 Political Economy Club lecture, would 
admit that the entire subject had been ‘charged with emotion’.1 The overall aim of 
this chapter is to understand the disparity between this assumed importance and the 
reality described in Chapters Two and Three. Though it will end by briefly 
expanding upon the views set out by Plowden and Jewkes, this chapter will primarily 
address two issues. Firstly, it will return to the rhetorical linkage between planning 
and controls outlined in Chapter One, to explain how an ostensibly narrow economic 
issue was linked to fundamental questions regarding freedom. Secondly, it will place 
these developments into a history of the growth of opinion polling and political 
sociology, to show why this link was seen to be politically relevant. The extent to 
which it was effective will be explored in Chapter Five. As has been the case so far, 
both of these politically-orientated chapters will trace developments across the long 
transition period and seek to understand the developments as they would have been 
                                                 
1
 Kew, The National Archives (TNA), T 230/323, Plowden, ‘Economic Planning’, 10 Jun 1953, p. 1. 
150 
 
 
understood at the time. Nevertheless, like Chapter One, this chapter begins at the 
1950 General Election – a notable highpoint in the debate. 
 
-I- 
 
According to Herbert Nicholas, a lecturer and former Ministry of Information (MOI) 
specialist who had been entrusted to provide a second instalment to Nuffield 
College’s seminal Election Studies series, the General Election of 23 February 1950 
was something of a failure. With Labour holding onto a slim five seat majority in the 
face of a 3.7 per cent swing towards the Conservatives, he saw that neither side had 
been given a particularly clear mandate and feared that the government returned 
would not be able to serve a full term.
2
 His pessimism was well founded. After all, 
the British public would revisit the polls within eighteen months. The 1950 contest 
was, nevertheless, an important marker in twentieth century political history. Indeed, 
after having successfully interpreted the nation’s mood in 1945, the British Institute 
for Public Opinion (BIPO) went head to head with the Daily Express Public Opinion 
Centre and the recently founded Research Services Ltd in an attempt to forecast the 
outcome; the idiosyncratic Mass Observation (M-O) offered its own brand of 
anthropological analysis after the event.
3
 Although the accuracy of such research 
remained fairly contested, their findings were widely reported in the popular press 
and, as will be seen, were beginning to have an impact at a party level. A number of 
academic psephologists also paid particularly attention to the contest. Nicholas’ 
broad survey was, thus, complemented by a handful of constituency-level studies, 
including an intensive analysis of voting behaviour in Greenwich undertaken by a 
team of political sociologists from the LSE.
4
 Their findings – which suggested that 
the result had fallen neatly along class lines – heralded a start to a period of 
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‘alignment voting’ and would shape the way that politics was perceived for a 
generation.
5
 All of which makes the 1950 election very interesting for the historian. 
 
For many contemporary observers, however, the two and a half weeks between 
Parliament’s dissolution and polling day appeared relatively dull. This was, as noted 
at the outset of Chapter One, the culmination of an election campaign which had 
effectively begun with the publication of Labour Believes in Britain in April 1949 
and the Conservative’s The Right Road for Britain that July. These extended policy 
statements set the tone for both parties’ manifestoes and the debates which followed. 
Given the emphasis that each of the originals placed on either a loosely-defined 
planning or a loosely-defined freedom, it should come as no surprise that both 
subjects became recurrent themes within the campaign. In the broadcast which 
launched the Conservative manifesto, for instance, Winston Churchill expressed his 
disgust at the sheer number of controls enforced – which the Conservatives estimated 
at 25 000 – and argued that this bureaucratic version of socialism had led Britain 
towards a drab ‘Queuetopia’.6 In the second most popular of his party’s broadcasts, 
Dr Charles Hill, who had risen to fame during the Second World War as the BBC’s 
‘radio doctor’, continued this theme with a homely abandon. ‘It’s a grand world for 
the planners’, he exclaimed, ‘But it’s no good, is it, if you are one of the planned, one 
of the bits and pieces which are moved about’.7 For Lord Woolton, whose broadcast 
linked a pledge to increase home building with a reference to Douglas Jay’s The 
Socialist Case, so-called ‘planned controls’ were evidence of Labour’s belief that 
‘the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better’. Turning to the listener directly, 
he asked rhetorically, ‘How do you like that? Isn’t it monstrous?’8 In response, 
Clement Attlee, adopting a pragmatic approach that was symbolic of a campaign in 
which he and his wife toured the nation in their family car, joked that most voters 
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‘would like to keep … control of Mr Churchill’ whilst stressing that his party had 
‘shown that orderly planning and freedom are not incompatible’.9 
 
Such arguments were continued at a local level. Douglas Jay fighting for re-election 
in Battersea, used a local meeting to demand an apology from Woolton; 
unfortunately for him, this was met with a pithy retort about not having read his own 
book and simply served to exacerbate the issue.
10
 A few miles north, in the marginal 
seat of Edmonton, similar themes were being repeated in a battle between Edwin 
Hubbard and Austen Albu. Hubbard, a local accountant who had only narrowly been 
beaten in the 1948 by-election, called on the electorate to arise in ‘the battle for 
freedom’ whilst Albu stressed that full employment had actually provided a ‘new 
freedom from insecurity’.11 Like Hubbard, four hundred and fifty or so other 
Conservative candidates would include a statement on freedom from controls in their 
election addresses.
12
 Their language consciously invoked a call to ‘set the people 
free’ that had been adopted by Churchill in 1947 and echoed many activists. Writing 
to the Conservative Party’s Central Office (CCO), Frederick Dench, for example, a 
party member from Forest Hill who was hoping for the defeat of Herbert Morrison in 
the newly formed Lewisham South constituency, suggested that the choice could be 
expressed simply as being between ‘State Slavery [and] Freedom’.13 His suggestions 
for the campaign – which also included the slogan ‘Cancel Controls: Vote 
Conservative’ – were just some of those received during the winter and symbolised a 
contest that was described by Hubbard as the ‘last chance’ to avoid ‘Socialist 
Regimentation’.14 When the ballots were counted, however, it became clear that this 
was a chance that the majority of voters had missed. A high turnout – 84.5 per cent in 
Edmonton – had helped Albu extend his majority to eleven and a half thousand.15 
This defeat signalled Hubbard’s last attempt to stand for office. But with Labour’s 
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small national majority widely expected to necessitate a further election, the result 
did little to dampen either party’s rhetoric. 
 
Eight months after the election, on 31 October 1950, Labour’s intention to pursue 
permanent ‘powers to regulate production, distribution and consumption’ was set out 
by King George VI.
16
 Launching one of the first debates to take place in a House of 
Commons’ chamber that had had only reopened the previous Friday, after having 
been destroyed by a Luftwaffe bomb in 1941, this was a reference to the proposed 
Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill mentioned in the last chapter. The 
argument that it sparked, like the green benches from which it occurred, was 
comfortably familiar. From the government’s perspective the aim was simply to use 
controls to avoid a ‘mad scramble’ for resources.17 For Churchill, however, echoing 
an argument that had been heard throughout the transition, the proposed Bill’s: 
 
vague language for giving all kinds of tremendous powers to the 
Executive … goes further than anything I have seen before. This is not 
planned economy. This is a blank cheque.
18
 
 
It was during this debate that Rab Butler made his comments about Labour imposing 
a ‘Reichstag method of government’.19 It was not, he assured those opposite, that he 
thought the party was consciously fascist, but that their approach was leading 
‘precisely in that direction’. Indeed, quoting from Oswald Mosley’s Fascism: 100 
Questions Asked and Answered, he noted that it was inevitable that ‘The first Act of 
a Fascist majority will be to confer … the power to act by Order’.20 Against a 
background dominated by the situation in Korea, these arguments were 
overshadowed during a 1951 election campaign which lacked much real detail. 
Nonetheless, when they were discussed, the language had become even more 
libertarian. As Churchill stressed in a famous broadcast that sketched out the 
difference between ‘the ladder and the queue’, controls and planning had become a 
‘snapshot of a large controversy’.21 ‘A worthwhile society’, declared their latest 
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manifesto, ‘cannot be established by Acts of Parliament’.22 As argued by John 
Ramsden, it did not matter that their own policy suggestions seemed 
underdeveloped; freedom was an issue upon which the Conservatives felt secure.
23
 
 
The eventual result of the 1951 General Election was slightly less comfortable. For 
the youthful David Butler, who had assumed responsibility for the Nuffield studies 
with which he would become synonymous, the result was most notable for its 
similarity to 1950 and for its highlighting of the vagaries of Britain’s first-past-the-
post system.
24
 The Conservatives may have won a seventeen seat majority, but 
Labour had gained a greater share of the popular vote and it was widely held that the 
result was best explained by the effective collapse of the old Liberal Party as a 
political force.
25
 The outcome, argued the News Chronicle, suggested that the 
electorate had swapped a ‘party it does not want in favour of one it does not trust’.26 
As will be seen later, this ‘moral defeat’ would haunt Churchill’s new government 
throughout the early 1950s and arguably contributed to a lack of clarity in office (of 
which the inability to remove the Supplies and Services Act could be seen as one 
part).
27
 However, such failings did not inhibit a continued campaign against controls. 
In October 1952, for example, the party released a sober progress report entitled We 
Shall Win Through that blamed Labour for having ‘distorted our economy’ through 
its manipulation of a ‘vast paraphernalia of State control’. The new administration, 
by contrast, claimed to have ‘sought every opportunity’ to remove such 
‘impediments’.28 This theme defined the party’s political message. Its monthly 
colour publication, Tory Challenge, which included a range of articles designed to 
appeal to the grass roots, continually stressed that Churchill’s government were 
starting from scratch. This gathered a pace in early 1953 when it declared that the 
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‘march to freedom [had] gone forward with ever-lengthening strides’. Seeking to 
trace this progress back to the pledge to ‘set the people free’, Challenge proudly 
noted that ‘the promise is, indeed, being kept’.29 By November 1954, it claimed that 
‘the vast structure of Socialist restrictions and allocations [had] been abolished’.30 
 
Such assertions would, as they had previously, also play an important role in the 
build up to 1955 General Election. As was shown in Chapter Three, this began with 
Rab Butler adopting Tory Challenge’s metaphor of a ‘march to freedom’. His party’s 
Campaign Guide, produced by the CCO for candidates and agents, similarly 
emphasised this message with chapters devoted to ‘The Growth of Economic 
Freedom’ and ‘The Citizen and the State’.31 The message was again carried into the 
constituencies with a study carried out in Bristol North East certain that controls 
were mentioned more in 1955 than they had been four years’ earlier.32 They certainly 
provided a notable element of colour to a campaign that was described by David 
Butler as being marked by apathy and lacking in ‘any great issues’.33 Playing upon a 
poster that warned the electorate not to risk a return of controls by voting Labour – a 
contention that had been raised by Reggie Maudling in a Parliamentary debate over 
the Budget and in the ephemeral pamphlet ‘Socialists Impose Controls’ – one local 
Conservative Association even began to distribute fake permits and ration books 
bearing the Labour Party’s name.34 The fruits of their efforts were decried by Attlee 
as being among ‘the dirtiest things ever put out’ and even led to a lawsuit. 
Nonetheless, drawing upon the same logic as Rab Butler’s earlier ‘Reichstag’ 
comments, Anthony Eden, who had replaced the ailing Churchill in April 1955, was 
adamant that – although Labour might not intend to take such actions – ‘experience 
of the past has shown that Socialist governments [do] a lot of things they never 
intend to do’.35 Despite his insistence to the contrary, the episode was merely 
symbolic of an official campaign that had always claimed, ‘The Socialists offer the 
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gruesome prospect of a return to the wartime system of drastic economic controls’.36 
It was an argument that was obviously believed to hold some electoral resonance. 
 
* 
 
It would be easy to dismiss much of the above as examples of errant political 
manoeuvre. Many contemporary commentators, and later historians, working within 
a framework defined by consensus, have done just that. The Times, to give one 
example, castigated the Conservative Party’s approach in 1955 for offering ‘a 
maximum of rhetoric and a minimum of program’.37 This was not entirely 
unfounded, but, for many within the political establishment, the broad issues raised 
were much more important. Indeed, just as their relationship with planning had 
helped Labour to define the framework of debate in 1945, controls were at the heart 
of Conservative attempts to define a new political identity in the years that followed. 
The clearest attempt to do so was made with the publication of The New 
Conservatism in October 1955. Carefully edited by Peter Goldman and introduced by 
Butler, this anthology of extracts from speeches and pamphlets was a deliberate 
attempt to encapsulate the very essence of their faith following a decade in which the 
party had been forced to ‘re-think our philosophy and re-form our ranks’.38 It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that the text has since become as important an 
historiographical marker as the earlier Industrial Charter. Martin Francis and Harriet 
Jones, for instance, have both argued that its deliberate stress on modernity 
reinforced a stereotypical view of interwar inaction.
39
 This can be seen to have 
contributed to a wider narrative that sought to portray 1945 as a distinct point of 
change.
40
 However, by focusing upon the construction of a socially compassionate 
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Conservative identity, such work has arguably detracted attention from the strong 
emphasis that The New Conservatism placed upon economic and personal freedom. 
The very first extract included was, in fact, taken from a 1947 speech in which Eden 
had identified ‘liberty of the individual’ as the ‘core of Conservatism’.41 Indeed, at 
the risk of appearing counterintuitive, the Labour Party’s decision to publish a 
pamphlet on Personal Freedom as the first of its own post-1955 policy statements 
testifies to the importance of the issue.
42
 
 
As was hinted by The New Conservatism, these attempts at political rethinking drew 
upon a long lineage. David Clarke, for example, the Director of the Conservative 
Research Department (CRD) and author of The Conservative Faith in the Modern 
Age, sought to place an opposition to industrial controls within a framework bound 
by a ‘deep sense of those traditions which have persisted … from generation to 
generation’. Drawing upon the work of the eighteenth century political theorist 
Edmund Burke, Clarke maintained that controls risked upsetting the natural 
development of society. The question, he stressed, was ‘whether man will [be able 
to] master the machine of modern industry or whether the machine in the hands of an 
oligarchy will stifle man’.43 This point was expanded by Quintin Hogg. His Case for 
Conservatism, which was considered briefly at the beginning of Chapter Three, also 
drew upon Burke to place its political faith within a rich historical context. 
Contrasting his vision of organic and decentralised ‘Conservative planning’ with ‘the 
absolutist dreams of the modern Socialist State’, he wholly rejected Labour’s claim 
that the removal of controls would lead to chaos by noting that ‘history records no 
examples of a fixed political theory … which does not appear wrong, and even 
ridiculous, in the eyes of succeeding generations’.44 Decontrol, it was stressed, was a 
matter of common sense and not of doctrine. It was, for Clarke, best understood as 
the difference between a garden within which ‘an army of gardeners … [trim] every 
tree and bush into a distorted formality’ and one which ‘brings out the natural 
                                                 
41
 CCO, The New Conservatism, p. 11. 
42
 Labour Party, Personal Freedom (London, 1956). The first step in an attempt to redefine the 
relationship between the ‘Individual and Society’ this was spurred by a desire to counter ‘anxiety, 
however misguided, that socialism is a philosophy in which the interests of the individual are 
subordinated to those of the State and particularly the bureaucracy’, see: Manchester, Labour Party 
Archives (LPA), LPRD, Re. 15, ‘The Individual and Society’, Dec 1955, p. 1. 
43
 David Clarke, The Conservative Faith in the Modern Age (London, 1947), pp. 10 and 37. 
44
 Quintin Hogg, The Case for Conservatism (West Dayton, 1947), pp. 13-14. 
158 
 
 
beauties and encourages those plants which have been shown by generations that it is 
their natural environment’.45 Yet, by promoting a particular understanding of 
freedom, one which is considered in greater detail below, the issue was also one that 
remained inherently political. 
 
These attempts were, as shown in Chapters Two and Three, not solely theoretical. 
Indeed, returning briefly to David Maxwell Fyfe’s Advisory Committee on the 
‘Liberties of the Subject’, it is clear that libertarian rhetoric was matched by very 
practical fears about the impact of controls on society. By enforcing powers that 
were disproportionate to needs, Maxwell Fyfe was adamant that the Supplies and 
Services Act posed a real ‘constitutional danger’. His committee’s suggestions for 
decontrol were, thus, seen to represent the ‘legal safeguards of liberty’.46 In this 
sense, the populist accusations of totalitarianism made by Churchill in October 1950 
can be traced back to the legalistic findings of an individual who had been a 
prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials before joining the Conservative front bench.
47
 
Butler, too, had been keen to set out his rationale for opposing any extension of the 
controls apparatus. In a confidential paper on Conservative principles that was 
motivated by Maxwell Fyfe’s initial conclusions, he warned of ‘the paralysing grip 
of the State machine’ and stressed that: 
 
Personal initiative and enterprise, personal property and personal rights and 
liberties must be preserved from an exaggerated and partisan conception of 
the functions of the State, which, if continued will bring us very near to the 
full Communist or Socialist State, where none are free, even the 
Commissars.
48 
 
This was an impassioned – and fairly inarticulate – critique from a man who has 
tended to be remembered for his ‘progressive’ outlook.49 It was, however, symbolic 
of a party which placed freedom at its core. In fact, in an article written for the 
Political Quarterly six months earlier, Butler had described the Conservative Party’s 
primary objective as being the defence of liberty against an ‘omnicompetent and 
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centralised state’.50 The fact that his vision was notably underdeveloped does not 
detract from its significance. 
 
Although they had clearly defined the parameters of this debate, such thoughts were 
not limited to the Conservative Party. Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, 
attempts to define a ‘philosophy of controls’ had also been undertaken by a Labour 
government that was committed to maintaining ‘the maximum possible freedom of 
choice’.51 Like their opponents, this tended to converge around the proposed transfer 
of the Supplies and Services Act into permanent legislation. Certainly, the belief – as 
expressed by Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Bernard Gilbert – that such powers were 
disproportionate represented an inherent political difficulty.
52
 In fact, their appraisals 
help to explain why departments were asked to take particular care in announcing 
decontrol lest they consolidate a perception that controls were indeed somehow 
totalitarian.
53
 With Morrison’s initial plans for an Economic Controls Bill put 
forward just one month after the 1950 election, these fears were exacerbated by the 
precarious parliamentary situation and a fear that Churchill would use the issue to 
push for the government’s resignation.54 This was heightened by a growing disdain 
for many of the controls currently enforced. Morrison, in particular, had become 
increasingly exasperated by ‘a particularly tiresome building control case’ and feared 
that such examples would bring the entire system into disrepute.
55
 This became a 
common theme. In fact, once initial drafts had been considered, it was noted that the 
now renamed Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill was still open to the 
allegation that it would ‘[encroach] upon the legislative functions of Parliament’ and 
risked drawing attention to ‘the powers which the Government were already 
exercising’.56 It was for this reason that Morrison urged his colleagues to deliberately 
play down the importance of the Supplies and Services Act in an attempt to 
distinguish between it and the proposal for permanent powers.
57
 By 1950, then, 
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controls had become identified with a negative vision of planning that was seen to be 
a potential threat to civil liberties. Moreover, both Labour and the Conservatives 
believed that they were electorally potent. It is for the rest of this chapter to explain 
why this should have been the case. 
 
-II- 
 
In keeping with this thesis’ approach, it must be noted that an attempt to consider this 
very question had been made by Richard Law in Return from Utopia. Published in 
November 1950 and included on Faber and Faber’s ‘Christmas List’, this engaging 
account of the economic and political landscape was motived by a moral pessimism 
that resonated with Hogg’s Case for Conservatism. Identifying a ‘collapse of all 
absolute moral values’, attempts to manage the economy were seen as examples of 
‘pragmatism run riot’ in so far as they presented something essentially arbitrary as an 
end in itself.
58
 Although Law based aspects of his argument upon an applied critique 
of Labour’s approach – stressing that ‘the most elementary economic facts’ had been 
obscured – the thrust was notably more abstract.59 Planning’s practicalities, he 
contended, reduced each individual to the level of ‘a cog in a vast and impersonal 
machine’. Moreover, in doing so, any ability for them to lead a virtuous life was 
removed.
60
 Arguing that a rejection of planning represented ‘the beginning of hope’, 
Law stressed that: 
 
It is to hold out once again the prospect of society in which man is free to be good 
because he is free to choose. Freedom is the first condition of human virtue, and 
Utopia is incompatible with freedom.
61
 
 
Extending this point in absolute terms, Return from Utopia declared that planning 
could never be reconciled with democracy because somebody, somewhere, would 
have to impose decisions that could never be truly representative.
62
 As noted in the 
last chapter, and despite being described by Ewen Green as ‘over logical’, this strong 
emphasis on choice – and belief that the price mechanism was the only way to avoid 
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unrepresentative political interference – contributed to an intellectual climate that 
was increasingly moving towards decontrol.
63
 In fact, by portraying the market as a 
plebiscite that was more democratic than a political system, it even pre-empted a 
number of more famous neo-liberal interventions.
64
 Crucially, though, a number of 
Law’s conclusions echoed those made at the opposite end of the political spectrum. 
 
Eighteen months before Law’s book was published, Michael Young, at this point still 
the Labour Party Research Department (LPRD)’s director, had offered his own 
thoughts on the relationship between planning and the individual in a short pamphlet 
called Small Man, Big World. His intervention coincided with internal discussions 
over future policy and was, for The Times Literary Supplement (TLS), the outcome of 
a political system that had become ‘unwontedly self-conscious’ but only rarely took 
time to consider ‘what it [was] really trying to do’.65 Like Law, Young also argued 
that planning had to pay more attention to the individual if it were to be truly 
democratic. But, in contrast to the former’s belief that religion provided the only 
framework within which humanity could be truly free, it was stressed that political 
engagement and liberty would flourish if the state adopted a model based upon 
familial relationships rather than centralised controls.
66
 This argument was based 
upon Young’s growing interest in applied sociology as a tool for political and 
economic reform. It was an interest that would, after 1951, with Young dejected by 
Labour’s perceived inability to grasp the issue, see him leave the LPRD to undertake 
a doctoral dissertation into communities and housing at LSE.
67
 But, in 1949-50, 
during the period of re-thinking that sparked the New Fabian Essays, it was one that 
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seemed full of potential.
68
 This was especially true for Albu, who, in an attempt to 
shape the discussion, helped to organise a series of Fabian lectures in political 
philosophy that autumn. His own paper, delivered on 20 October, a month before the 
publication of Return from Utopia, offered a wide ranging history of ideas that 
culminated with an analysis of what he termed a ‘New Sociology’. Building upon 
Young’s foundations and invoking Graham Wallas, the founding father of British 
political science and an original Fabian essayist, Albu contended that – if it was 
accepted that family relationships were socially constructed – it would be 
theoretically possible to replicate them on a national level, so long as the incentives 
were planned properly.
69
 
 
Although these philosophical works consciously drew upon their context, their 
exploration of the relationship between controls, planning and freedom was not all 
that surprising. It was, after all, noted very early in Chapter One that – regardless of 
the chosen method for attainment or an agreement over the principle of intervention 
– any definition of objectives necessarily involves making certain value judgements. 
This point had lain at the heart of those debates undertaken in the 1930s. Then, the 
growth of Trade Associations and ‘piecemeal planning’ raised questions about the 
undermining of individual choice and seemed, to commentators as diverse as 
Douglas Jay and F.A. Hayek, to prove that ‘bigness’ was inherent in the British 
economy.
70
 Moreover, as Harold Macmillan stressed in The Middle Way, against an 
uncertain international backdrop, questions surrounding freedom were ‘by no means 
academic’.71 The diagnoses were, however, far from harmonious. Unlike Hayek, who 
is considered below, Jay and his New Fabian colleagues rejected the absolutism that 
would later underpin Return from Utopia and sought to distinguish between types of 
freedom. Drawing upon the same corpus of ideas as Albu in 1950, Barbara Wootton 
proposed that those which described interactions within the economy should not be 
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seen as sacrosanct because they were a human construct.
72
 This point was expanded 
by Albu who contended that capitalism had actually served to negate more concrete 
freedoms by imposing ‘invisible compulsions’.73 The solution proposed was, as 
already noted, to expand the sphere of intervention. A democratic form of planning, 
claimed Evan Durbin, was a positive way of preventing ‘one man’s freedom from 
destroying another’s’.74 In fact, by drawing upon a sociologically-informed 
understanding of society, protecting Parliamentary democracy and devolving 
responsibility, it was hoped that it could actually increase the freedoms enjoyed by 
both and ensure that any limits – i.e. the controls – were visible, equal and fully 
understood.
75
 In extending the ‘activity of society’, and not just the role of the state, 
this ideal seemed, for H.D. Dickinson, to represent a form of ‘libertarian socialism’.76 
 
Similar contentions were, in keeping with the open outlook of the discussion, shared 
across the political spectrum. Macmillan and Robert Boothby’s Industry and the 
State, for example, similarly identified the questions raised by planning as being 
practical and ‘not, like those of religion and politics, metaphysical’.77 That the same 
point would be made by both the Next Five Years (NFY) group and the Trade 
Unions’ Congress (TUC) speaks volumes.78 But, although the democratic planners 
were adamant that they had rejected a blunt Utopianism for a more realistic 
approach, their conclusions continued to raise philosophical questions. As has 
probably been guessed, this was particularly true for Professor Hayek. As noted in 
Chapter One, his belief that planning equated to central direction stemmed from a 
deep conviction that it would be impossible to reconcile planning and democracy 
outside of a market-based system. Extending beyond the technical critique set out 
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earlier, he stressed that the sheer complexity of the process would make it impossible 
to agree on ‘absolute ends’ and necessarily lead to standardisation.79 Moreover, if, as 
he was quoted as saying by Law, ‘Planning by the individual was the expression of 
his personality’, then any such attempt to plan by the state must be seen as a denial of 
it.
80
 For an otherwise sympathetic Roy Harrod, this view rested upon a doctrine of 
liberty that was not easily translated into reality.
81
 Nonetheless, as shown by Ben 
Jackson, it formed just one part of a deliberate strategy to offer a positive alternative 
to intervention and was complemented by more practical attempts to show that 
individual plans could be pursued through the price mechanism.
82
  Both contentions 
were at the heart of the Road to Serfdom. And, adamant that political freedom was 
meaningless without an economic counterpart, they were also a direct challenge to 
those ‘Socialists of All Parties’ to whom Hayek dedicated his work. 
 
Significantly, this battle of ideas was replicated within government. Labour’s The 
Old World and The New Society, for instance, had posited planning as the only way 
to achieve the ‘four freedoms’ included within President Roosevelt’s 1941 Atlantic 
Charter speech whilst the Ministry of Reconstruction’s reluctant commitment to 
default retention had sparked protest amongst more liberal officials and contradicted 
Lord Woolton’s own preference for greater industrial freedom.83 Although expressed 
in a more practical form, the attempt to identify those controls that would be needed 
after the end of hostilities became a contest over these differing conceptions. Even 
Churchill’s attempt to depoliticise the issue with a Parliamentary statement split the 
Cabinet between planning’s adherents and detractors: both sides agreed that 
Churchill should speak, but neither could agree on what he should say.
84
 According 
to Woolton, the whole issue ‘seemed to have become a matter for political 
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manoeuvre’.85 With agreement over the recommendations of Employment Policy at 
stake, it was, to the relief of all, eventually agreed that the best way forward was to 
avoid any detail. Thus, a paragraph on relaxation was omitted and Churchill’s 
ostensibly practical account was prefaced by the caveat that it only related to the end 
of hostilities with Japan. This compromise diffused tensions within the Cabinet, but 
it did not placate everyone. One reluctant official believed that the outcome was 
being unduly influenced by a vocal campaign within the Conservative Party, whilst, 
from the opposite perspective, Lord Lyle, the forceful sugar magnate who had helped 
to set up Aims of Industry in 1942, continued to press for further relaxation.
86
 The 
maverick MP Waldron Smithers, an active member of the National League for 
Freedom, even felt obliged to lobby Churchill to end ‘the race down the road to the 
Totalitarian State’.87 This was perhaps to be expected from a man who had launched 
a ‘Fighting Fund’ to prepare for this struggle earlier in the year. Nonetheless, his was 
not the only invocation of Hayek. 
 
From within the relative safety of the CCO, the party’s chairman Ralph Assheton, a 
political friend of Law and lead author of the 1945 report on red tape referenced 
earlier, had been so taken by the Road that he sent fifty copies to his colleagues and 
began to instruct all constituency agents to read it as a matter of course.
88
 In April 
1945, as the coalition began to disintegrate, he would publically accuse Labour of 
toying with ‘theories and doctrines’ that would inevitably lead to a totalitarian 
dictatorship.
89
 Assheton’s intervention – which was delivered as the government 
made a final attempt to approve the contents of its proposed Supplies and Services 
Bill – was certainly well timed. It was, however, only the latest in a series of 
manoeuvres that had begun when Churchill had accused Labour of seeking to impose 
controls which were ‘designed to favour the accomplishment of [a] totalitarian 
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system’ at the Conservative Party’s conference on 15 March.90 This second flaring of 
ministerial tensions was further stoked when an impassioned Lord Beaverbrook 
rejected the legality of any peacetime application of Defence Regulations during a 
stormy Cabinet meeting on 25 April.
91
 Although this political positioning drew upon 
the more academic debates of the 1930s, the stakes were altogether more practical. 
Indeed, by forcing the removal of the Bill’s preamble, which set out the purposes for 
which controls could be used, Beaverbrook was able to render the entire apparatus 
temporarily obsolete.
92
 To portray such machinations as a Hayekian triumph would 
undoubtedly be a stretch too far. It should, though, be noted that Hayek had been 
keen to promote the discussion of his ideas within such debates. Having personally 
sent Churchill two copies of the Road, he even urged his publishers to continue 
advertising the (soon out of print) text so as to build public interest.
93
 Nonetheless, 
although it has been argued that controls were inherently political, the question of 
their perceived electoral significance remains unanswered. 
 
This question is particularly intriguing when one considers how these elections were 
perceived by the sociologists, political scientists and psephologists mentioned above. 
In fact, combining a review of those surveys conducted in the years after 1945 with 
an understanding of ‘irrational forces’ and ‘party image’ derived from Wallas, David 
Butler would suggest that social status and perceptions of class were far more 
important in deciding elections during this period than any particular issue.
94
 His 
conclusion had not escaped others writing in the long transition period.
95
 On the 
contrary, having conducted a study of voting behaviour in Bristol North East in 1951, 
R.S. Milne and H.C. Mackenzie echoed the Greenwich findings when they 
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concluded that the existence of such behaviour – which they refused to label 
‘irrational’ – was evidence that issues could not be ‘uncritically accepted as reasons 
for voting’.96 This appeared to be corroborated by evidence from BIPO.97 Speaking 
four years later, in the weeks before the 1955 General Election, one anonymous party 
agent would describe a feeling that the contest was little more than ‘a national census 
to see who’s Labour and who’s Conservative’.98 For the political scientist Bill 
Mackenzie, one of Ely Devons’ closest colleagues at the Victoria University of 
Manchester, this was all part of a ‘ritual of choice’ that obscured a more entrenched 
reality.
99
 Moreover, even if it was accepted that issues played some role, these were 
widely defined as being a subject about which voters are aware of, on which they 
held a specific opinion, around which individual parties are perceived to hold 
different policies, and for which they are willing to cast their vote.
100
 Viewed in such 
terms, the system of industrial controls – however it was described – might not be 
expected to be a particularly pertinent one. Given that all the main parties had 
accepted the need for transitional retention, this should have been especially true of 
the 1945 General Election. Thus, in order to address why this was not the case, it is 
necessary to consider that year’s campaign. 
 
-III- 
 
The campaign which unfolded during June 1945 was certainly an interesting one. It 
was, after five years of coalition government and a postponed General Election, the 
first for a decade. Moreover, with the Liberal Party keen to capitalise upon its 
association with William Beveridge, not to mention the involvement of Richard 
Acland’s populist Common Wealth alliance, twenty one Communist candidates and 
an additional seventy five independents, R.B. McCallum and Alison Readman, the 
authors of the very first Nuffield study, saw it as a referendum on Britain’s political 
establishment.
101
 With such high stakes, all sides were keen to mix economic ideas 
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with moral arguments. Thus, one week after hosting an emotional party in Downing 
Street to mark the end of Labour’s contribution to coalition, Churchill, the diligent 
host, began the Conservative Party’s campaign in the first of a series of nightly radio 
broadcasts.
102
 Addressing an estimated audience of 16.5 million listeners, roughly 
half of the electorate, he read from a script that had been carefully edited by 
Assheton and his colleagues.
103
 In a well-planned attack on the possibility of 
permanent controls, he noted that a: 
 
Socialist policy is abhorrent to the British [idea] of freedom. Although it 
is now put forward by people who have a good grounding in the 
Liberalism and Radicalism of the early part of this century, there can be 
no doubt that Socialism is inseparably interwoven with Totalitarianism 
and the abject worship of the State. 
 
It was, using this logic, claimed that any attempt to control the ‘life and industry of 
the country … would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo’ and a vast 
bureaucracy of officials who were ‘no longer servants, and no longer civil’.104 This 
dystopian vision of British National Socialism was, according to Attlee, whose 
rejoinder was broadcast the following evening, little more than ‘a second-hand 
version of the academic views of an Austrian professor’.105 Given that Assheton had 
just negotiated with Hayek’s publishers to give up 1.5 million tons of the 
Conservative’s electoral paper allocation to print 12 000 copies of an abridged Road 
to Serfdom, his charge was not without some justification.
106
 
 
That this exchange set the tone of debate was vividly captured by a small team of 
film makers who had been dispatched to Kettering to produce a twenty minute 
documentary on the election for the British Council. As part of a series that aimed to 
promote British values abroad, the film guided its viewers through each step of the 
local contest between Labour’s Gilbert Mitchison, the incumbent Conservative John 
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Profumo and an independent called John Dempsey. Partially scripted by the young 
screenwriter Mary Bendetta, the film was, with lengthy sections on the electoral 
register and role of the Post Office, deliberately educative. Yet, with this material 
carefully edited into the overall narrative, it also gave a distinct insight into the 
election’s politics. The questions raised by controls certainly provided an important 
point of debate. Indeed, in a self-conscious platform performance, Profumo stressed 
with increasing agitation that: 
 
I believe in being governed but not in being spoon-fed and kicked and patted 
and cursed and praised and directed and fined and licenced and exhorted all 
of the time.
107
 
 
Like Profumo, the party’s literature also sought to draw a link between the practical 
and fundamental questions raised by controls. As one pamphlet noted, ‘Controls have 
not won us the war. It has been won by the freedom loving spirit of the people’. For 
another, it was vital to now ‘get back to the freedom we have temporarily suspended 
and that we do not allow bureaucracy to strangle and confine’.108 The danger, noted 
The Onlooker, the precursor to Tory Challenge, was that, ‘The others don’t call it 
interference, they call it “constructive” planning’.109 Notably, this message was also 
echoed by the Liberals who, though not standing in Kettering, sought to emphasise 
‘the value of individual effort’ in a bid to reclaim their historical stake to the 
cause.
110
 
 
Labour, despite publically dismissing Churchill’s ‘philosophical stuff’, made their 
case in similar terms by drawing upon the ideas of societal responsibility and 
extended freedom put forward by the democratic planners. Penned by Young, the 
party’s manifesto Let Us Face the Future, which was described by Morrison as his 
‘Five Year Plan’, began by setting out the need for increased government 
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intervention to ensure public control.
111
 In language that echoed an earlier statement 
called Labour Looks Ahead!, the electorate was reminded that ‘the concentration of 
too much economic power in the hands of too few men’ had resulted in ‘great inter-
war slumps’. Accusing the Conservatives of standing solely on a platform of ‘back to 
private enterprise’, it was claimed that planning was the only way to avoid allowing 
these same men ‘an entirely free hand to plunder the rest of the nation’.112 This 
argument underpinned Labour’s campaign. It was included in the magazine-like Your 
Future, in ephemeral flyers like ‘Britain out of Control’, on posters – a notable 
example read ‘Industry Must Serve the People not Enslave Them’ – and provided the 
opening statement to forty per cent of its candidates’ addresses.113 Seeking to portray 
decontrol as being ideologically bound, one coalition-era publication even went so 
far as to imply that the Conservatives were ‘a Party of dogmatic and self-righteous 
individuals who are itching to regiment the lives of the rest’.114 Oliver Lyttelton, 
despite his safe seat being officially unopposed by Labour, found himself as a 
particular target of this campaign when he faced a Common Wealth candidate who 
was keen to play upon his earlier successes in building up private controls.
115
 His 
probable involvement in the transfer of 9 577 tons of British nickel to Germany 
during the first half of 1939 had already caused a minor political storm.
116
 It was, 
claimed the TUC, now abundantly clear that ‘the liberty of the individual is most 
endangered by a system of unrestrained private enterprise’.117 
 
In a deliberate attempt to nullify the Conservatives’ Hayekian charge, these 
arguments were matched by drawing upon practical experience. To quote again from 
the TUC’s influential Interim Report, it was carefully stressed that controls were not 
being ‘advocated for their own sake or on the basis of a pre-conceived doctrine’.118 
Instead, as was noted in Chapters One and Two, Labour’s campaign invoked 
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wartime successes to portray retention as a matter of common sense. The 
technological complexity and popular resonance of its products ensured that the 
achievements of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) became a particularly 
fraught battleground. Thus, the Conservative Party’s claim that ‘every British 
aeroplane and aero engine is the product of free enterprise’ was matched by Labour’s 
insistence that ‘private enterprise, left to its own wasteful devices, would never have 
produced enough of the right sort of things we needed to fight the enemy’.119 Calls 
for a similar degree of planning to be adopted in the longer term were matched by a 
more immediate argument concerning the transition. Indeed, expecting their 
opponents to ‘thunder about the [system’s] tyranny’, a nine page section in the 
party’s Speakers’ Handbook urged candidates to remind audiences about the 
experience of 1918 and stressed that it was ‘quite clear that the opponents of controls 
are not concerned about the freedom of the ordinary worker’.120 This was 
exemplified by John Freeman who, standing in the previously safe Conservative seat 
of Watford, claimed anything other than the retention of public controls would be 
unable to guarantee full employment and must ‘inevitably lead to inflation and thus 
endanger the savings of the small man’.121 Helping to set up a clear argument either 
for or against controls, such contentions were deceptively simple.
122
 
 
The results of all of this campaigning would become known on 26 July. With the 
count having been delayed for three weeks so as to allow for the return of ballots 
from those serving overseas, the British Council’s film makers had been given plenty 
of time to prepare for their concluding scenes. The result in Kettering, however, 
reflecting the national picture, came as something of a surprise. In fact, as the 
Returning Officer spoke, it became clear that Profumo had lost his apparently safe 
seat by six and a half thousand votes.
123
 It was soon evident that this was just part of 
                                                 
119
 CCO, ‘Free Enterprise Helped Us Win’ (1945), f. 1; Labour Party, Your Future – After Victory, f.3 
and ‘Britain Out of Control’, f. 1. 
120
 Labour Party, Speakers’ Handbook 1945 (London, 1945), pp. 46-7. This was written by Durbin, 
see: Laura Beers, ‘Labour’s Britain, Fight for it Now!’, The Historical Journal, 52:3 (2009), 667-695 
(p. 683). See also: R.S.W. Pollard, ‘Reconstruction – Then and Now’, Fabian Research, 98 (1945), 6-
9. 
121
 Peter Sloman, ‘Rethinking a Progressive Moment: The Liberal and Labour Parties in the 1945 
General Election’, Historical Research, 84:226 (2010), 1-23 (p. 17). 
122
 Daniel Ritschel, The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 
1930s (Oxford, 1997), p. 102. 
123
 F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1949 (Glasgow, 1969), p. 437. 
172 
 
 
a landmark Labour victory. In fact, having taken 393 seats to the Conservatives’ 213, 
the party had achieved its first ever independent Parliamentary majority by a 
comfortable margin. The reasons for this result have since become a fertile area of 
historical debate. Although Laura Beers, drawing upon detailed research into the 
interwar period, has recently sought to emphasis Labour’s success in translating its 
message to the public, most studies have approached the subject in relation to 
broader movements in public opinion.
124
 Against what Paul Addison has described as 
a ‘popular swing to the left’, the Conservative Party’s decision to focus its appeal 
upon a relatively abstract critique of controls has been seen as a notable mistake. Not 
only were the majority of such restrictions unimportant to the electorate, it is argued, 
but in positioning themselves so clearly against their use, the party had damaged its 
own credibility.
125
 The first point is borne out by results from a BIPO survey which 
gave a 68 per cent approval rating to ‘Government control of the reconversion’ and 
M-O’s finding that only 5 per cent of its respondents thought controls to be among 
the most important issues being discussed.
126
 The second point has been backed up 
by Peter Sloman’s recent analysis of tactical voting patterns which show that 
Labour’s success was more marked than that of other progressive candidates and 
suggests that planning was something of a political trump card.
127
 Notably, his 
conclusion is shared by Stephen Brooke and Richard Toye.
128
 
 
There has, however, been less analysis of the reasons for choosing this tack. Indeed, 
even those who have cast doubt on the influence of popular radicalism – most 
obviously Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo – have themselves 
relied upon the notion that such discussions failed to resonate with the general 
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public.
129
 This is, as was noted at the beginning of Chapter One, an important 
paradox. It is also one that will be explored in Chapter Five. Yet, by focusing on 
results, it arguably avoids the more difficult questions surrounding motivation. To 
address this, one must consider how the contest was viewed at the time. This is by no 
means easy. Indeed, as Addison rightly suggests, the peculiarities of wartime 
coalition complicate the picture whilst the evidence gathered by the pollsters was 
widely ignored and did little to alter an expectation that Churchill would ultimately 
triumph.
130
 Nonetheless, when focused upon perceptions, it is possible to gain a 
degree of clarity. It was, for instance, understood that support for independent and 
apparently non-party figures meant that the election would not be a simple one. As 
was noted by The Economist, it was simply ‘impossible to make any kind of 
forecast’.131 With most independents standing on a broadly reformist ticket, Labour, 
in particular, knew that it had to differentiate itself in order to capture the ‘radical 
middle ground’.132 Nonetheless, whilst making very little use of contemporary 
opinion polls, which were portrayed as an unreliable and unwelcome intrusion into 
the political system, neither Labour nor Conservatives took the existence of any 
radical sentiment for granted.
133
 In fact, like Fielding, they tended to be preoccupied 
with political disengagement. Sir Stafford Cripps, for example, warned against a 
sense of ‘hopelessness and … sour disillusion’ whilst Profumo wrongly identified 
apathy as his ‘first and most important [opponent]’.134 This was not altogether new. 
Not only had such issues been something of a preoccupation since the mid-1930s, 
but they also reflected wartime reports from the MOI and which estimated that only a 
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‘thinking minority’ had any real interest in political issues.135 The challenge was to 
attract an apparently uncommitted electorate. 
 
As the election loomed, both Labour and the Conservative parties increasingly 
focused their efforts on a small number of disproportionately middle class Liberal 
supporters. Indeed, with the Liberal Party’s 306 candidates automatically unable to 
win a majority, these potentially disenfranchised – or otherwise disillusioned –
individuals were seen as a particularly important source of support. The notion of 
deliberately targeting ‘floating voters’ was, like the fear of apathetic supporters, not 
entirely novel. In March 1938, for instance, in an unprecedented experiment at the 
Fulham West by-election, M-O had worked with the Labour Party to enhance the 
impact of its canvassing by deliberately manipulating the outlook of wavering 
Conservative supporters.
136
 The trial, although not repeated, was a notable success 
with Labour taking the seat from the Conservatives with 52.2 per cent of the vote – a 
result that the newly-formed BIPO had, coincidentally, predicted with its own trial 
survey.
137
 In 1945, Morrison, who had liaised with M-O’s Tom Harrison in Fulham, 
would emphasise the importance of this type of appeal and called for a manifesto that 
‘will strike the average elector as good sense’.138 This was, as shown by Beers, the 
rationale underpinning the party’s deliberate ‘call to all progressives’ and colourful 
publications like Your Future and the two million selling Straight Left.
139
 The 
Conservatives, too, were keen to play down accusations of a sectional identity by 
stressing Churchill’s broader appeal. Their approach was again exemplified by 
Profumo who, speaking from a car sun roof in a memorable address to an almost 
empty field, noted that he was standing ‘as a Conservative candidate in support of the 
                                                 
135
 Kevin Jefferys, Politics and the People: A History of British Democracy since 1918 (London, 
2007), pp. 68-9; Joe Moran, ‘Mass Observation, Market Research, and the Birth of the Focus Group’, 
Journal of British Studies, 47 (2008), 827-851 (pp. 832-3); Mark Roodhouse, ‘“Fish-and-Chip 
Intelligence”: Henry Durant and the British Institute of Public Opinion’, Twentieth Century British 
History, advanced access (2012), 1-25 (p. 2) and Penny Summerfield, ‘Mass Observation: Social 
Research or Social Movement?’, Journal of Contemporary History, 20:3 (1985), 439-452 (p. 442). 
136
 Beers, ‘Whose Opinion?’, p. 193; Moran, ‘Birth of the Focus Group’, p. 834 and Tom Harrisson, 
Britain Revisited (London, 1961), pp. 107-9. 
137
 Roodhouse, ‘Fish-and-Chip Intelligence’, p. 19. 
138
 Stephen Brooke, Labour’s War: The Labour Party during the Second World War (Oxford, 1992), 
p. 309; Moran, ‘Birth of the Focus Group’, p. 834 and LPA, LPRD, RDR 282, Morrison, ‘First Draft 
of Policy for the 1945 Annual Conference’, Feb 1945, covering note. 
139
 Beers, ‘Labour’s Britain’, p. 673. See also: Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political Organization 
in Second World War Britain (Oxford, 2008), p. 47. 
175 
 
 
formation of a National Government’.140 Churchill, for his part, after having 
carefully retained a number of non-party figures in his Caretaker Government, was 
keen to stress that he was standing as a ‘Conservative and National’ and carefully 
avoided making any overtly party references in his self-titled manifesto.
141
 The tactic 
was, ironically, reinforced by the Liberal Party’s almost deferential treatment of the 
Prime Minister.
142
 
 
The need to translate these tactical aims into a definite strategy turned industrial 
controls – through their rhetorical linkage with planning – into a fairly unlikely 
political issue. Indeed, for all of the bluster, the peculiarities of coalition had ensured 
that the election was, as The Economist also noted, not a contest between two 
entirely divergent sets of ideas. However, in a party system built upon the 
dramatisation of alternatives, the need to draw a clear distinction forced controls into 
the spotlight, with their future presented as symbolic of a more fundamental 
divide.
143
 This point, as Toye has argued, was at the heart of the Conservative Party’s 
desire to present itself as the only viable defender of ‘historic Liberalism’ against a 
socialist ‘hunger for controls’. It also underpinned Labour’s Straight Left campaign, 
which essentially offered the same message from the opposite perspective. Both were 
deliberate. The allusions to extended freedom included in the first section of Let Us 
Face the Future were, for example, written after Morrison set out his preferred 
approach and planning was carefully presented throughout as an issue which 
distinguished Labour from the Liberal Party. Moreover, with one particularly 
targeted  poster reading ‘National Control of Industry Means Greater Scope for 
Managers, Technicians and Administrators’, it is clear that it was perceived to be a 
potential vote winner amongst these key groups.
144
 Industrial controls had been made 
into a dichotomous electoral issue. Nevertheless, given that The Economist 
maintained that the ‘orgy of verbal inebriation’ was little more than a smokescreen, 
perhaps it is unsurprising that they were one that failed to exert much popular 
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resonance. It was, noted the editor, as if the political class had ‘contrived between 
them to give an impression that what they are shouting about is something irrelevant 
to the great issues of national policy’.145 
 
-IV- 
 
To understand what happened next, and to explain why these debates were returned 
to in 1950, 1951 and 1955, it is necessary to assess how the 1945 General Election 
was interpreted in its immediate aftermath. It will be argued later that the publication 
of McCallum and Readman’s study in 1947 was to be of profound importance in 
maintaining a focus on analysing political trends. But, in the years before 1947, with 
little detailed evidence available, the result led to a more intuitive response. The 
Times, for instance, adopting the maxim that governments – and not oppositions – 
decide elections, pointed to campaign mismanagement for allowing Churchill’s 
stature to be diminished.
146
 In an argument later backed by Rab Butler, Assheton 
blamed Labour’s superior propaganda whilst Churchill pointed to the weakness of 
his party’s organisation.147 Morrison, by contrast, believed that Labour’s stance on 
controls and its call for ‘a more rational and orderly social and economic order’ had 
won supporters disillusioned by the ‘somewhat chaotic platform position’ of their 
opponents.
148
 This appraisal avoided The Economist’s point about controls being a 
pseudo-issue and stands in contrast to the later focus on socio-political factors. 
Nonetheless, although it contradicted a BIPO finding from October 1944 that only 8 
per cent of voters thought that issues were important in shaping their vote, the claim 
was not without precedent.
149
 M-O, for example, whose observers had returned to 
Fulham, agreed that issues were of minor importance but identified a perception of 
‘common sense’ as the key determinant in a contest undermined by ‘violent and 
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abusive denunciations’.150 The American researcher Frank Cantwell, writing in 
Princeton University’s Public Opinion Quarterly, a journal which was widely read 
by Britain’s early pollsters, similarly identified Labour’s ‘program of government 
control’ as the reason for its success.151 The problem with the Conservatives’ 
virulently hostile approach, noted Oliver Franks in 1947, was that the war had made 
‘nonsense of [such] dogmatic contentions’.152 
 
The success of Labour’s approach was believed to have been particularly marked 
amongst the working and lower middle classes. A switch in support amongst these 
groups, which – despite the emphasis that would later be placed upon alignment – 
had traditionally made up over half of the overall Conservative vote, had produced 
dramatic swings in many urban areas and was perhaps the most visible reason for the 
1945 result.
153
 For some, this swing appeared as clear evidence that the rhetorical 
link between controls, planning, individual freedom and full employment had stuck. 
The Bristol Unionist Association, for instance, whose policy suggestions were given 
careful consideration by the CCO, maintained that the result ‘was in part a vote for a 
planned economy’ and, thus, necessitated a real change in approach.154 The party had 
certainly been aware of planning’s political potential. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 
Two, they had carefully presented their own aims for Britain’s transition as a ‘Four 
Year Plan’ in March 1943 and had even included a reference to this document in 
Churchill’s Gestapo speech.155 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Bristol Unionists 
were not the only Conservatives to have called for profound change in emphasis; it 
was, as Butler admitted, ‘universally acknowledged that the party will stand or fall 
by its industrial policy at the next election’.156 But, if Churchill hoped that this policy 
would allow him to represent ‘the People [against] Socialism’, then the scale of 
defeat appeared, for the authors of a resolution accepted at the 1946 National Union 
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conference, to show that it must be based upon these people’s ‘considered wishes’.157 
This resolution – which was dismissed as ‘rather vague’ by Stephen Piersenné, the 
Central Office’s Director, and never actually discussed because the mover failed to 
turn up – began a very deliberate attempt to engage with public opinion. In fact, after 
its launch in early 1947, the ‘two way movement of ideas’ envisaged became the 
centrepiece of Conservative strategy and led to the opening of bookshops, a plethora 
of new pamphlets, the setting up of discussion groups and the inauguration of a new 
Political Centre as an Conservative alternative to the Fabian society.
158
 
 
This ‘movement’ sat alongside the attempted redefinition of economic policy 
explored in Chapter Three. The Industrial Charter, which was accompanied by a 
series of factory-floor talks that aimed to recapture the party’s lost support, can, thus, 
be seen as an attempt to redefine the parameters of debate by reconciling the rhetoric 
of freedom with a language of planning. By claiming that this could be achieved 
without controls, it was, in the words of Hogg, designed to expose ‘one of the biggest 
swindles ever put across the people by a political party’.159 Such attempts would 
continue into the latter half of 1947 when Eden set out his own ‘Seven Point Plan’ to 
meet the economic crisis.
160
 Nonetheless, drawing upon views put forward by 
industrialists during the course of the Industrial Policy Committee (CIPC)’s drafting 
process, it was matched by a more practical critique of controls.
161
 Most importantly, 
in something of a prelude to Law, by rejecting the possibility of a Utopia and 
offering ‘something quite modestly better than the present’ it also aimed to rekindle a 
critique of Labour’s approach as being motivated by ideology.162 ‘Planning’, assured 
Butler in an explanatory pamphlet on the Charter, was simply being used as a ‘new 
word for [a] coherent and positive policy’.163 This dual strategy was not entirely 
successful. Indeed, as seen in Chapter Three, important questions regarding clarity 
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and confidence remained. Moreover, from a more explicitly party-political point of 
view, it did little to change the party’s electoral fortunes. On the contrary, in a point 
that will be explored further in Chapter Five, the party was forced to admit that by-
elections results had shown no real swing in support amongst its targeted groups – a 
situation that they attributed to a belief that ‘The wage-earner has little need to fill up 
forms for licences permits or passports etc and is not affected to the same extent [as 
managers] by resptrictions [sic]’.164 
 
The Conservative Party’s difficulties were not helped by the fact that Labour had 
continued to emphasise a democratic interpretation of planning whilst in office. 
Indeed, despite the new government’s inability to define what would actually 
constitute a positive control, Morrison continued to promote wartime successes and 
took great care to ensure that that public announcements – and internal memoranda – 
avoided using terms like ‘negative’ and ‘restrictive’.165 His October 1946 address to 
the Institute of Public Administration provides a case in point. Indeed, arguing that it 
was not enough to replace ‘the control by blind forces … [with] control by a few 
people sitting in Whitehall’, he stressed that, ‘We in Britain stand for free planning 
and for planning as a means to fuller freedom’.166 This was echoed by more 
academic contributions. Jay’s second edition of The Socialist Case and Wootton’s 
extended Freedom Under Planning, to give two notable examples, were clear that 
planning would allow for a real shift ‘from centre to circumference’.167 This was, as 
Attlee himself stressed in November 1946, part of a commitment that there should be 
no ‘controls for their own sake’.168 This careful assurance was partly motivated by 
administrative necessity. It had, in fact, been understood since 1944 that gaining 
public approval for regulations was the only way to avoid sending out ‘an army of 
inspectors’.169 Nevertheless, the continued emphasis on purposeful planning also 
allowed decontrol to be dismissed by Jay in his fighting Plan for 1947 as ‘the only 
shadow of a Tory policy’ and enabled Richard Crossman to claim that Churchill’s 
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approach continued to ‘threaten the foundations of our freedom’.170 Nevertheless, as 
had been the case in the administrative questions explored in Chapter Two, the 
parameters of this debate would fundamentally change during the course of 1947 as 
the domestic economic situation worsened, wider fears about freedom grew and the 
political landscape became the focus of increased attention. 
 
* 
 
On the first point, the succession of bad news served to highlight the fragility of 
Britain’s post war transition and undermined confidence in the planner’s ability to 
resolve economic uncertainties. With this fall in confidence matched by a very real 
intensification of consumer-facing restrictions, the situation provoked a widespread 
critique of controls more broadly-defined. As Jewkes had argued in his Ordeal by 
Planning, which began with its own lamentation for Britain’s ‘recent melancholy’, 
the argument was economic but ‘the stakes [were] moral and spiritual’.171 Indeed, 
pitying that so many ‘intelligent, sincere and well-meaning people’ – including a 
number of his former colleagues – had been fooled by ‘mis-representations and pure 
ignorance’, he sought to expose what he saw as the ‘the logical incompatibility of a 
planned economy and freedom’.172 Others made similar assertions. Harrod, for 
example, who commended Ordeal’s ‘vivacity and wit’, also linked what he described 
as an ‘all-pervading system of control’ with societal servitude in a paper written in 
December 1947.
173
 It was against this background that Jewkes and Lionel Robbins 
would join Hayek and thirty three others in the small Swiss town of Mont Pelèrin to 
discuss alternatives to what they saw as an ‘extension of arbitrary power’.174 Unlike 
the Road to Serfdom, however, this new wave of comment was founded upon a much 
more applied critique.
175
 So, in contrast to Hayek’s dire warnings of strong men and 
serfdom, Jewkes guided his readers through stories of multiple licences, fines for 
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failed crops, Home Office sanctions covering children’s pocket money and the need 
for forty two signatures to despatch a shipment of lubricating oil.
176
 This was quite 
deliberate. In fact, each such control, although innocuous in itself, was presented as 
contributing to a wider ‘moral sicknesss’. Their very existence, Jewkes contended in 
an argument that would be popularised a year later by the Ealing comedies Passport 
to Pimlico and Whisky Galore, encouraged a disregard for the law by alienating the 
public from the planners. People were not just actively evading restrictions, they 
were often breaking muddled laws of which they had absolutely no knowledge.
177
 
 
The ideas put forward by Jewkes and Harrod clearly resonated with a number of key 
Conservative thinkers. Not only were they grounded in a similar ‘common sense’ to 
that which Hogg had placed at heart of his Case for Conservatism, but they echoed 
Clarke’s belief that ‘virtue can only grow where there is freedom of choice’ and 
obviously fed into Law’s later warnings about the latent immorality of arbitrary 
decision making.
178
 They were also welcomed by many at the party’s grass roots. 
These years were, in fact, marked by an increasingly libertarian turn amongst many 
supporters with recurrent calls for a ‘Charter of Liberties’ to complement the party’s 
other policy statements.
179
 Even before the fuel crisis, in 1946, at the Conservatives’ 
first conference as a party of opposition, The Times reported that the biggest ovation 
had been for a female delegate who strongly denounced Labour’s extension of 
controls as an ‘insidious step … to undermine our liberty’.180 With similar 
contentions featuring in a number of local elections, paid agents, too, believed that 
controls were likely to be one of the defining issues of any future General Election. 
A survey in 1948 resulted in them being placed third on a list of the fifty most 
important political issues.
181
 As would be the case at the height of the 1950 
campaign, numerous anti-controls slogans also began to be collated by the CCO 
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during the latter part of the decade. Controls, it was noted within a CRD framework 
for the construction of speeches, were now characteristic of a ‘fundamental cleavage’ 
in ‘political theories’.182 Crucially, though, like Jewkes’ everyday examples of 
administrative incompetence, this was not simply a theoretical process. Instead, it 
coincided with a number of other contextual shifts as international tensions reignited 
earlier fears about an erosion of civil liberties. 
 
Although a work of fiction, this mood was captured by George Orwell in the novel 
1984. Indeed, this literary critique of ‘oligarchic collectivism’, which returned to 
ideas explored in a review of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, can be read as part of 
the author’s own despondency at the institutional nature of British socialism. After 
all, Orwell had, in 1944, warned that ‘there was a great deal of truth’ in the Road’s 
appraisal.
183
 As demonstrated by Mark Roodhouse, the moral argument against 
controls would become particularly important during the course of 1948 when 
allegations of misconduct at the Board of Trade uncovered a political scandal 
involving the exchange of gifts for industrial licences.
184
 This case – which provoked 
the Archbishop of York to warn against ‘a dangerous and slippery slope’ towards 
immorality – led to the setting up of a public Tribunal of Inquiry under Mr Justice 
Lynskey and eventually found John Belcher, a Parliamentary Secretary, and George 
Gibson, a director at the Bank of England, guilty of misconduct. Although the 
quantities involved were relatively insignificant, the case served to focus popular 
attention onto the complex apparatus of control and ensured that its discussion of 
controls was not limited to left wing authors.
185
 The Tribunal was, in fact, a matter of 
notable public interest and would dominate the press during November and 
December 1948; the Yorkshire Post, for instance, consistently carried the story on its 
front page during the twenty six days of evidence.
186
 Moving beyond the business-
orientated criticisms explored earlier, the London Chamber of Commerce had been 
just as insistent that the undermining of respect for the law was ‘in itself, a very 
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insidious and far-reaching evil’.187 This potent combination of intensified hardships 
and discredited planning helps to explain the importance of 1947. And it was against 
this background that a more virulent debate was rekindled. 
 
As would be the case in 1950, this began with an attack on the Supplies and Services 
Act but soon became much more expansive. It was at this point, in October 1947, in 
what remains the most obvious example of the change in tack, that Churchill linked 
the Act into a broad plea to ‘set the people free’.188 As was noted in another briefing 
document, this approach was part of a conception of governance wherein the state 
would define a ‘framework within which the people may be reasonably free to go 
about their own business’ and the ‘tactics of industry’ could be left to individual 
enterprise.
189
 Industrial controls were, by contrast, the practical embodiment of 
excessive interference. The pugnacious MP John Boyd-Carpenter, for example, 
explained the growth of petty controls as an example of the civil service’s 
‘irrepressible itch to interfere’ and its apparent hatred of the ‘unregulated untidiness 
of ordinary people’s lives’.190 His invocation of the ‘Gentleman in Whitehall’ – a 
figure who was by now prevalent in political propaganda – played upon the 
Industrial Charter’s earlier accusations of doctrinaire controls and resonated with a 
more populist critique. In 1947, for example, in two stinging attacks on excess 
bureaucracy, one Daily Express cartoon depicted legions of umbrella-toting civil 
servants passing a solitary builder on their way into a faceless ‘Ministry’ whilst 
another in the Daily Mail depicted the creeping tentacles of an enormous octopus 
grasping at requisitioned offices as Londoners looked on bemused.
191
 Faced with 
such criticism, Labour sought to use its on-going reviews of the system to emphasise 
its own commitment to decontrol whilst simultaneously stressing the need to 
maintain restrictions where materials remained scarce. As will be seen in Chapter 
Five, Harold Wilson’s infamous Bonfires, which sought to capitalise upon 
departmental relaxations whilst playing down the subject as one ‘on which too much 
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doctrinaire rubbish is talked’, provide an apt example of this dual strategy and were 
supported by continued attempts to position controls as the guarantors of ‘freedom 
from exploitation’.192 After its brief abeyance, the politics of controls and freedom 
had returned. 
 
* 
 
Although ideas were important in this shift, the Conservative Party’s change in tone 
was also motivated by a pragmatic re-assessment that was symbolic of a growing 
interest in political analysis following the publication of McCallum and Readman’s 
Nuffield study.
193
 Like Cantwell and Harrisson, McCallum and Readman maintained 
that issues had been an important determinant in the outcome of the 1945 General 
Election.
194
 But, in an unprecedented reading of the contest, they also accused 
Labour of having run a negative campaign which took advantage of a dispirited 
electorate and stood starkly with Churchill’s ‘entirely forward-looking appeal’.195 
Moreover, chiming with a renewed interest in electoral irrationality following the re-
issue of Wallas’ Human Nature in Politics in 1948, this re-reading of the result also 
suggested that British politics could be almost wholly explained by entrenched socio-
political identities. In fact, despite recognising that individual voter’s motives were 
contingent upon a range of factors, McCallum argued in a striking early passage that 
it was irrefutable that ‘every consideration of class, creed, or family tradition’ had 
made its influence felt.
196
 Undermining the idea of elections as sites of rational 
choice, this conclusion was crucial as it suggested that the contest had been decided 
by a relatively small number of votes. Indeed, as the American Journal of Politics 
had reminded its readers a year earlier, despite a percentage swing, the overall 
Conservative vote was little changed to that of 1935.
197
 If this was accepted, and 
Labour’s victory was solely due to a small number of first time and ‘floating’ voters, 
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all the Conservative Party had to do was capture this support. And, given that the 
party had maintained its core support despite a marked ‘swing to the left’ amongst 
new voters, M-O contended that the Conservative Party’s stance on controls might 
actually prove very successful in the longer term.
198
 
 
Having undertaken to classify each constituency according to its marginality, the 
Conservatives had already begun to deliberately target their efforts.
199
 Tied into the 
broader ‘two way movement’, the party had launched a twenty five week campaign 
in 1948 during which almost two hundred and fifty paid ‘Missioners’ and a voluntary 
‘Crusader Corps’ were deployed into marginal seats to spread the party’s message.200 
This canvassing sat alongside more imaginative attempts to measure the impact of 
their efforts.
201
 In April 1947, for instance, overcoming a wartime fear that opinion 
‘snoopers’ were akin to a ‘home made Gestapo’, M-O was commissioned to gauge 
the Industrial Charter’s success in reaching a general public that was still perceived 
to be apathetic and uninformed.
202
 Just over a year later, in June 1948, the party set 
up its own Public Opinion Research Department (PORD) to collate Missioner’s 
reports with by-election results and information from Gallup. Initially concerned 
with plotting a nascent ‘swing to the right’, the PORD would also increasingly focus 
its attention on those who it called ‘doubtful voters’ and circulated monthly opinion 
digests to MPs from January 1949.
203
 In an attempt to measure the size and make up 
of this new constituency, the party also appointed Market and Information Services 
Ltd – a subsidiary of the advertising agency Colman, Prentis & Varley – to undertake 
a bespoke sample survey across 52 constituencies in the summer of 1949. Their 
report, of which a summary was circulated by the PORD, broke down Gallup’s broad 
‘Don’t Know’ category into degrees of doubtfulness and estimated that over five 
million voters should be regarded as genuinely floating.
204
 It suggested that these 
electors, who stood ‘somewhere about the level where the working class merges into 
the middle’, were most likely to be those ‘with a degree of responsibility, intelligence 
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and general interests above the average’. Most importantly, their personal 
characteristics were seen to be strikingly similar to those who declared themselves as 
Liberals. It was, the author noted, as if ‘the label “Liberal” [was] being used as a 
convenient cover’.205 
 
The impact of the ‘doubtful voter’ survey is open to debate. Indeed, although Ina 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska has maintained that it was an important part of the 
Conservative Party’s success in 1951, Andrew Taylor contends that its findings did 
little to alter a strategy that remained concentrated on their core supporters.
206
 
Moreover, although the pragmatic survey was less Utopian than a similar one 
undertaken by M-O in the weeks after their Industrial Charter findings were 
discussed, the head of Colman, Prentis & Varley’s research department was certainly 
less than impressed with the politicians’ response to his efforts. In fact, during an 
interview with Mark Abrams, the founder of Research Services, he noted that 
‘talking to them was more infuriating than talking to a small-minded provincial 
manufacturer of shoelaces’.207 For their own part, the PORD were similarly 
disillusioned at the advertiser’s ‘showiness’ and had hoped that the CRD would grant 
the opinion research contract to an alternative agency.
208
 Less contentious, however, 
is that the findings confirmed a widely held belief that any future election would be 
decided by often disillusioned individuals who held a ‘lingering hope’ that they 
would not have to vote for either of the main parties.
209
 As the campaign neared, this 
point was echoed by Abrams who anticipated that the balance would remain with a 
disparate group of Liberals and a relatively small number of uncommitted ‘fence 
sitters’ who had opted for Labour in 1945 but were politically closer to the 
Conservative Party’s views.210 Interestingly, however, the ‘doubtful voter’ survey 
also suggested that these fence sitters were perhaps less apathetic than often 
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presumed. As the final report stressed, they tended to display ‘some degree of 
intelligence’ and were remarkably independent when compared to ‘the sheep like … 
mass of the public on either wing’.211 Thus, although it was understood that identity 
was hugely significant, it also appeared that issues would remain potentially decisive. 
 
It is probably fair to say that these findings confirmed what was already believed to 
be known. The Liberal Party’s ‘near extinction’ had, for example, been another of 
the most obvious outcomes of 1945 and it was instinctively understood that their 
former voters held the balance of power.
212
 It was this belief that would underpin the 
Conservative Party’s merge with the National Liberals in 1947 and the conciliatory 
‘Unite for Freedom and Recovery’ campaign that followed. It also helps to explain 
why Dr Hill – who dubbed himself a ‘reluctant Tory’ – was officially adopted as a 
‘Conservative and Liberal’ in 1950 and why Churchill’s first call to ‘set the people 
free’ was delivered with ‘a sly glance’ to the Liberal benches.213 Importantly, the 
need to find an issue to attract such voters also led Woolton, who had replaced 
Assheton as Chairman in 1946, to consider a memorandum on electoral strategy from 
the Liberal publicist Jack Cherry in 1949. This had an important impact. Indeed, it 
emphasised that liberty could ‘re-establish national unity’ and stressed that a 
campaign against controls would allow this ‘unchallengeable moral foundation’ to be 
combined with an opportunity to ‘pelt [Labour] with facts as we might with rotten 
eggs’.214 Such a call would, of course, also bring the party into line with its activists 
and avoid the Industrial Charter’s inherent complications. It was in an attempt to 
seize this initiative that the party’s Tactical Committee deigned to circulate its much-
criticised list of ‘Controls or Parts of Controls that Could be Removed’ as a means of 
providing candidates with ‘platform ammunition’.215 Even Clarke, in contrast to his 
earlier scepticism, stressed that the party ‘must [now] err on the side of promising too 
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much’.216 For Mark Chapman Walker, the CCO’s Publicity Officer, it was clear that 
an anti-controls message should form the ‘keynote’ of his party’s appeal.217 The 
overall aim, noted the CRD, was to ‘make the free system attractive to the average 
man and woman’.218 
 
It is obvious from the above that the Conservative Party had played a key role in 
defining the terms of debate as Britain approached the 1950 General Election. 
Nonetheless, just as Chapter Three showed that the opposition had not entirely 
neglected questions of policy, Labour had not been wholly absent from this more 
political story. Indeed, it was alleged by the director of the BIPO that Attlee had 
waited until a swing in the polls before making an announcement on the date of the 
election.
219
 This is obviously impossible to verify. Nonetheless, it is clear that Labour 
had thought very carefully about how best to counter their resurgent opponents and 
had even managed to obtain a leaked report on the outcome of a mock campaign 
conducted by the CCO in 1949.
220
 Morrison, too, despite a continued uncertainty 
about polling methods, clearly recognised that his party’s fate rested on the choices 
of a relatively small group of electors and continued to stress that Labour should 
focus its efforts on ‘shaky’ middle class seats.221 The party’s stance on controls – 
and, more importantly, the rhetorical link with planning – continued to form part of 
this appeal. Their 1950 manifesto, Let Us Win Through Together, emphasised the 
party’s success in attaining full employment and stressed that basic controls were 
needed to turn these achievements into ‘a permanently thriving national economy’; 
adopting a markedly more negative tone, the Conservatives were denounced as a 
‘party of outdated ideas’ and their focus on decontrol as potentially ‘disastrous’.222 
This hinged upon familiar arguments about unregulated vested interests. For a 
broadsheet consciously entitled the Thinking Voter, it was about breaking down 
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Churchill’s now well-worn call to ‘set the people free’ to ask whether this did not 
mean a ‘Freedom for the few to winter in Monte Carlo … [and] for the many to face 
the threat of unemployment and insecurity?’223 Moreover, as can be inferred from 
Aneurin Bevan’s eloquent defence of the need to take ‘ethical choices on a national 
scale’, it was an argument about which the whole party could agree.224 
 
-V- 
 
The Conservative Party’s reaction to the crises of 1947 may have encouraged the 
politicisation of controls in the run up to the 1950 General Election, but it was the 
inconclusive outcome of that contest which consolidated their position. The handful 
of studies undertaken to analyse the campaign actually confirmed a number of 
existing preconceptions. Firstly, Labour was seen to have suffered disproportionately 
from a redistribution of seats and had lost support in more affluent suburbs.
225
 But, as 
anticipated, the Liberal Party’s decision to field 475 candidates had split the 
opposition vote and left the party virtually bankrupt. In a further strengthening of two 
party politics, the abolition of University seats was also seen to have ‘speeded the 
extermination of Independent members’.226 However, though the result in Greenwich 
suggested that most voters had divided along class lines, their sample – which had 
deliberately over-represented ‘Don’t Knows’ – also confirmed that many doubtful 
voters had chosen to abstain rather than vote for the Conservatives.
227
 This point 
intrigued M-O which estimated that, despite the unprecedented turn-out and their 
being generally more politically-conscious than other respondents, over a fifth of 
Liberals had elected not to vote.
228
 Public opinion was as complex as it had been in 
1945. Yet each party’s task was clearer than ever. In fact, as was shown by David 
Butler in an anonymous article on the ‘cube law’ written for The Economist, the 
balanced situation suggested that it would only take a one per cent overall swing to 
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alter the outcome in between 15 and 20 seats.
229
 With other polls suggesting that up 
to twenty per cent of the electorate were still undecided about which party was best 
placed to deliver on key issues like full employment, such a swing was by no means 
improbable.
230
 Besides, as M-O satirically noted, ‘Elections, like statistics, may be 
said to prove anything’.231 
 
As had been the case in 1945 and 1947, the Conservative Party’s response to this 
situation was the most deliberate. Undertaking a thorough stock-take of their 
progress, the party’s Central Office collated information from constituency agents, 
the CRD and PORD in an attempt to understand why only such a small number of 
voters had switched allegiances. Drawing upon a sample of 527 people who had not 
voted Conservative in 1945, the PORD concluded that the party had suffered from a 
sense of ‘defeatism and despondency’ whilst a ‘bandwagon effect’ had seen many 
doubtfuls vote Labour.
232
 However, the data collected also suggested that the party’s 
approach had not been without some success. Indeed, of the 109 who had switched, 
15 had done so because of the Conservatives’ stance on controls and 42 mentioned 
freedom as being the party’s point of most general appeal. The numbers were small. 
But decontrol was still the third most successful issue, and had won the party more 
votes than promises to cut tax or increase food supplies.
233
 With a poll undertaken by 
Research Services also confirming that 82 per cent of avowed Conservative voters 
believed that there had been ‘too much’ government interference, it was clearly still a 
popular message amongst core supporters.
234
 Such findings ensured that the period 
between February 1950 and October 1951 would see a continuation of – rather than a 
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change in – tactics. Thus, the Missioner campaign was renewed and a direct mail 
scheme adopted with an aim to reach 2.5 million Liberal voters. Alongside this, a 
new broadsheet – the Popular Pictorial – was launched to convey matters of 
industrial and economic policy in a more popular style.
235
 And, most interestingly, in 
preparation for the Supplies and Services debate, Chapman Walker’s Publicity 
Department re-issued the Tactical Committee’s list of controls – now insouciantly 
titled ‘Ridiculous Controls’ – in October 1950.236 In this sense, the moral and legal 
arguments raised by Maxwell Fyfe were again matched by a more practical critique, 
albeit one that bore little relation to reality. 
 
Having shaken an instinctive belief that they were attuned to ‘the people’, the 
delicate electoral balance also encouraged the Labour Party to begin its own attempt 
to better understand public opinion. Like the ‘Doubtful Voter’ survey, the impact of 
this should not be overstated. Even so, when tied into the growing interest in applied 
sociology outlined earlier, it did provide some interesting evidence. In fact, with 
Young sitting on the Greenwich survey’s steering committee, the LPRD were 
allowed access to a range of detailed material with which to analyse the result. From 
a party-political perspective, these findings (which Young cross-referenced with data 
obtained from BIPO and Research Services Ltd) suggested that Labour’s success in 
attracting doubtfuls could be explained by a nebulous ‘“feeling” that Labour will 
look after the interests of their sort’.237 The methodology had little impact on the 
party leadership. But the belief that many electors would instinctively vote for 
Labour if encouraged to do so would certainly inform their strategy in a 1951 
election campaign which focused upon ‘getting out the vote’.238 It is equally 
important that the Greenwich study also highlighted that controls remained a minor 
issue for those who were most likely to vote Labour and that planning – when tied to 
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full employment – was still its most popular point of appeal.239 It was for this reason 
that the Morrison’s Economic Controls Bill was recalibrated as one to cover 
Economic Powers and Full Employment. ‘The point’, noted a cynical Bernard 
Gilbert, was to stress ‘the need for economic planning in order to secure full 
employment’ despite the fact that the ‘long title and preamble [were] merely pieces 
of rhetoric [and] not supported by the substantive provisions’.240 For the Treasury 
official to whom he delegated responsibility for drafting, it was quite simply an 
attempt ‘to make a measure which might conceivably lead to a General Election as 
attractive as possible’.241 Having already given a sense of Gaitskell and Morrison’s 
manoeuvring in 1950, his cynicism was not entirely without foundation. 
 
Importantly, though, later developments did little to change the nature of these 
debates. For example, although Law had tried to break the supposed link between 
planning and full employment with his Return from Utopia, it is clear that such 
interventions did little to alleviate earlier anxieties about the potential impact of 
decontrol.
242
 Moreover, with Churchill adamant that a majority of less than 40 was 
unworkable, findings from ‘Missioners’ that the perceived relationship between 
controls, employment and ‘fair shares’ remained potent were an obvious worry.243 
The Conservatives, it was admitted by the Advisory Committee on Policy (ACP), 
remained ‘on approval’.244 It was for this reason that the party continued to press on 
an issue that it believed held resonance, whilst using tangible changes to consumer-
facing restrictions to provide the same sort of platform ammunition as its examples 
of irrational controls had in opposition. In a period that was riven by internal debate 
and high political manoeuvre, older ideas also provided Labour with a comfortable 
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point around which both revisionists and fundamentalists could converge.
245
 Indeed, 
although the party recognised that it was ‘particularly vulnerable to the charge that a 
vote for Labour means more bureaucracy’, it was hoped that the continued linkage of 
planning and economic certainty – such as that promoted by Challenge to Britain – 
would recapture lost support.
246
 Entrenching the party’s stance, this allowed 
Crossman to launch a blistering attack on Rab Butler as the ‘ideologist of inequality’: 
a man determined to perpetuate a society ‘controlled by an élite’.247 With Milne and 
Mackenzie’s 1951 voting behaviour study – which began with its own quotes from 
Burke and Wallas – reiterating that ‘Floaters who mentioned issues as reasons for 
voting are more likely to have been decisively influenced by them’, such tactics 
remained important.
248
 Indeed, as The Economist was careful to repeat in the run up 
to 1955, future polls were just as likely to be determined by ‘the unreliable voter’ as 
had those before it.
249
 With both parties defending differing interpretations of the 
system, the politics of freedom and control continued to reflect this reality. 
 
-VI- 
 
This chapter has shown that the significance of controls lay in their ability to 
combine theoretical debates with political necessity. It has shown that they did not 
command a great deal of attention and had entered the popular political lexicon 
without ever being fully defined. As Plowden would note in his Political Economy 
Club talk, it was a debate about planning that was ‘actually not [about] planning in 
the best sense of the word’.250 Nevertheless, in contrast to Jewkes’ intimations, the 
chapter has also contended that the decision to focus upon them was at least partially 
deliberate. This fact underpinned Devons’ belief in magic. Indeed, despite having 
initially agreed with Jewkes that the ‘controversy [was] inconclusive’ because it had 
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taken place ‘at cross purposes’, he became increasingly interested in the political 
nature of the controls debate.
251
 By 1954, and still adamant that no planner would 
ever fully understand a system that was riven by the tension between centralisation 
and devolution, he would claim that their very impossibility ensured that both the act 
of control and the concept of planning were inherently political.
252
 Extending upon 
his hypothesis, the somewhat paradoxical importance of controls might, therefore, 
best be regarded as a socio-political construct. One wherein a confused, hidden, and 
often self-defeating system of industrial controls was presented as a fundamental 
means of control from which multiple interpretations could be drawn and links made 
between economics, ethics and the everyday. They were the rhetorical symbols upon 
which other myths could hang. It was, if this is accepted, the outcome of a politically 
useful uncertainty. Like the ‘Numerology’ of the last chapter, the very intangibility 
of the system provided an opportunity for controls to be presented – in Butler’s 
words – as emblematic of ‘a choice between two ways of life; [between] individual 
liberty and state domination’.253 
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Chapter Five 
The Limits of Public Control 
 
The political slanging match about “freedom of enterprise” versus “planned 
economy” is not closely related to reality. I doubt very much if either side 
really gains much from the discussion, or if the ordinary voter finds anything to 
choose between. 
 
TNA, PREM 4/4/82, John M. Martin, ‘Controls’, 26 Nov 1944, f. 2. 
 
 
Although Winston Churchill remained adamant that a significant portion of the 
electorate was ‘genuinely alarmed … by the increasing exercise of the powers of the 
state’, it has been shown that this group was relatively small in number.1 Even in 
1945, when arguments surrounding their continuation had dominated an election 
campaign, Mass Observation (M-O) found that only 3 per cent of its Fulham sample 
had voted for Labour because of the party’s stance and noted that only 5 per cent had 
placed controls amongst the most important issues being discussed.
2
 It was perhaps 
for this reason that the Financial Times should have somewhat misleadingly claimed 
that they had ‘barely been mentioned’ as a political issue.3 For John Martin, 
Churchill’s Principal Private Secretary, it was certainly evidence that controls should 
have been ‘left out of Election Politics’.4 As Britain moved deeper into its transition 
to peace, the continued lack of interest was reflected by the fact that the British 
Institute for Public Opinion (BIPO) only began to enquire into ‘controls in trade and 
industry’ in April 1948.5 Though symbolic of the issue’s politicisation, this should 
not be regarded as evidence of any profound change in popular feeling. BIPO would, 
in fact, find that a remarkably consistent majority believed ‘some, but not all, are 
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necessary’ each time the question was asked.6 Moreover, without the prompt of a 
direct question, Research Services Ltd found that only 5 per cent raised concerns that 
the government had ‘kept control on business too long’ during a survey conducted in 
early 1950.
7
 Given the very real problems inherent within the system, Herbert 
Morrison’s private secretary admitted that it was ‘remarkable that there [were] not 
more complaints’.8 
 
Of course, this situation can be partly explained by the very nature of the controls at 
stake. They were, as noted throughout the preceding chapters, far less visible and far 
less well understood than their consumer-facing counterparts. Nonetheless, the lack 
of popular resonance also fits into a broader picture of political disengagement. 
Indeed, although the 1940s and early 1950s were ostensibly a golden age of popular 
political participation, with a record 84 per cent turn-out recorded in the 1950 
General Election and both main parties boasting individual memberships of over a 
million people, these years were marked by a high level of despair at the general 
public’s apathy.9 The belief that most electors ignored issues in favour of social 
loyalties was a particular point of contention for those pioneering political 
sociologists. Indeed, it was seen to suggest that the abstentions of an uninterested 
minority, and ‘not the politically interested or knowledgeable voters’, determined 
results.
10
 This particular comment was made in 1955. But, as briefly noted in the last 
chapter, it could easily have been made ten years earlier. The Times had, in fact, 
reported a widespread disengagement during the last days of the 1945 General 
Election campaign whilst M-O noted that its prelude seemed to have been enveloped 
by a ‘cloak of apathy’ without either ‘active demonstration [or] excitement’.11 With 
political appeals to reason matched by an obstinately unreasonable public, the 
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contradictory situation appeared to conform to that sketched out by Walter 
Lippmann’s Public Relations (a text that expanded upon Graham Wallas’ interest in 
irrationality and was republished in Britain in 1949).
12
 Despite approaching the 
questions this raised from a markedly different perspective, the flurry of ‘New 
Political History’ conducted in the last two decades has tended to arrive at a similar 
conclusion. Drawing upon existing literature examining the nineteenth century, this 
has seen the 1945 campaign being used by the authors of the ironically titled 
England Arise! to explore a broader ‘myth’ of popular radicalism and has most 
recently been continued by Lawrence Black’s more nuanced contention that electoral 
involvement was just one part of a mid-century fluid political culture that was 
shifting away from traditional sites of engagement.
13
 
 
These readings have not been without contention. Nor have they resolved the 
paradox between an apparently disengaged – or, at least, differently engaged – public 
and the relative strength of organised politics. On the contrary, James Hinton accused 
England Arise! of setting up a ‘no win choice between immersion in popular culture 
or political activism’ whilst Stephen Brooke was certain that it had never attempted 
to define what ‘popular politics’ actually meant.14 Yet, although it is worth 
remembering Brooke’s earlier argument about planning’s potency, and both parties 
attempts to link means with ends, such debates have tended to revolve around 
meaning and have broadly accepted the existence of a disconnection between the 
issues being discussed at a high level and those that the public regarded as most 
important. Notably, the relative marginality of party politics has also been 
acknowledged by those who have taken a more explicitly high political approach.
15
 
Indeed, far from discussing controls, it is widely understood that most mid-century 
voters were unmoved by the overtly ideological debate and focused upon issues of a 
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more everyday nature.
 16
 In a period defined by food shortages, poor quality housing, 
gentle inflation and latent fears regarding unemployment, it was perhaps no surprise 
that the bread and butter of politics failed to sustain an electorate beset with more 
pressing needs. The situation would, however, feed into the perception of political 
‘otherness’ which now underpins the New Political approach.17 It had also been a 
particular point of interest to some of those who had sought to make sense of the 
relationship between state and society from a slighter older political perspective. It 
was, after all, The Economist which noted in 1945 that politicians were to blame for 
having alienated the public in a debate which seemed ‘marginal and petty’.18 This, 
M-O concluded in an earlier report, ensured that the mood was ‘not apathy but a lack 
of leadership, a lack of any focal point on which to direct a desire to have the vote’.19 
 
-I- 
 
Although the last chapter showed that this lack of popular resonance did not 
necessarily detract from the political significance of controls, the importance of the 
above should not be understated. Indeed, when moving beyond a narrowly electoral 
perspective, it is clear that popular disengagement represented an inherent political 
difficulty for those on both sides of the political spectrum. The following section will 
show why this was the case from both a practical and more fundamental perspective. 
Regarding the former, there was, of course, a strong political motive for public 
engagement. At a very basic level, the mid-century political system obviously 
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necessitated a degree of consultation and communication through Parliamentary 
debate, elections and relations with the press. ‘Democracy’, explained Francis 
Williams, who served as Clement Attlee’s publicity advisor in 1946-7, ‘requires a 
willingness and ability on the part of governments to explain their policies … and 
competence on the part of the people to judge whether those policies are any good’.20 
More specifically, as the last chapter has shown, during this period of competitive 
party politics, both Labour and the Conservatives sought to tie their competing 
visions of controls into a broader political narrative. Crucially, however, it was also 
shown that neither party was able to fully resolve the uncertainties surrounding 
controls and that this ensured that neither was ever fully comfortable with the issue. 
Thus, whilst Labour was able to nullify the Conservative Party’s Hayekian charge in 
1945 by appealing to common sense, the Conservatives were able to make a similar 
appeal just two years later by pointing to a lack of progress. Their emphasis on 
decontrol was similarly contested and, after 1951, both parties found themselves 
seeking to defend their records whilst maintaining a commitment to some level of 
control. With neither party able to strike a decisive blow, both sought to mobilise 
latent support through targeted appeals and drives to ‘get out the vote’. And, with a 
significant number of political sociologists identifying the success of mobilising 
potential non-voters – or persuading others to stay at home – as a potentially decisive 
determinant, their ability to communicate a message was an obvious concern.
21
 
 
The political necessity was matched by an economic one. Indeed, despite an initial 
recalcitrance surrounding the publication of sensitive statistics, Britain’s continued 
balance of payments problems, and the resultant need to divert production into 
exports, forced an increased emphasis on public engagement. As a conscious attempt 
to engage with the human side of production, this can be seen as part of a broader 
effort to avoid repeating those problems exposed during the first years of the Second 
World War. As Sir Stafford Cripps explained to a 1947 Board of Trade press 
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conference, his wartime experience at the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) had 
shown that ‘People respond to facts’ and that they had to ‘realise [the] national 
difficulty’ before being expected to overcome it.22 It was for this reason that a 
distinct Economic Information Unit (EIU) was created as part of the broader 
reassessment of the planning apparatus sketched out in Chapter Three.
23
 Working 
alongside the Central Economic Planning Service (CEPS) and Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), the EIU was charged with translating the government’s plans for 
public consumption and helped to co-ordinate the Central Office of Information 
(COI)’s infamous ‘Work or Want’ campaign during the summer of 1947. The scale 
of this work, which built upon existing departmental campaigns and the first 
Economic Survey, was enormous. In fact, with 20 per cent of all poster sites occupied 
by a government advert, the inauguration of a wide ranging series of public lectures 
and talks, regular BBC broadcasts devoted to reporting on ‘Britain’s Crisis’, the 
production of 30 films focused upon aspects of the economy, an ambitious plan to 
turn newspaper advertising space into a ‘National Notice Board’ and the free 
distribution of wall charts and pamphlets to factories, this was an information 
campaign of unprecedented scale.
24
 
 
Although the EIU’s efforts were primarily focused upon broader economic issues, it 
would have important implications for more specific policies towards controls. 
Indeed, even before the EIU’s formation, Sir Edward Bridges had written to the COI 
for advice on ways to simplify administrative processes and to enquire about the 
possibility of gauging reactions to developments within the system from amongst the 
business community.
25
 The Official Committee on Controls (OC) set up in December 
1945 had similarly hoped for ‘further publicity and explanation to bring home to 
industry and the public the purposes for continuing controls’ as well as the work 
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‘being done to sweep away, relax and simplify’.26 Like Bridges, they saw that the 
question of publicity was particularly important because the system remained 
decentralised. For this reason, both would stress the desirability of releasing a 
coherent ‘Sponsoring Authority Guide’ – essentially a ‘Handbook of Controls’ – as a 
first step (it should be remembered that Alec Cairncross would call for the Board of 
Trade to produce its own ‘Dictionary of Controls in 1947).27 Looking to the longer-
term, Morrison also believed that it would be possible to employ some of the EIU’s 
techniques to help explain why restrictions were necessary for planning. Linking this 
to his own desire for simplification, he later suggested that a public-facing Tribunal 
could be set up to better communicate this point whilst concurrently collating any 
remaining administrative complaints from the public.
28
 Although this suggestion 
would remain untested, a number of attempts were made to explain the importance of 
long term powers. In 1950, for instance, a nine-minute documentary film called 
From the Ground Up (which emphasised the need for the regulation of strategic 
capital investment) was put onto general release.
29
 Moreover, as was shown in 
Chapter Three, a desire to attract continued American support ensured that such 
efforts were matched by publicity surrounding those controls specifically forced by 
the Korean War.
30
 Importantly, these were not the only instances wherein a political 
and an economic motive were entwined. 
 
Harold Wilson’s decision to announce the results of the Board of Trade’s internal 
review into controls as a series of self-styled Bonfires during the winter of 1948-49 
remains the best known example. Indeed, although Lawrence Merriam’s 
investigation was motivated by administrative concerns in the first instance, each 
was deliberately politicised by their linkage with the relaxation of consumer 
restrictions and careful timing to coincide with the political fallout from the Tribunal 
of Inquiry set up to investigate allegations of corruption within the department. With 
Wilson appearing at a press conference to announce the abolition of clothes rationing 
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on the day before the by-election forced by the resignation of the junior minister 
found guilty of exchanging industrial licences for gifts, many accused him of blatant 
trickery.
31
 This was not without justification. Indeed, despite having been urged by 
the Government Organisation Committee (GOC) to avoid investigating a system 
described as being ‘of minor importance’, Wilson’s decision to refer to individual 
permits as controls exaggerated the importance of his announcements and stood in 
stark contrast to the more subdued line taken by other departments.
32
 This unnerved 
Bridges, who referred to the disparity between the first Bonfire’s illusion and its low 
staff savings as a ‘potential scandal’ before being informed by an embarrassed John 
Woods that it could be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the licences 
included were those covering the distribution of vacuum flasks.
33
 As Bridges feared, 
this was picked up by The Economist, which satirically noted that ‘it ought not to 
have needed an official examiner to find out that the permit scheme for the 
distribution of thermos flasks had become a complete farce’.34 Yet, by capitalising 
upon the uncertainty surrounding the system, Wilson had won plaudits from other 
commentators. The Daily Telegraph, to give a usually hostile example, noted that it 
was ‘clearly a step in the right direction’.35 Coinciding with a broader swing in 
support, there was ‘no doubt’, Merriam admitted after Wilson’s November 1947 
announcement, ‘[that] this bonfire had a better press that its actual content 
deserved’.36 
 
The Conservative Party were similarly aware that they needed to put over their 
arguments in ‘terms which the ordinary men and women can understand’.37 Their 
Industrial Charter, for example, although also seeking to offer its own coherent set 
of economic ideas, was arguably an attempt to make an impression ‘through 
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language and image’.38 The printed document was certainly supported by a number 
of more explicit public relations efforts. For instance, taking inspiration from Mather 
and Crowther, the advertising agency which had masterminded the early stages of the 
government’s ‘Work or Want’ campaign, the Conservatives launched their own 
series of factory-floor talks and set about producing an abbreviated version of the 
Charter to appeal ‘to the unpolitical audience’.39 The delicate electoral balance 
described during the last chapter ensured that such efforts were expanded after 1950. 
Hence, in the months before the 1951 General Election, Lord Woolton sent a letter to 
all MPs, candidates and local associations urging them to ‘break down the suspicion 
with which many Conservatives are regarded’ by relating ‘to the personal needs and 
problems of the mass of the electorate’.40 Like John Jewkes’ Ordeal by Planning, 
Mark Chapman Walker’s list of ‘Ridiculous Controls’ embodied this approach by 
deliberately adopting a humorous tone and seeking to combine a moral argument for 
liberty with everyday examples of government ineptitude.
41
 Interestingly, non-party 
bodies adopted similar campaigns to promote their own agendas. Most notably, Aims 
of Industry, which was described by the Advertiser’s Weekly as ‘a body of public 
relations storm-troopers’, co-ordinated a direct mail scheme, provided the BBC with 
‘speakers, facilities, contacts, scripts and ideas’ for broadcasts covering industrial 
matters and claimed to have placed over 93 000 column inches of editorial 
propaganda in the national press during the course of 1950.
42
 Some of this activity 
was covertly supported by the Conservatives and Oliver Lyttelton, who drew upon 
his contacts at the Institute of Directors, even helped to launch a £200 000 ‘free 
enterprise campaign’ in July 1951.43 
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Given this attention to detail, it is somewhat ironic that the Conservatives’ neglect of 
the COI left their handling of the inflationary pressures that awaited them in office as 
something of a public relations failure.
44
 Churchill’s new government was certainly 
less willing than Attlee’s to support the financial burden of such campaigns. 
However, although much less was spent on official publicity after 1951, such efforts 
did not stop entirely and the COI’s activities began to expand again after 1954. In a 
parallel with his administration’s use of certain recontrols, Churchill was even given 
an unofficial Press Officer in 1952 when it became apparent that the post – which 
had been abolished a year earlier – was indispensable.45 As was seen in the last 
chapter, Labour’s ‘moral victory’ also ensured that the new government maintained 
its focus on monitoring public opinion whilst the Conservative Party continued to use 
its own propaganda machinery and ‘Missioners’ in an attempt to build trust.46 Their 
efforts even expanded into the drafting of the Economic Surveys. Indeed, despite the 
deliberate playing down of its importance, the Survey for 1952 was criticised by the 
Conservatives’ new Economic Policy Committee for ‘condoning the mistakes made 
by the former administration’ and suggesting that ‘the present crisis was due almost 
entirely to factors outside [of their] control’.47 With this in mind, the Cabinet’s 
decision to abandon Operation ROBOT and its unwillingness to legislate for any 
permanent economic powers (despite being unable to remove the last vestiges of 
Defence Regulation 55 unless it did so) can both be explained by an understanding of 
their presentational difficulties.
48
 
 
* 
 
The efforts outlined above cannot be explained solely by the desire to win votes, nor 
by the practical need to encourage harder work. In fact, although their relative 
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successes will be questioned below, both Labour and the Conservatives rejected the 
notion that they were merely exhorting a recalcitrant public. For the latter, a 
‘voluntary and virile’ partnership between the state and society – one based upon the 
principles embodied by the party’s ‘two way movement of ideas’ – appeared to be 
the only way of reconciling individual freedom with a degree of planning.
49
 It was, 
drawing upon an interwar emphasis upon responsible co-partnership, even hoped that 
this could help to foster a ‘property owning democracy’ within which all would hold 
a stake and individuals would be ‘neither slave nor tyrant’.50 As Eden explained to 
the party’s Annual Conference in 1946, this vision of positive liberty would require 
the state to provide information so as to foster an environment within which organic 
‘initiative, individuality and enterprise’ could be unleashed.51 For David Clarke, 
whose Conservative Faith provides a clear link between this chapter and the last, it 
was one part of a realisation that the politics may have been ‘couched in economic 
terms’ (ie ‘more of less State control of industry’) but was inevitably about more 
fundamental ends.
52
 It was from this perspective that the party’s Industrial Policy 
Committee (CIPC) had embarked upon its industrial fact-finding mission and had 
rejected controls for being overly centralised and potentially oppressive. Indeed, 
despite accepting that industry must have a degree of public accountability, the 
Industrial Charter proclaimed that ‘we want co-operation in making these plans and 
competitive enterprise in carrying them out’.53 The party’s call to ‘set the people 
free’, which sought to reconcile this with a more Hayekian platform position, was, 
therefore, predicated upon a conception of shared responsibility and active 
participation. 
 
Of course, for all of the Conservatives’ criticism, Labour remained equally adamant 
that there was an ‘essential difference between totalitarian and democratic planning’. 
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The latter, noted Attlee and Cripps, in their respective forewords to the Economic 
Survey for 1947, was not about ‘the rigid application by the state of controls and 
compulsions. Rather, it aimed to ‘take the people frankly into [the government’s] 
confidence’ so as to ensure that planning was actually delivered ‘from the ground 
up’.54 It was, in the words of the equally ambitious Labour Believes in Britain, about 
creating a ‘flourishing and sensible democracy’ that was ‘as virile in industry as 
in … Parliament’.55 This would be no small task. On the contrary, as Morrison 
informed the 1948 Labour Party Conference, it would mean replacing an outdated 
‘ballot box’ mentality with ‘an active, living, democracy’ of the type imagined by 
H.D. Dickinson.
56
 Nonetheless, as has been seen in Chapters One and Four, it was a 
task that the New Fabians believed would transfer power from ‘centre to 
circumference’ and encourage the ‘growth of social responsibility in the economic 
sphere’.57 On the first point, Morrison, like Cripps, believed that it was simply part of 
‘the duty of the government to inform the public of the facts’.58 On the second, and 
with most importance to this study, it was stressed by the likes of Austen Albu, 
Barbara Wootton and Michael Young that the promotion of an active citizenship 
could provide a positive counterbalance to the power of both government and 
industry whilst potentially negating the need for a myriad of more complicated 
restrictions.
59
 By efficiently relating ‘what people want to have with what they want 
to do’, Durbin saw that such efforts were a way of avoiding manpower controls and 
effectively ‘planning without a plan’.60 Put simply in the Trade Unions’ Congress 
(TUC)’s Interim Report on Post War Reconstruction, this meant that ‘An informed 
public opinion is itself a means of control’.61 Economic public relations were, thus, 
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seen by an enthusiastic Political and Economic Planning (PEP) report as a ‘political 
experiment of great significance to humanity’.62 
 
In spite of their vehement rhetorical differentiation, not to mention the difficulty of 
putting such ideas into practice, a faith in co-operation and enlightened public control 
united Labour and the Conservatives during the long transition.
63
 This can be 
demonstrated by a comparison of two texts, which, though originating at very 
different ends of the political spectrum, came to rest upon a shared belief in public 
control as a guarantor of liberty. The first, Richard Law’s Return from Utopia, has 
already been explored in detail. Without wanting to repeat what was said in Chapters 
Three and Four, it should again be emphasised that Law’s absolute vision of freedom 
emphasised the self-regulating nature of the market and the diffusion of power so as 
to allow for positive choice.
64
 The second text, Patrick Gordon Walker’s 1951 
Restatement of Liberty, which was a philosophical exploration of governance that 
drew on its author’s experience in the Lord President’s Office, was ostensibly very 
different. Indeed, drawing upon his earlier involvement with the Socialist Clarity 
Group (SCG), Gordon Walker rejected Hayek from an academic’s perspective. 
Stressing that freedom could never be absolute, he called for a complete overhaul of 
society and – in a chapter that would have no doubt riled Law – even argued that 
planning must be viewed as a means of ‘determining where scarcity shall fall’.65 
Nonetheless, as part of a forceful rejection of Utopianism, such statements were 
actually symbolic of a shared understanding of society and a belief that freedom was 
dependent upon making moral judgements.
66
 Thus, despite the emphasis on planning, 
Restatement of Liberty stressed that its proposed new society would have to be built 
upon organic economic activity. To reconcile the two, public relations would be used 
to ‘help achieve the sort of natural behaviour that the new State is almost wholly 
debarred from bringing about by the use of its direct powers’.67 Although expressed 
in profoundly different ways, both the Conservative Party’s insistence that ‘a 
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worthwhile society’ required more than controls and Michael Young’s hopes for a 
‘close two way connection’ between small men and the state were underpinned by a 
similar faith.
68
 
 
* 
 
Five or so years before Law and Gordon Walker began to clarify their thoughts, the 
idea of public control had been enshrined by James Meade within the 1944 
Employment Policy White Paper. This had insisted that the success of any such 
policy would ‘ultimately depend upon the understanding and support of the 
community as a whole’.69 Although this passage might initially be seen to embody 
the deliberate opacity described in Chapter Two, it also served to redefine the 
relationship between the state and society.
70
 To quote again from PEP, an acceptance 
that ‘the public have a right to know what and why their Government has done, is 
doing, and wishes to do’ followed naturally from an extension in its societal role.71 
Its emphasis can certainly be detected in later developments. In 1945, for example, 
John Anderson, the incumbent Chancellor of the Exchequer and a man not known for 
his faith in public engagement, passed on a number of recommendations relating to 
‘the publication of statistics … and of generally supplementing and improving the 
statistical material published by the Government’.72 Such calls were increased during 
the crises of 1947, when, following Oliver Franks’ notable restatement of principle in 
his series of public lectures at the LSE, calls for greater openness were made across 
the political divide. Hence a call for improved public relations from the authors of 
Keep Left was matched by Douglas Jay’s insistence that planning had to place 
ultimate responsibility with the people and Lyttelton’s demand ‘that every instrument 
                                                 
68
 See above, pp.153-4 and 161. It should be noted here that Young and Gordon Walker had worked 
closely during the drafting of Labour Believes in Britain, although the latter remained fairly 
dismissive of his colleague. See: Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971, ed. by R. 
Pearce (London, 1991), p. 186 (17 Apr 1949). 
69
 HMSO, Cmd 6527, Employment Policy (London, 1944), p. 3. 
70
 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Re-inventing the “Moral Economy” in Post-War Britain’, Historical Research, 
84:224 (2011), 356-373 (p. 360). 
71
 PEP, ‘Government Information Services’, Planning: A Broadsheet by PEP, 230 (1945), p. 2. 
72
 TNA, CAB 71/21, Anderson, ‘The Publication of Statistics’, 17 Jul 1945, f. 1. 
209 
 
 
of publicity’ should be employed in the fight against ‘the economic enemy’.73 The 
Conservatives even staged a ‘Trust the People’ exhibition in Regent Street’s Dorland 
Hall in an attempt to put their own spin on the ‘Work or Want’ campaign.74 Such 
actions, Williams claimed, offered a solution to the challenge of increasing 
intervention ‘without endangering the personal liberties which democracy exists to 
sustain’.75 Indeed, as Cripps informed his staff upon taking his position as both 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Chancellor of the Exchequer, information was 
now ‘a fundamental part of our great experiment’ and one ‘upon which a 
considerable part of its success or failure will depend’.76 
 
Reflecting on Cripps’ words a decade later, ‘Clem’ Leslie, a friend and former 
colleague of Morrison’s who had been entrusted with running the EIU, noted that 
they stood in contrast to Whitehall’s traditional preference for ‘decent reticence’.77 
This was not without foundation and those who were at the forefront of the 
government’s ‘information work’ – men like Leslie, Williams, the COI’s Robert 
Fraser and Max Nicholson – could all be reasonably described as ‘progressive’ in 
outlook.
78
 Nonetheless, it must be noted here that their sentiments were shared by a 
number of other officials. In fact, drawing upon the experience provided by the 
wartime Ministry of Information, a Treasury study group set up to review 
government practice had recommended in 1944 that public relations should play a 
greatly extended role in the future.
79
 This was especially true with regard to controls. 
Indeed, as Norman Chester had stressed, it was well understood that the retention of 
any restrictions was reliant upon public acceptance and that a strategic approach was 
needed to explain their purpose lest the government be forced into the use of legal 
measures.
80
 For this reason, the Economic Section had even been asked to contribute 
to an official information film explaining the policies adopted by Employment 
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Policy.
81
 Although some of this was grounded within an idealistic hope that the 
public sphere could be enlightened by increased engagement, the main reason for this 
shared acceptance can be traced to a belief that the provision of economic 
information was an essentially technical and, thus, non-partisan task.
82
 Writing in a 
special publication for the Institute of Public Administration, Jack Brebner, a 
government public relations officer and a former advisor to Lyttelton, summed up his 
profession’s position by noting that the ‘expert does not make the policy. But … he 
is the eyes and the ears of the policy maker’.83 Much like the traditional role of a 
civil servant, or the New Fabian’s positivist take on planning as a mechanism of 
administration, the release of economic information was, in Morrison’s memorable 
words, simply the ‘statistical floodlighting’ that would allow the public to make up 
their own minds.
84
 
 
The belief that public relations could empower individual action was of some interest 
to commentators during this period. Ritchie Calder, for example, a left wing 
journalist who had enthused about the possibilities of planning whilst working as a 
wartime propagandist alongside Richard Crossman, maintained that publicity could 
help bring government ‘out of the region of experts and into the market-place’.85 
Brebner, too, taking an equally optimistic position, believed that such methods could 
provide a method of tempering the ‘application of power … with humanity and 
appreciation’.86 This point had also been expounded by Williams, whose earlier text 
noted that: 
 
An intelligent democracy must be prepared to make the fullest use of every 
available method of informing its citizens of what is essentially their business. 
Information is a weapon of democracy … to refuse to use it is to turn one’s 
back on one of the ways in which the enormously complicated business of 
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modern government can be made comprehensible to the ordinary person. There 
cannot be public control without public understanding.
87
 
 
Given the hope that public controls could replace more detailed restrictions, 
Williams’ reference to the ‘complicated business of modern government’ was telling. 
It was also one that was picked up by John Pimlott in a study of Public Relations and 
American Democracy that defined the former as being those actions that bridged ‘the 
gulf between “big” institutions and their “publics”’.88 Serving as Morrison’s private 
secretary, Pimlott was another leading proponent of greater openness, but his views 
were not unique. Indeed, with such actions rooted in Employment Policy and the 
wide-ranging Nuffield conferences that had preceded it, they were also broadly 
accepted by many in industry.
89
 For Franks, who was keen to remember the success 
of his fellow wartime specialists, this generation of industrialists were ‘able, as no 
one else, to bridge the gap between Government and business and make possible that 
venture of mutual confidence which central planning implies’.90 Thus, emphasising 
this shared acceptance, Pimlott stressed that it was much easier to view public 
relations as an application of common sense than it was to become ‘trapped in 
abstractions’.91 
 
* 
 
This agreement ensured that governmental communication efforts would continue 
well beyond the immediate crises. Thus, in July 1947, the EPB was formed to 
provide what Morrison referred to as a ‘two-way link’ between the state and 
industry.
92
 A year later, and the commitment developed into a publicity drive aimed 
at medium sized enterprises with two new publications (the colourful Target and 
wordy Bulletin for Industry) distributed to the management of firms employing over 
                                                 
87
 Williams, Press, Parliament and People, p. 130. 
88
 J.A.R. Pimlott, Public Relations and American Democracy (Princeton, 1951), p. 240. 
89
 Keith Middlemas, Power Competition and the State, Vol. I Britain in Search of Balance, 1940-61 
(Basingstoke, 1986), pp. 116-8. 
90
 Oliver Franks, Central Planning and Control in War and Peace (London, 1947), p. 47. In further 
evidence of their acceptance of ‘planning with a small “P”’, Courtauld’s even set up their own 
‘Government Relations Unit’ to co-ordinate the firm’s dealings with departments, see: Rogow and 
Shore, The Labour Government and British Industry, p. 58. 
91
 Pimlott, Public Relations, pp. 49-52. 
92
 TNA, T 229/28, EPB(47)1, 21 July 1947. 
212 
 
 
one hundred people.
93
 Matched by the launch of Aims of Industry’s Voice of Industry 
series, this was just one part of a £5m COI campaign which also included promoting 
‘National Production Weeks’ to drive home the message included in Economic 
Survey for 1948 and its ‘short’ counterpart. The communication effort was continued 
within departments. At the Board of Trade, for example, Wilson liaised carefully 
with industrial associations, held regular press conferences, appeared in a handful of 
Pathé interviews and even enlisted his wife’s help to announce some of his 
decontrols. Cripps, too, held regular press conferences at the Treasury, whilst the 
Ministry of Supply’s press office often issued up to 300 press briefings in a day.94 
Such activities were also continued in a more political guise, with both parties 
holding public talks and using discussion pamphlets to foster the active citizenship 
that they espoused. Of these, Labour’s Talking Points was the longer serving, with 
152 issues of the original run printed between January 1948 and January 1955, but 
the Conservatives’ ‘What do You Think?’ series was arguably the most ambitious. 
Indeed, in an attempt to prove that ‘politics was not a remote science’, it involved 
issuing ‘factual’ material to discussion groups, collating their responses and issuing 
follow-up pamphlets based upon the ideas raised.
95
 John Boyd-Carpenter’s pamphlet 
on bureaucracy, which was quoted from earlier, even called on groups to send in 
their own examples of ‘ludicrous controls’ that a future Conservative government 
could remove.
96
 A similar model was continued by left-leaning organisations like the 
Workers’ Educational Association and the Co-operative – for whom Barbara Castle 
wrote a discussion piece called Are Controls Necessary? in 1947. 
 
It is clear that a great deal of thought went into these public relations efforts, with 
even the most overtly political actions being meticulously planned. The 
government’s reaction to the Lynskey Tribunal was, for example, shaped by a careful 
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note produced by P.D. Proctor’s Co-ordinating Committee (CC) that stressed the 
‘energetic action’ already taken to ‘overhaul the machinery of control’.97 This was 
itself skilfully countered by the Conservative Party, with a supplementary question 
asking Wilson to provide ‘a list of the controls still exercised by his Department’ in a 
bid to highlight the limited nature of his Bonfires.
98
 The party’s ‘Trust the People’ 
exhibition, which included an interactive display where visitors could hear the 
recording of an industrialist trying to get a licensing decision out of the Board of 
Trade and a set designed to look like a suburban living room created out of nothing 
but permits and statistical returns, was similarly inventive and claimed to be the first 
ever curated by a political party.
99
 Its allusion to housing was just one part of a 
broader strategy to translate a critique of planning into a domestic setting. Indeed, 
continued within Conservative publications like Home Truths, Tory Challenge and 
Topic for To-day, the party sought to link industrial controls with everyday shortages 
through a mixture of photographs, strip cartoons and pictorial statistics. This aspect 
of the Conservative Party’s approach has been considered in some detail by Ina 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska and can be seen to have helped the party strengthen its 
appeal amongst a key demographic of female voters.
100
 It is, however, clear that 
Labour also understood the importance of what was referred to as ‘the housewives’ 
vote’ and both parties adopted phrases like ‘national housekeeping’ to explain their 
approach. The EIU even developed targeted economic literacy campaigns for women 
under the banner ‘Report to the Women of Britain’.101 A very similar picture 
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emerges when one considers the adaptation of wartime language and the imaginative 
use of public opinion surveys to gauge the impact of individual campaigns.
102
 
 
These campaigns were not without their successes. It should, for instance, be 
remembered that the Conservative Party’s The Right Road for Britain, whose anti-
controls message had been furthered by a national advertising campaign and an 
abridged version, smashed all existing records for party publications when it sold 2.2 
million copies within three months of its launch.
103
 Dr Charles Hill’s libertarian 1950 
broadcast was also lauded by pundits for having talked to the public in a tone that 
suggested a willingness to engage rather than lecture.
104
 Although the Labour 
government’s achievements were not quite as successful, 1947’s The Battle for 
Output still sold 176 000 copies and 1948’s Short Economic Survey 440 000. Like 
The Right Road, the latter was also claimed to be ‘almost certainly a record for a 
publication of such a type’.105 It should also not be forgotten that these sales were 
augmented by the circulation of free pamphlets and multi-media activities outlined 
above. It was because of this that Morrison would remain adamant that his 
government had ‘attached utmost importance to keeping the public informed’.106 
However, when one considers the picture of political disengagement sketched out in 
the opening section of this chapter, it is obvious that both parties’ efforts had fallen 
some way short of their stated intentions. Indeed, although Leslie believed that the 
Short Surveys had helped to ‘make the subject more real’, the pollsters’ findings 
suggested that the majority of the public remained disconnected and had paid ‘little 
conscious attention’ to their efforts.107 This continued after 1951. In fact, in a 1957 
study that returned to questions first addressed twelve years before, PEP identified a 
continued disconnection before noting that an ingrained predisposition towards 
confidentiality ensured the government was ‘not too readily adapted to the need for 
public relations work in securing co-operation’.108 The remainder of this chapter will 
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explore why this should have been the case, before examining the impact of such 
failings on attempts to utilise an informed public as a positive control. 
 
-II- 
 
There were, especially at the outset, a number of very practical reasons for the 
shortcomings. It is broadly accepted that the Attlee administration had initially given 
very little thought to the complexity of the task at hand and had assumed, to quote 
from Martin Moore’s detailed study of The Origins of Modern Spin, that: 
 
the means and ends of ends of communication were straightforward … that it 
could create messages that were consensual … [and] that it could continue to 
distribute information through a compliant media which would then be 
welcomed by a grateful public.
109
 
 
Such assumptions were soon undermined. In fact, by November 1946, it was clear 
that the communication of economic issues had been anything but straightforward. 
For Pimlott, whose interest had been sparked in the months after the OC’s report, a 
lack of consistency had simply left the government unable to convey how individual 
actions fitted into the national picture.
110
 Although motivated by the specific 
challenges facing the Lord President’s Home Information Service (IH), Pimlott’s 
comments should be considered as one part of the broader critique of irrationality 
detailed at the end of Chapter Two.
111
 It was certainly motivated by the same failings 
that had inflicted Nicholson’s OC. Indeed, as ‘Mike’ Williams Thompson, the 
Ministry of Supply’s Chief Information Officer, later recalled, a failure to co-
ordinate departmental actions led to ‘an appalling delay in getting anything done’.112 
It was, therefore, with a degree of irony that the decision taken within the Lord 
President’s Office not to circulate the OC’s February report until May 1946 had left 
the question of publicity for controls unanswered for three months.
113
 Such actions 
were indicative of a continued need to ‘adopt a clearly thought out strategy’ if 
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democratic planning was ever to become more than a political phrase.
114
 It has 
already been shown that the Conservative Party’s initial reluctance to be drawn on 
specifics was similarly challenged by calls for a clear restatement of policy. 
 
These issues, which have already been explored from a different perspective, were 
exacerbated by a number of more specific difficulties. Firstly, the time needed to 
devise and execute detailed publicity campaigns should not be understated. This was 
especially true of attempts to use film, with even animated shorts – like the Halas and 
Batchelor produced Export or Die, which explained the need for controls over 
foreign trade – taking over a year to create.115 Money, too, formed an important 
barrier. In fact, although government expenditure on publicity remained historically 
high during this period, ministers accepted that this was liable to criticism and made 
a concerted effort to cut costs after 1947 (such efforts were increased after 1951).
116
 
This was compounded by a neglect of existing channels of communication. It is well 
known that the Labour government’s relationship with the print media, soured by 
criticism of its economic competence, not to mention accusations of totalitarianism 
and the highly politicised debates surrounding the 1947 Royal Commission on the 
Press, was notoriously bad during their period in office.
117
 As a government, 
Williams Thompson noted, they simply ‘didn’t know how to “use” the press’ to their 
advantage.
118
 It should, however, also be mentioned that Churchill’s dealings with 
the media were confused by his refusal to be photographed and the barring of 
ministers from giving interviews during the autumn and winter of 1951-52.
119
 In 
addition, although a newspaper market which reached 87 per cent of the population 
was especially significant, the failings were not limited to print. Indeed, a distrust of 
professional advertising extended across the political spectrum and Attlee even 
warned ministers against making broadcasts in 1947, in case they led to criticism.
120
 
With the Conservatives’ Central Office (CCO) maintaining a distinct series of files 
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dedicated to criticism of its publications, it is clear that there were also a number of 
more prosaic presentational difficulties to contend with. Indeed, even its attempt to 
replicate Aims of Industry’s use of celebrity ‘Brains Trust’ panels in advance of the 
1955 election was something of a failure, with one of the organisers forced to admit 
that the discussion had been very dull indeed.
121
 
 
Stylistic weaknesses were, as might be expected, particularly marked with regard to 
economic propaganda. Indeed, although the ambitious young MP Christopher 
Mayhew had assured Morrison that the war had provided ‘a good education in 
economics’, it soon became clear that the subject matter threw up a number of its 
own barriers.
122
 The 1946 ‘Prosperity Campaign’, which was conceived as one for 
‘economic literacy’, was the first to run into trouble when its message revealed 
widespread misunderstanding. Indeed, although it had aimed to explain the link 
between transitional industrial controls, foreign trade and long-term recovery, the 
Government Social Survey estimated that less than half of the population were aware 
of the need to boost exports, let alone able to explain the role of controls in doing 
so.
123
 It was, however, with the Economic Survey that the difficulties were most 
obvious. Hailed as the centrepiece of democratic planning and claimed to have been 
written for the whole population, the Survey for 1947 was widely dissected in the 
press and led to a number of analyses of its effectiveness. M-O, for example, sought 
to gauge the extent to which The Battle for Output – edited by Nicholson – had been 
able to popularise the Survey’s message. Given that this was a key test for any hope 
of enlightened public control, their findings were particularly damning. It was noted 
that, apart from the addition of a striking colour cover and the insertion of several 
statistical diagrams, the text had been virtually unchanged and included a number of 
phrases that were simply not understood. Somewhat worryingly, its key message – 
that ‘the OBJECTVES of this Paper EMBODY the Government’s determination to 
put first things first’ – was seen to have caused ‘semi-paralysis’ whilst the sections 
on freedom led to numerous misrepresentations regarding controls.
124
 For PEP, the 
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government’s inability to put across the issues in a less technical language had 
removed the potential for co-operation.
125
 
 
The M-O report, which was mailed to a number of MPs, was widely circulated and 
even led Tom Driberg and Woodrow Wyatt (two Labour backbenchers with an 
interest in the public relations and the press) to formally question Attlee on The 
Battle for Output’s effectiveness in the House of Commons.126 The letter had also 
reached the COI and was sent by them to Bridges alongside a note that accepted it 
was ‘rather frightening’ to learn that the majority of the public ‘cannot understand 
words such as “objectives”, “conception”, or “embody”’.127 Other commentators 
took an even more hands-on approach. Indeed, both Picture Post and Mark Abrams 
produced their own versions of the Survey with straightforward visual 
representations to clarify the key points; as Abrams noted, such appeals would never 
work ‘unless the ordinary man and woman fully understands the nature of the 
obstacles which have to be surmounted’.128 Such actions did have some impact. 
Research Services were invited to test the public’s reaction to the ‘Report to the 
Nation’ series of adverts and 1948’s Short Economic Survey certainly made more use 
of diagrams and pictorial representations than its predecessor.
129
 It is, however, clear 
that a number of difficulties remained, with the Cabinet warning in 1948 that ‘the 
capacity of Parliament and public might be over-taxed if too many long documents 
were issued at short intervals’ and complaining about the ‘verbal obscurity’ of the 
Survey for 1950.
130
 Similar failings were continued into other parts of the 
government’s ‘information work’. The infamous ‘Work or Want’ campaign will be 
considered later, but another high profile drive to boost productivity in 1949 – which 
featured a cartoon policeman known as PC’49 – provides a similarly suitable 
example, with only 18 per cent able to offer an accurate definition of the concept by 
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the campaign’s end.131 It was a similar story with the Economic Planning and Full 
Employment Bill. Indeed, though he accepted that the controls included would be the 
same, Hugh Gaitskell urged his colleagues to avoid invoking ‘planning’ as he 
doubted it was ‘very much understood’.132 As Williams Thompson noted, such terms 
had been overused, but never matched by an attempt to make their purpose known.
133
 
 
The translation of economic policy into a ‘simple form’ was also remembered by 
Woolton to be the hardest task he faced as Chairman of the Conservative Party.
134
 
The Industrial Charter certainly encountered a number of familiar problems. In fact, 
the detailed M-O report commissioned by Woolton in 1947, which might reasonably 
have been inspired by the group’s handling of The Battle for Output, found that 
eighty per cent of its sample had no knowledge of the Charter whatsoever and noted 
that there was an ‘almost complete ignorance’ regarding Conservative industrial 
policy.
135
 Moreover, although its contents were broadly accepted, the document 
seemed to have made little difference to the widespread ‘lack of knowledge’ and 
‘bewildering mix-up of ideas’ which emerged most strongly from the 
investigation.
136
 As Derek Heathcoat-Amery admitted in early 1948, these failings 
were most pronounced with those ordinary voters at whom the Charter was supposed 
to have been aimed.
137
 This was not just a question of policy. Instead, exacerbated by 
a tension between Rab Butler and Lord Woolton, it was also one of presentation.
138
 
His view was shared by a number of letter writers who contacted Central Office in 
the months and years after the document’s publication. Colonel James Hutchinson, 
for example, the Unionist MP for Glasgow Central, reiterated that the party had not 
done enough to relate to people in terms that they could understand and identified a 
lack of industrial understanding amongst his colleagues as the main problem.
139
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Hutchinson’s conclusion was shared by the public relations consultant Edward 
Rawdon-Smith. Commenting on the Conservatives’ handling of the Charter, 
Rawdon-Smith, who had spearheaded publicity for the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation and London Passenger Transport Board during the 1930s, drew 
particular attention to the loose language used in its description. The problem, he 
feared, was that the party had been unable to deliver a coherent message by 
continually muddling terms like ‘guidance’, ‘direction’, ‘control’, and ‘management’ 
in its policy proposals and political critiques.
140
 With this in mind, it was not entirely 
surprising that the majority of M-O’s respondents had failed to identify the Charter’s 
author.
141
 
 
As was the case with the government’s The Battle for Output, such findings led to 
some interesting discussions within the Conservative Party’s Research and Publicity 
Departments. It was during this period that the party looked towards Mather and 
Crowther’s work for the EIU and adopted their use of loose leaf easels – or, in 
modern parlance, flipcharts – as a means to ‘fill the [popular] gap in our present 
organisation’.142 The party also considered inserting strip cartoons into a revised 
second edition of the abridged Industrial Charter as a way of ‘putting … its 
economic background to a larger public’.143 Nonetheless, such activities were not 
universally accepted and the proposals were matched by a continued dismay at the 
electorate. Rawdon-Smith’s proposals were, for instance, agreed by Clarke and 
Maudling in principle but were never acted upon, because both thought that it would 
be impossible to co-ordinate the party’s language.144 With the abridged Charter 
having sold 478 000 copies within a month of its publication, the M-O report was 
treated with even more scepticism and little was done to address the more intractable 
problems surrounding the document’s complexity and an emphasis that many 
thought at odds with a Conservative perception of industrial policy.
145
 This ensured 
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that production of the revised Charter was fraught with difficulties. Indeed, though 
the author maintained that he had ‘aimed at the language of the cinema’, Clarke 
complained to Stephen Piersenné that its length was still likely to alienate ‘those who 
do not like reading pamphlets’.146 This was unlikely to have been helped by the 
Publicity Department’s decision to remove the edition’s experimental cartoons.147 
Nor would it have been abetted by a ‘two way movement’ that remained limited to a 
small number of self-selecting party members who were overrepresented by 
relatively affluent associations clustered around London and the South East of 
England.
148
 There is, unfortunately, no record of the decision that was ultimately 
taken to shelve the project. 
 
It was the Conservative Party’s inability to fully translate its vision of ‘planning with 
a small “p”’ that led it towards the much simpler call to ‘set the people free’. As Jack 
Cherry had realised, if one accepted that the public were ‘woefully ignorant’ about 
the economy, it was a lot simpler to take advantage of the fact that the administration 
of controls ‘frequently involves much stupidity’ than to make a detailed policy 
argument with a similarly ‘common touch’.149 It was for this very reason that the 
Publicity Office decided to use its list of ‘Ridiculous Controls’. Crucially, a similar 
shift can be detected within Labour circles. Wilson’s Bonfires were, after all, a very 
different ploy than Castle’s thirty eight page discussion pamphlet and certainly did 
not encourage the public to overtly question the ‘nature of the new freedom towards 
which we are working’.150 These changes were not without contention. Both Douglas 
Jay and Cripps, despite accepting the rationale for further decontrol, feared that 
Wilson’s politicking could be misinterpreted, whilst even Merriam called for an 
‘alternative technique’.151 However, as explored in the last chapter, both Cherry and 
Wilson’s analyses showed that controls were perceived as being a useful proxy for a 
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broader debate; they provided a means of constructing a narrative wherein the 
language – if not the issue – made sense.152 Nonetheless, although this had its roots 
in the practical difficulties of any attempt to engage a general public in a debate that 
remained disconnected from their everyday lives, their actions raise a number of 
more fundamental questions surrounding the ideal of public control. Indeed, although 
Leslie maintained that his actions at the EIU had been little more than an ‘appeal to 
common sense’, it is clear that public relations work could never be a purely 
mechanical task.
153
 As Macmillan pointed out, ‘the analysis of a problem, whether 
positively or negatively, almost invariably tends to be one-sided’.154 Thus, before 
turning to consider their impact, the following section will first trace the reactions to 
these failings after 1947 to analyse later developments from a slightly more abstract 
perspective. 
 
-III- 
 
To do so, it is worth returning briefly to the unpublished Economic Survey for 1946. 
This document, which was noted very briefly at the beginning of Chapter Three, was 
seen by James Meade to offer a real chance for popular discussion over priorities.
155
 
Franks, who was still serving at the Ministry of Supply at the time of drafting, saw it 
as similarly essential and stressed that planning was ‘dependent on co-operation’.156 
The Survey could, in this sense, be seen as a necessary precursor to Labour’s 
democratic vision and symbolic of the deep change in attitudes called for by the likes 
of Wootton. Yet, as shown by Keir Thorpe, a fear that its statistical foundations 
would be proved wrong ensured that the experimental Survey was never published. 
Ministers were instead urged by Morrison to take ‘great care … to avoid any 
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references which might suggest to the public that any cut-and-dried plan exists’ in 
the fear that the existence of such a document would lead to ‘a clamour for the 
disclosure of facts’.157 Given his later faith in the democratic principle of public 
control, it is ironic that Cripps should have endorsed this decision and that he took a 
similar stance over Morrison’s first plan to publicise the role played by industrial 
controls.
158
 Moreover, whilst later developments appear to show a willingness to 
divulge such information, the extent to which 1947 was a turning point in this regard 
should not be overstated. Fraser was, in fact, barred from talking about his activities 
at the COI from the moment he took charge and Bridges continued to stress that the 
Surveys’ should be kept as broad as possible. It was no wonder that Leslie remained 
adamant that the entire concept of public information continued to be viewed as an 
‘almost indecent economic striptease’.159 Having failed to explain their purpose 
earlier, the government’s stance on controls continued to pose problems and 
Morrison feared that the Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill would draw 
undue attention to the scale of those controls already being enforced.
160
 
 
Some of this reticence was obviously motivated by a pragmatic reading of the 
political situation. It was, for instance, unlikely that a briefing produced by 
Nicholson warning ministers to expect ‘a rough ride’ over the Economic Survey for 
1947 would have engendered much support amongst a government that was already 
reeling from criticism of its handling of the fuel crisis.
161
 Such considerations were, 
though, matched by an equally important ignorance of public attitudes.
162
 Indeed, 
although its advocates believed that it offered a new form of democratic 
representation, the Attlee government’s use of public opinion research was 
remarkably patchy before 1947 and was seen by both Leslie and M-O’s Tom 
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Harrisson as the primary reason for failings before the installation of the EIU.
163
 As 
with the broader picture, there were a number of very different reasons as to why this 
should have been the case. Moreover, given the difficulties that accompany any 
attempt to quantify beliefs and feelings, many of these were inevitable. On this point, 
it should be noted that even Harrisson and electoral sociologists like Richard Rose 
were aware that the idea of a unified public opinion jarred with reality and pointed to 
the tension between ‘simple abstractions and complex realities’.164 Despite this, the 
extent to which the government’s reticence can be traced to an underlying hostility to 
engage with what was still a contested science should not be overlooked.
165
 Indeed, 
as Ely Devons recounted during a BBC Third Service broadcast that drew upon his 
wartime experience, there had been an unwillingness to see that ‘the need to “educate 
our masters” … can be read both ways’.166 Even PEP, who decried Labour’s lack of 
co-ordination, remained steadfast that opinion studies should never be allowed to 
impinge on Burkeian notions of representative government. This, it was stressed, 
meant ‘leading rather than following the people’.167 Such attitudes ensured that high 
level perceptions of the public remained crucial determinants in the formation and 
presentation of policy. As Leslie would complain, references to public opinion were 
often little more than ‘the personal impressions of senior Civil Servants’.168 
 
The government’s reaction to M-O’s report on the relative failure of The Battle for 
Output symbolised this tendency. Indeed, although it accepted that more effort was 
needed to ensure that future documents were clearer, it is hard not to distinguish a 
degree of contempt in a discussion that included phrases like ‘the ordinary man’s 
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vocabulary is incredibly limited’ and ‘even the simplest statement … is likely to be 
almost meaningless’.169 This was indicative of a tendency to measure understanding 
against a constructed norm of ‘correct knowledge’ that continued well after 1947. In 
fact, by 1949, after numerous discussions regarding intended audiences, it had been 
decided to overlook those who were ‘not equipped to quickly grasp the meaning of a 
situation like 1947’ and specifically target future publications at an intelligent 
‘leadership group’ (those who, in Leslie’s words, ‘read the more serious parts of their 
newspapers’).170 It was for this reason that Cripps felt comfortable enough to deflect 
the Cabinet’s criticism of the Economic Survey for 1950 by stressing that it was 
written for ‘technical people’.171 A similar prejudice can also be detected in the 
Committee on Economic Controls (CEC)’s dismissal of Morrison’s plan for a Public 
Tribunal. His suggestion, which was motivated by a belief that there was still ‘too 
many complaints … about unnecessarily complex procedures’, would have involved 
inviting members of the public to suggest controls for relaxation and publicising the 
results.
172
 This was, however, dismissed by the official in charge as a ‘highly 
dangerous proposal’ and was deliberately written out of the CEC’s interim report.173 
Such actions obviously made sense from an administrative perspective and it was 
highly doubtful that any non-expert review would have been better placed than those 
which had already failed. Nonetheless, they also raised serious questions for a vision 
of ‘community planned production’ that had hoped to allow all to ‘share fully in the 
making of the rules under which they work’.174 
 
The adaptation of the controls system had certainly failed to meet the ideal of 
enlightened public control. In fact, as Morrison feared, the continued tension 
between centralisation and devolution ensured that the apparatus became subsumed 
by accusations about its ‘officialdom, cold rigidity and lack of … human 
kindness’.175 Exacerbated by the failure ever to produce a definitive ‘Handbook of 
Controls’, most criticism was reserved for its duplication of functions and a belief 
                                                 
169
 TNA, T 273/299, JAB to Bridges, 1 Apr 1947. 
170
 Leslie, ‘The Economic Information Unit’, p. 18. 
171
 TNA, CAB 195/7, Confidential notes from CM(11)50, 16 Mar 1950. 
172
 TNA, CAB 132/15, Morrison, ‘Government Controls and the Public’, p. 1. 
173
 TNA, T 222/227, Simpson to Crombie and Bridges, 13 Apr 1950. 
174
 Labour Party, The Old World and the New Society (London, 1942), pp. 8 and 12. 
175
 Brebner, Public Relations, p. 18. 
226 
 
 
that individual controls were being ‘operated by unskilled juniors [using] rule-of-
thumb methods’.176 This, an alliterative PEP reminded its readers, was evidence that 
‘a civil servant in Whitehall has little or no opportunity for direct contact with firms 
in Woolwich, Wigan or Wolverhampton’.177 Even when direct controls were 
removed, the compulsion to provide statistics still left many reeling, with one large 
firm estimating that it was required to provide 650 separate returns a year.
178
 As has 
been noted elsewhere, the continued reliance upon Trade Associations also alienated 
many of the most enthusiastic planners. Frederick Cobb, for example, the Labour MP 
for Elland and the managing director of a large manufacturing business, was adamant 
that such bodies had simply been unable to ‘get down to the real “grass roots” of 
industry’.179 Nowhere was this more obvious than in the government’s use of 
investment controls. Indeed, although steel and building licences had emerged as 
strategic powers during the post-1947 re-organisation, it is quite clear that these were 
never co-ordinated with the activities of bodies like the EIU. On the contrary, the 
Investment Programmes Committee (IPC) remained entirely closed and its very 
existence kept secret from most MPs and local authorities.
180
 Thus, although the 
Treasury had attempted to discount M-O’s findings about its approach, it could well 
be argued that their conclusion that ‘any group’s public relations reflect its whole 
basic attitude of mind to the public with whom it is concerned’ was indeed valid.181 
There was, according to PEP, an obvious ‘danger that public relations may be 
regarded [simply] as a means of humouring and persuading a rather stupid 
populace’.182 
 
Whilst his treatment of democratic planning is less confident than his analysis of 
Labour’s fractious relationship with the press, Moore has traced this shift from 
idealistic public engagement to pragmatic exhortation in more detail than space here 
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permits. It is, though, worth mentioning a couple of points. The first is slightly 
paradoxical in that it regards the extent to which this shift was influenced by the very 
same theories that were treated with so much suspicion when one considers the use 
of public opinion polling. But, as shown by Moore, the selective use of such surveys 
sat alongside a less obvious infusion of behavioural theories introduced by men like 
Leslie. His past life as a lecturer in psychology was, in fact, matched by Pimlott’s 
enthusiastic interest in American information management techniques and Williams’ 
academic concern about the tripartite relationship between the public, Parliament and 
the press. Such interests, which even saw Pimlott undertake a year’s funded 
sabbatical in New York, brought the EIU into close contact with the writings of 
Wallas and Lippmann and ensured that they understood the potential power of 
emotionally targeted appeals.
183
 Yet, to move to the second point, this was not 
enough to avoid criticism. Instead, the partial adoption of such techniques merely fed 
into a growing malaise amongst Labour’s rank-and-file. Speaking in Margate at the 
party’s 1947 Annual Conference, for example, the delegate for Hampstead moved a 
resolution criticising the ‘Work or Want’ campaign for its overreliance on 
exhortation, or, as he saw it, ‘posters, pep-talks and propaganda’.184 The difference 
between this and real democratic planning, noted the increasingly critical Harold 
Laski, was that the relationship had been one-way and that planning was ‘not likely 
to be attained in a society where the citizen does not feel an interest in the 
process’.185 His claim that Labour’s public relations were ‘the worst in modern 
times’ was a little unfair, but, given that the broader proposition was restated so 
strongly by the likes of Young, Albu and Gordon Walker, he may have had a point. 
 
* 
 
Though the Conservative Party sought to capitalise on this ‘them and us’ mentality, 
its  thoughts were just as complicated and displayed many of the same tensions. The 
fact that the party’s ‘two way movement’ almost never began because Clarke feared 
that it would necessitate a costly questionnaire and dismissed its principle advocate 
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as ‘a rather awkward individual’ set the tone rather nicely.186 Indeed, even with the 
party’s experience of running political education schemes, it was never able to fully 
define how its ‘voluntary and virile partnership’ would work in practice and 
questions over the cost were never too far away.
187
 Such comments were paired with 
a view of the electorate which was, if anything, more disparaging than that outlined 
above. For example, during the attempt to reach out to working class voters in 1947, 
it was noted that greater representation would be difficult as ‘any wage earner who is 
capable of being a Member of Parliament will probably be something other than a 
wage earner’.188 The proposed author of the aborted second popular version of the 
Charter was even more scathing, claiming that it was ‘literally impossible to be both 
brief and intelligible to Demos’.189 Though seemingly unaware of the on-going 
attempt at redrafting, this view was reiterated by Heathcoat-Amery, who drolly 
suggested the party should take ‘a second shot at a very simple edition in words of 
one syllable … for direct consumption’.190 Although one would be forgiven for 
thinking that the party’s attempts to reach out to the business community would be 
slightly less fraught, such complications were by no means limited to the relationship 
with wage earners. Instead, the ill-timed leak of one of the CIPC’s drafts left Harold 
Macmillan and Hutchinson facing a barrage of criticism from industrialists in 
Newcastle as they were accused of treating the consultation process as ‘pure eye 
wash’.191 Jay’s ‘Gentleman in Whitehall’ may have been subjected to a vigorous 
critique, but in such cases it is obvious that political elites were still seen to know 
best. 
 
It was this attitude that Woolton sought to break after his party’s disappointment in 
the 1950 General Election. Motivated by a belief that the Conservatives had 
struggled to shed their sectional identity, and building upon Chapman Walker’s 
earlier warning that their message would only succeed if ‘matter’ was co-ordinated 
with ‘instrument’, he stressed that ‘no amount of organisation or propaganda can 
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achieve [our] objects unless there is a genuine enthusiasm for them among all 
sections of the party’.192 Woolton understood that this was ‘a long-term problem’ and 
that it could not ‘be solved by short-term expedients’. Yet, as with the Publicity 
Department’s campaign to make controls a political issue, his appeal was also 
motivated by an obvious political imperative and did little to alter a very blunt 
conception of the electorate. Indeed, such attitudes were arguably more pronounced 
during the highly politicised period between February 1950 and October 1951. 
Clarke, for example, was forced to admit in September 1950 that the Public Opinion 
Research Department (PORD) had lost much of its early objectivity and no longer 
seemed to appreciate the intricacy of its work.
193
 This continued after 1951 with the 
PORD winding down its activities during 1952 and policy makers continuing to draw 
a distinction between ‘classes’ and the ‘masses’. Somewhat surreally, Woolton 
received a personal note of caution on this issue in 1953 from the amateur historian 
and motor-racing enthusiast Prince Chula Chakrabongse of Thailand. Chakrabongse, 
who lived in England with his wife Elizabeth, noted that a poster slogan reading 
‘Things are a lot better under the Torys’ seemed to contradict the party’s desire to 
liberate the public from governmental interference. As he noted: 
 
I feel that the British people do not like to think that they are under anyone. 
Why not the slogan “Things are a lot better with the Torys”?194  
 
The difference in wording may have been minimal, but in terms of meaning the gulf 
was much wider. 
 
Chakrabongse’s letter to Woolton may be a fairly peculiar source, but its message 
requires careful attention. Indeed, for all of the libertarian rhetoric expounded during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, the essence of Conservatism remained somewhat 
more complex than the simplistic call to ‘set the people free’. This was not entirely 
surprising. On the contrary, twentieth century Conservatism would always include a 
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blend of paternalistic and libertarian impulses.
195
 The party’s quest for ‘freedom and 
order’ was, as Butler explained, predicated on the fact that ‘a good Tory has never in 
history been afraid of the use of the State’.196 Thus, for Quintin Hogg, there was no 
paradox in the fact that ‘Conservatism remains the traditional party of authority even 
though it has become the defender of liberty’.197 Yet, the exact balance of this 
relationship remained strangely elusive. This was partly the result of Butler and 
Hogg having deliberately played down the importance of ‘isms’ and ideology during 
the course of their rethinking. Nonetheless, the situation was exacerbated by those 
internal debates over state intervention which had, since 1945, left the party facing in 
two directions. Thus, although the party remained strongly libertarian in its rhetoric, 
it has already been seen that many of the least visible controls remained after 1951. 
This ensured that a critique of bureaucratic interference would remain potent.
198
 
Indeed, as Edwin Plowden claimed after stepping down as Chief Planning Officer, 
the government’s opposition to controls was perhaps more a problem with the term 
than the concept.
199
 Thus, looking back from 1957, PEP remained certain that a 
longer term ‘development in both the inclination and capacity of Government to 
carry out tasks which … were [previously] done less comprehensively by others’ had 
continued.
200
 Moreover, according to R.S. Milne, who played upon a British 
stereotype to explain the situation to an American audience, the entire apparatus had 
remained in the hands of a ‘small circle of individuals’ whose informal links were 
often more important in framing their outlook than official exchanges of 
information.
201
 Interestingly, Hayek referenced this continuing ‘fondness for 
authority’ to explain why he was not a Conservative in 1960.202 
 
* 
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In spite of the New Fabians’ efforts, the Labour Party’s reaction to defeat in 1951 
was no more enlightened than had been the Conservatives’ in 1950. Indeed, despite 
Young having re-emphasised that voters wanted to be talked with and not talked at in 
preparation for his party’s election broadcasts, they refused to see the result as a 
popular rejection of their democratically planned vision and were similarly torn 
between a rhetoric of engagement and profound sense of despair at the public’s 
supposed apathy.
203
 Following Young’s resignation, this was accompanied by an 
even greater unwillingness to engage with opinion research and ensured that political 
engagement remained understood in terms of presentation rather than content (the 
decision to finally commission a bespoke survey from Abrams in 1956 was only 
taken when it became clear that the Conservative Party were making full use of such 
techniques).
204
 On a more abstract level, it can be seen that both parties were 
continuing to operate within a shared framework of governance shaped by a 
Burkeian ideal of paternalistic authority and the intellectualist assumptions critiqued 
by Wallas’ Human Nature in Politics.205 It should not be forgotten that Gordon 
Walker’s vision still hoped to promote certain behaviour so as to create a better 
society; his idea of liberal public relations was to help ‘clarify and disabuse 
[people’s] minds’ rather than to open up the creation of policies.206 These were 
almost inevitable difficulties. After all, any political system, and especially a 
democratic one, necessarily interposes a ‘stage between the citizen and the 
administration’.207 Nonetheless, the contradiction between a strong central state and a 
dispersal of powers within society proved to be just as fundamental a problem for 
Labour as it was for their primary opponents. The apparent similarity between these 
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beliefs questions the efficacy of ever applying a rigid ideological framework to 
determine attitudes towards controls. To amend a quote from Wootton, ‘traditional 
battle cries no longer make sense in a world where so many people are … fighting on 
several sides at once’.208 
 
The situation certainly complicated the relationship between controls and freedom 
that was so central to the last chapter. In fact, with the notable exception of Wootton, 
who had been meticulously careful to delineate between concrete and abstract 
freedoms, it has been shown that the nature of this debate was far from as simple as 
the protagonists hoped. Instead, echoing W.H. Greenleaf’s vast The British Political 
Tradition, it was one that involved ‘shades of difference’ between collectivist and 
libertarian approaches with both parties drawing upon an unstable mixture of the 
two.
209
 If this was not complicated enough, the parameters within which it was 
framed can be seen to have distracted from a deeper discussion regarding the act of 
control, whilst concurrently setting up a further tension between positive and 
negative ideas of freedom.
210
 Indeed, whilst maintaining that the debate over controls 
involved the former, both Labour and the Conservatives played out their differences 
in terms of the latter: with controls as either the arbiters of ‘freedom from want’ or 
relaxation as a ‘freedom from interference’. In neither case was freedom conceived 
as the positive choice envisaged by the likes of Albu, Young or Law. This, combined 
with the rather uncomfortable dependence upon deliberate obscurity, not to mention 
the fact that its economic foundations were often less than secure, ensured that the 
rhetorical difference between a democratically planned ‘socialist commonwealth’ 
and ‘setting the people free’ was rather more opaque than it first appeared. Both 
were, in the words of an admittedly sceptical David Worswick, aspects of an overtly 
political dispute that was being played out within a ‘thickly wooded region’ where 
the ‘frontier itself was hard to discern’.211 It was no wonder then that Roy Harrod had 
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thought the public would be left mystified when he reviewed Ordeal by Planning in 
1948.
212
 
 
As an inexorable part of the process by which the controls debate had been 
constructed, this need not have mattered to either party if the issue had delivered 
votes. But, as shown at the outset of this chapter, this was not necessarily the case. 
Rather, the nature of the debate helped to underpin the very disengagement that it 
had aimed to surmount. It is, indeed, something of an irony that Utopian hopes for a 
politically engaged and self-aware citizenship, one that would negate the need for 
detailed state control, were partly dashed by a political debate over restrictions that 
all sides hoped to remove. Yet, dependent upon a constructed version of its subject 
that bore little relation to reality, the democratic need for differentiation hindered 
engagement by enforcing a level of confusion and impressing a falsely dichotomous 
argument upon an electorate that remained disillusioned with overt partisanship.
213
 
Their disillusion was particularly felt with regard to negative campaigns – like those 
surrounding controls – that were adept at fostering cynicism, but had less success in 
building support. Indeed, when set against continued domestic economic woes and 
the increasingly uncertain geo-political situation, political point scoring appeared, in 
the words of an anonymous floating voter from Keighley, to be little more than a 
‘silly game’.214 The controls debate that dominated the early 1950s was, then, really 
not greatly different from the ‘political slanging match’ criticised by John Martin and 
The Economist in advance of 1945. In fact, it arguably worsened the ‘feeling against 
all parties’ that M-O had warned the Conservatives about in 1947.215 That this should 
have been the case – despite Martin’s insistence that it was based on ‘muddled 
thinking’ – can be traced back to a serious misrepresentation of the public’s mood.216 
One in which their focus upon issues of a more everyday nature was interpreted as 
political indifference rather than a differing political interest. The political elite had, 
as suggested by M-O, failed to distinguish between apathy and cynicism. They had 
effectively dismissed the fact that fifteen million people were regularly classified by 
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pollsters as ‘Don’t Knows’ as evidence that Britain was ‘rapidly becoming a nation 
of morons’.217 Having taken advantage of a useful uncertainty, both parties had 
found themselves hostage to its inherent contradiction. 
 
-IV- 
 
This chapter has sought to explain why the party-political debate surrounding the use 
of controls remained relatively inconsequential and to analyse the impact that it had 
on attempts to promote a more active popular political engagement. Focused broadly 
on the techniques adopted, it has shown that a great deal of effort went into such 
public relations and has suggested that this ‘information work’ should not be written 
off entirely. In fact, for all of the practical problems, it must be remembered that the 
debate imbued the system with moral significance and ensured that it was played out 
in a very public arena. This is to present a slightly different picture from that which 
has tended to dominate the historiography. Turning back to the notion of a retreat 
from planning, it is to suggest that the emphasis on economic public relations did not 
represent a change in approach, but was symbolic of a desire to replace direct 
restrictions with a democratic framework of public controls. Thus, whilst Richard 
Toye has decried the Attlee government’s ‘language of exhortation’ as evidence of a 
failure to enforce any permanent powers, this chapter has argued that it was perhaps 
more worrying that such language represented a failure to engage.
218
 The attention 
paid to the translation of policy was certainly noteworthy, with enthusiasts like 
Cripps insistent that ‘you can encourage, persuade and inspire but you cannot 
compel’.219 However, a combination of practical failings and deeper inconsistencies 
ensured that even the most well-known efforts, like Wilson’s Bonfires and the 
Conservative Party’s ‘Trust the People Exhibition’, remained primarily one way 
affairs. 
 
Returning to the party-political contest sketched out in Chapter Four, it has also been 
shown that the debate over controls and ‘freedom’ was similarly misleading. It was, 
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extending beyond Greenleaf’s picture, an attempt to draw distinctions in murky 
water about an ill-defined topic that was imperfectly understood and included a blend 
of ideas that cut across traditional boundaries. This might have been approached 
from a controls-based perspective, but it is clear that the issues raised have broader 
implications. Indeed, they hint at a fundamental paradox surrounding an ideal of 
public rationality around which it was possible to construct a political debate but to 
which neither party seemed wholly committed. Although echoing the ‘New Political 
Historians’ mentioned earlier, this conclusion is not exactly novel – with the 
complications of political representation had been of notable interest to a mid-
twentieth century political class grounded in the work of Wallas and aware of the 
often artificial nature of their actions.
220
 PEP, for instance, a group which embodied 
this tension and whose wide-ranging survey of active democracy led to a 
consideration of turnout at local elections, were just as adamant that politics was 
defined by its very ‘theyness’ as has been more recent generations of 
commentators.
221
 Drawing upon such findings, it is argued here that the controls 
debate was undermined by a cycle of artificiality, disengagement and exhortation 
that was only worsened by an unattainable rhetoric of partnership and the practical 
difficulties facing those who sought to translate it to the general public. 
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Conclusion 
The Political Economy of Controls 
 
When I first started this examination, I was bewildered. There were so many 
different kinds of control; there were so many different reasons for maintaining 
a control; and many of the measures which I should have called a control were 
not regarded as such by those who operated them. I hope I have covered all 
the controls properly within my remit; but even now I cannot be absolutely 
and completely certain that some control measures have not escaped 
examination. 
  
TNA, T 230/319, Lawrence P.B. Merriam, ‘Final Report to the President on the 
Examination of Controls’, 23 Feb 1950, p. 1. 
 
 
When asked about the process he had taken during the course of the Board of Trade’s 
investigation into controls in 1949, a confident Lawrence Merriam noted that he ‘had 
not presumed to become more expert than the experts’. Instead, he had ‘merely 
sought to discover what measures of control [were] exercised, and whether they 
[were] still necessary’.1 This study, which has sought to determine the political 
economy of those industrial controls employed by the state in the decade after 1945, 
began with a similar set of questions. As Merriam would later realise, however, such 
questions can only provide a limited introduction to a subject that is more complex 
than it first seems.
2
 Sketching out developments before 1945, it has been shown that 
a highly personal system of control, one which rested upon the decisions taken by 
individual Controls with a capital ‘C’, was able to exert a degree of influence over 
the flow of resources but struggled to co-ordinate these efforts. Indeed, having grown 
piecemeal to meet specific needs, the system remained focused primarily on the 
short-term and perhaps should not be viewed as a single system at all. Nonetheless, 
incorporated into existing ideas, its structure was used to provide the physical 
framework that would underpin attempts to plan the economy after 1945. This 
process was far from simple and, having traced post-war attempts to rationalise the 
system, it has been demonstrated that the relationship between planning and controls 
would remain beset by uncertainty. With early hopes that the vast wartime apparatus 
could be scaled back to a small number of strategic powers being dashed by the very 
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nature of the system, the aspiration that these efforts would be supported by a 
spontaneous form of enlightened public control proved even harder to attain. Instead, 
returning to the rhetorical linkage which had overplayed their economic significance, 
the word ‘controls’ became charged with political emotion. How, then, can one 
describe the political economy of such measures? 
 
* 
 
If one were to adopt a primarily economic perspective, the history of controls is one 
of compromise. Operating on a number of levels and without any uniform design, the 
pragmatic development of the system in 1945, and again after 1947, remained bound 
by the experience of war and a framework that had first been established by the 1939 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. Moreover, despite all of the Hayekian criticism 
about the consequences of this intervention, it must be remembered that it simply 
failed to offer much practical guidance. This point was widely recognised. Having 
turned to a former Board of Trade civil servant called James Douglas for advice in 
advance of the 1951 General Election, for example, the Conservative Research 
Department (CRD) was informed that controls were a fascinatingly complicated 
subject. Indeed, offering his own description of the system, alongside a reading list 
that aimed to provide details of those controls that it would be possible to remove, 
Douglas warned that: 
 
In simplifying, as I have done, one is bound to give chaos a semblance of 
order which it does not really possess…there are loose ends all over the place 
on which everybody, industrialists, officials, politicians, can clutch and tie 
the whole thing into knots.
3
 
 
Although it has not been possible to answer every question that this has raised, the 
preceding chapters have sought to examine this chaos by deconstructing the issue of 
planning to consider the controls themselves. In recreating aspects of this complex 
reality, they have sought to show that the system’s failings were not simply of an 
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intellectual nature.
4
 They were, as Douglas recognised, merely part of a realisation of 
how difficult it was to puts ideas into practice. 
 
Whilst this study has primarily focused upon questions of application, the ideological 
significance attributed to controls in the years after 1942 must be acknowledged. The 
belief – illusory, or otherwise – that industrial controls provided a suitable 
mechanism for longer term intervention remains the key to any understanding of the 
emotion with which they were debated during the long transition period. Indeed, no 
matter what the administrative reality, the conviction that these measures constituted 
a system when taken as a whole (like those related fears that planning would 
undermine personal liberty) cannot be overlooked. To do so would be to construct a 
version of history as artificially clean as that about which Douglas warned. Even so, 
to have ignored the paradoxes surrounding this perceived significance would have 
been equally anachronistic. It is for this reason that the linkage between direct 
controls and planning, whether from a theoretical or practical standpoint, has been 
questioned throughout. In fact, rather than accepting their significance as a given, 
this thesis has sought to better understand the process by which it was constructed. 
Avoiding a declinist narrative of retreat, it has shown that the history of controls was 
not one of impotence, but of an active socio-political construction. This has not been 
to argue for a wholesale change in our understanding of such measures. Instead, by 
expanding the parameters of existing research and combining the administrative and 
political history of the apparatus, the intention has been to offer an alternative 
perspective from which to approach a subject that remains well-referenced yet poorly 
understood. 
 
* 
 
Having explored the intricacies of this process, it would be incredibly misleading to 
claim that the politicisation of controls was a deliberate outcome. Nevertheless, it 
was certainly the result of a deliberate process. To return, for instance, to autumn 
1944, it is clear that the increasingly fraught debates sketched out in Chapter Four 
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had their genesis in decisions taken amongst a political elite. Indeed, despite all sides 
being agreed to a dual policy of selective retention and gradual relaxation, controls 
continued to be used as rhetorical symbols in a more fundamental debate. This, John 
Martin had stressed to Winston Churchill, was ‘founded upon a lack of precise 
definition’ that made it almost inevitable that any such debate would remain 
inconclusive.
5
 For Martin, who had been involved in drafting the overtly practical 
statement used to diffuse Cabinet tensions, this was evidence that controls were a 
political issue that should be avoided at all costs. Churchill, however, like his Labour 
Party opponents, was astute enough to realise that an issue without resolution was an 
issue nevertheless. Moreover, when tied into broader themes, it was one that could 
link practical policies with idealistic beliefs. Drawing upon familiar debates 
regarding the proper role of the state, industrial controls provided both sides of this 
discussion with a simplistic narrative through which they could make sense of an 
increasingly complex set of questions. An exaggerated version of reality, it did not 
even matter that such instruments were almost impossible to define, so long as they 
remained synonymous with their illusion; the system’s very intangibility had allowed 
for a catch-all campaign. 
 
The heat of the 1945 General Election campaign did dissipate in the months after 
Churchill’s infamous Gestapo speech. The controls debate, like any other, enjoyed 
peaks and troughs during its decade of existence. Importantly, though, despite being 
somewhat overshadowed by optimistic schemes for planned economic progress, the 
questions raised continued to excite attention amongst those industrialists and former 
specialists who had witnessed the system at first hand. Their discussions, carried out 
in university seminars, learned journals and the broadsheet press, made possible the 
popular political rekindling of this debate in subsequent years. That this should have 
been the case can be attributed to the nature of the long transition itself. Indeed, 
whilst it is maintained that the economic challenge of reconversion cut across 
established political boundaries, it is clear that the crises of 1947 helped such 
critiques to resonate in a far more practical setting. It is, of course, something of an 
irony that the fuel and convertibility crises should have entrenched a constructed 
relationship between planning and controls. After all, with failings within the 
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apparatus exposed, it was at this point that a serious process of rethinking would 
begin. Nonetheless, with the main protagonists facing the same economic realities 
and sharing a commitment to the framework set out by the 1944 White Paper on 
Employment Policy, their rhetorical linkage was again used to provide a point of 
political differentiation. Moreover, in something of a contrast to 1945, this linkage 
was able to successfully weave fundamental questions about liberty back into the 
economic worries, administrative failings and mundane grumbles from which they 
had originated. This is not to argue for a blunt all-party consensus, but it is to 
emphasise that such debates were rather more complicated than they first appeared. 
 
* 
 
Despite this thesis being roughly split into two parts, a decision that was taken for the 
sake of clarity, the political and economic questions raised by controls should not be 
viewed in isolation. Reliant upon successful co-operation with private industry, with 
authority delegated between a variety of departments and with most power exercised 
at a local level by quasi-governmental bodies drawn out of former Trade 
Associations, the system was as dependent upon personal relationships and the belief 
that it provided control as it was on any firm economic standing. Moreover, having 
argued that ‘information work’ and exhortation were regarded by some to be as 
important a mechanism as the licensing of industry was to others, these 
administrative politics were also matched by more popular political imperatives. The 
idea that physical restrictions could be replaced by a self-regulating public was 
perhaps more than a little naïve. Nonetheless, though an overlooked aspect of the 
planning debate, it remains evidence of both continued intellectual interest and a 
shared understanding of planning as a deliberative process of decision making. With 
this in mind, economic priorities were, as both Richard Law and Aneurin Bevan 
argued, inherently political entities.
6
 However, as demonstrated by the popular 
political debate to which both contributed, this relationship was not linear. On the 
one hand, it was complicated by continued misunderstandings, on the other, by the 
context within which it took place. Individual politicians may have been crucial 
actors in the formation and dissemination of ideas, but they were not acting in a 
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vacuum. Instead, forced to reconcile competing tensions whilst maintaining a level of 
support, the links between the political and economic debate were interactive and 
interconnected, even if the public remained ostensibly disengaged from it. 
 
It is often claimed that the Conservatives benefitted the most from this intermingling 
of political, economic and moral arguments. The politics of controls, in so far as they 
have been assessed, have tended to be viewed in relation to Churchill’s call to ‘set 
the people free’ and popular discontent with austerity.7 After probing these links, 
however, the situation has been revealed as slightly more complex. The debate over 
controls and freedom was certainly regarded as a useful one by Conservative Party 
strategists. A ploy to attract wavering Liberal support, it avoided the difficulty of 
having to reconcile a language of planning with a libertarian critique and offered a 
coherence that had been missing within the Industrial Charter. It was, in short, a 
message that made sense. Yet, for all of these successes, Churchill’s cry had not 
removed inherent tensions of an official party policy that sought to balance ‘freedom 
and order’. It was for this reason that the Conservatives found themselves unable to 
take more radical action whilst in office. It must also be remembered that the Labour 
Party had helped to shape the parameters of this debate by arguing in 1945 that 
controls would be the guarantors of peacetime progress. A point of agreement within 
internal debates, this faith in planning, if not in controls as currently defined, was 
evident throughout the course of the long transition and ensured that the muddling of 
each continued well into the 1950s. Most importantly, though, it must be reiterated 
that these debates were centred upon a system that neither party had chosen. The 
controls at stake were, after all, the product of a strategic compromise between 
individual industrialists, Trade Associations, officials and governmental advisors that 
had only been finally agreed in the fevered summer of 1939. Seeking to protect their 
interests, the likes of Oliver Lyttelton had certainly not been trying to construct an 
apparatus that would revolutionise the relationship between government and industry 
in the long term. 
 
* 
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This situation had initially perplexed Ely Devons, whose earliest academic work 
sought to distinguish between the real and remembered practice of the wartime 
system. Having already warned against the ‘naïve perfectionism’ of established 
economic writing, his Planning in Practice can be seen as the culmination of these 
attempts.
8
 Loosely organised as a set of essays on different aspects of the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production (MAP)’s planning apparatus, the text implicitly explored the 
relationship between theory and practice by detailing the experience gained during 
six years of total war. Yet, focused on Whitehall and somewhat neglecting 
departmental relationships with individual Controls, even Devons admitted that his 
treatment of these activities as a system had ‘inevitably over-simplified’ the 
situation.
9
 Drafted during the years 1947-50, the importance of Planning in Practice 
arguably lies in its re-assertion of irrationality at a time of intense rhetorical debate. 
Indeed, although the text would only ever sell 1 200 copies, its reflective tone 
arguably helped to shift the economic debate surrounding planning (rejecting the 
mechanistic accounts associated with Joel Hurstfield and Michael Postan’s official 
histories whilst refusing to be drawn into an abstract debate about liberty).
10
 For 
Devons, this would reach its apex when invited to give the UCL Newmarch Lectures 
in spring 1954 and the Valedictory Address to a conference hosted by the Merrill 
Center of Economics that summer. It was during these light-hearted talks, which 
marked the start of a shift in focus towards a philosophy of statistics, that Devons 
would assert his belief in magic by maintaining that economics were best viewed as a 
series of political arguments taking place within an immeasurable ‘zone of 
uncertainty’.11 In drawing upon what he would eventually call the ‘social 
anthropology of political economy’, this thesis has sought to expand upon Devons’ 
ideas by applying his later reflections to the practical issued explored towards the 
beginning of his career. In doing so, it has suggested that the very nature of 
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planning’s myth ensured that both Labour and the Conservatives found it easier to 
debate abstractions than to rationalise their practice. 
 
Given that many of Devons’ arguments were so simple that they tended to be 
overlooked, it is fitting that this conclusion should end with a suggestion that the 
failings identified by Merriam and others can be explained by the success of the 
myths that came to surround the system. Indeed, having shown that the economy was 
being managed, but that this was neither a dramatic nor a simple process, it is clear 
that any claim that controls provided control obscured an obvious tension.
12
 Yet, 
with both sides of the debate reliant upon this rhetorical linkage, the construction of 
controls as a political issue can be seen to have rested upon an artificially rational 
version of reality wherein a commitment to intervene was equated to a belief that 
such intervention was possible. Furthered by a scientific language of priorities and 
claims that the success or failure of planning was little more than a matter of political 
choice, it is argued that this process imbued the debate’s proponents with an 
unobtainable illusion of agency. Thus, with their respective appeals predicated on a 
belief that it was possible to act (either to rationalise the system whilst maintaining 
overall control, or to use decontrol as a means of expanding freedom), both sides 
faced the difficulty of having to fall short of their self-imposed expectations.
13
 
Moreover, reliant upon rhetoric and simple dichotomies, it has already been argued 
that the transformation of a primitive magic into an official orthodoxy merely 
alienated many voters by reinforcing barriers between themselves and policy 
formers. Perhaps an unavoidable result of the reliance upon an otherwise useful 
uncertainty, it was this that ensured the post-war system’s history would remain 
defined in terms of a retreat. 
 
Although their myth was unsustainable, this is not to argue that controls are 
unimportant. If this were so, then their history would have been a rather frustrating 
one. Instead, this study has sought to emphasise their importance as sites of political 
interaction and manoeuvre. By examining the complex interrelationship between 
theoretical ideas, administrative practice, high politics, public relations and public 
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opinion, it has suggested that they can perhaps be viewed as a lens through which to 
analyse wider debates. Indeed, if understood as one part of a broader history of the 
state – a history which can be defined in terms of both expansion and a gradual 
undermining of authority – controls may, to paraphrase Stephen Brooke, be regarded 
as the building blocks of an often uncertain post-war political economy.
14
 Most 
importantly, however, in tracing their complex development across the long 
transition period, it has also emphasised the need for historians to engage with 
uncertainty, muddle and misunderstanding. If this study has achieved anything, 
hopefully it is this. 
                                                 
14
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